By Anton Evstratov
Armenia, regardless of the outcome of the internal political struggle in the country, and who will be in power, will be pro-Russian and a relatively reliable partner in the EAEU (Eurasian Economic Union) and CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization).
The armistice declaration in Nagorno-Karabakh, signed on November 9 by Nikol Pashinyan, Ilham Aliyev and Vladimir Putin, is unequivocally perceived in Armenia as a surrender. Against the backdrop of the loss of Shushi and Hadrut’s Artsakh Defense Army, as well as the agreed withdrawal of its units from the Karvachar and Lachin regions, and the arrival of Russian peacekeepers in the region, Armenian society has many questions to the government and the political and military leadership of both the Artsakh Republic and Armenia. The armistice document is only a declaration, not an official agreement, and it needs a serious revision. So far, this makes it possible to continue negotiations, reducing both military and emotional tension. In this case, one cannot fail to notice an elegant maneuver by Russian diplomacy.
At the moment, Armenia is in a state of political crisis, as the entire opposition and a significant part of the population are convinced that Nikol Pashinyan’s government must leave. He is accused both of the purely political component of the defeat (for insufficient attention to relations with Russia, inclination towards the West, which has “offended” Moscow and personally President Putin, and for hiding the progress of negotiations on Karabakh and even the text of the final declaration) and military (refusal of general mobilization in Armenia, non-use of two bodies of the Armenian armed forces, stationed in Syunik – on the border with Artsakh, and which never entered the battle, inaccurate information from combat zone, and also useless purchases of Iskander and Su-30CM without rocket part).
At the same time, Pashinyan, who had a significant political position before the war in Karabakh (it was supported by at least 80% of the population), has not completely lost favor with he people, and he still has a considerable number of supporters. The incumbent prime minister is “helped” by the bad reputation of his opponents – now even the many Armenians convinced of the need for Pashinyan to step down are not ready to appoint his successor.
The fact is that the Armenian society as a whole does not want the old authorities (former leaders Robert Kocharian and Serzh Sargsyan) – who are also associated with the unsatisfactory results of the war – to return to power, since they, in power for over 20 years, in fact, have not been able to prepare the republic for modern armed confrontation. Having sufficient time to ensure sustainable economic development, arms purchases relevant to the conditions existing at the time, they did not, limiting themselves to obsolete models, mainly from the Soviet era.
Moreover, relatively little was done in the current military-technical conditions: the second and third lines of defense, as it turned out already during the war, were insufficiently fortified, and in many respects, even the new positions on the first line practically not they were – the Artsakh Defense Army used in numerous cases, even the trenches and benches built during the First Karabakh War in the early 1990s, the settlements were not dug by anti-tank ditches, they were not prepared for battles cities based on the experience of battles in Syria, Iraq or Donbass.
All this, on the one hand, does not give the possibility of a rapid resolution of the Armenian political crisis and, on the other, it outlines a series of candidates for the possible leadership of Armenia in the near future. It is noteworthy that there is no mention of the resignation of the president of Artsakh Arayik Harutyunyan, who is also associated with the unsatisfactory actions of the army units of the republic.
As for the possible candidates for the post of head of Armenia in the near future, one can distinguish:
Nikol Pashinyan – despite the military and political failure in Karabakh, as noted above, he still has a significant number of supporters (according to our preliminary data, his popularity is now just under 40%). Given the low popularity of competitors, he still has a chance to stay in office. If such a scenario is realized, the prime minister will no longer feel free as before, he will be obliged to fulfill all the conditions of the signed truce and to act in close agreement with Russia. The latter, despite the antipathy of its military-political community to Nikol Pashinyan, is not against such a scenario now – after all, only Pashinyan can guarantee 100% fulfillment of the conditions of the Karabakh declaration. In addition, he has already built some principles of relationship, both with Moscow and with other allies (in particular, the CSTO countries, including Kazakhstan) and partners.
The current prime minister is predictable, bound by an agreement and many other levers of Moscow’s influence. His initial orientation towards the West could negatively affect the situation in Armenia and the position of the head of government himself in terms of image, but this is unlikely to change Armenia’s foreign policy in any way. At the same time, Pashinyan’s presence in his post can lead to internal political tensions and even riots – especially against the backdrop of popular unrest in Yerevan in recent days and the sometimes inadequate statements by the prime minister himself (in particular, he urged his supporters from the front to come to Yerevan and resist those who wanted him to leave, which is perceived negatively not only by society, but also by members of the Pashinyan “My Step” block).
Armen Sargsyan is the current president of Armenia. A person who, in general, does not cause negative emotions in anyone. He has close ties, both in Russia and in the West, and in the highest offices. He has a reputation as a strong economist, technocrat and expert in world economic practice. At the same time, Armen Sargsyan has had no real power for the past 2 years, being the president of a parliamentary republic, and even learned of the signing of the ceasefire on November 9, in his own words, only from Facebook. If this statement is true, it hardly testifies in favor of the president and in general of the entire power of Armenia, but it has impressed the society. The figure of Sargsyan is not associated with failures in Karabakh and could theoretically become a technical prime minister. Among the disadvantages of the president, one can note his lack of resolve and charisma, as well as British citizenship, from which Armen Sargsyan refused to give official information, but no one saw the corresponding certificate.
Robert Kocharian is the former president of the Republic of Armenia, the leader of the opposition camp of Pashinyan, which gathers around him the majority of politicians, activists and ordinary citizens dissatisfied with the prime minister. His camp is actively spreading rumors that Kocharyan and other former leaders of Armenia have been removed not only from the leadership, but also from consulting the current leadership, which was one of the reasons for the unsuccessful outcome of the war. Meanwhile, in the eyes of the older generation, Kocharyan seems much more preferable than Pashinyan, because the current prime minister lost the war in Karabakh, and Kocharian, being, in the early 1990s, in fact, the dictator of the not recognized as a republic, he won it. At the same time, there is also a fairly negative attitude towards Robert Kocharian in Armenian society, both for political and economic reasons. The former president of Armenia is accused of bribery and enrichment at the expense of the population, as well as shooting protesters in 2008. Sometimes they recall the fact that it was under Kocharian that Artsakh was withdrawn from negotiations on the Nagorno Settlement in Karabakh in the late 90s. This was done by Robert Kocharian for convenience, since, despite being the president of Armenia, he previously held the post of president of Artsakh, so he knew his needs and was respected by his citizens. At the same time, Kocharian is perhaps among the current Armenian politicians, Vladimir Putin’s best friend and has good relations with most of the leaders of the CSTO and the CIS. He is an experienced diplomat and a successful political and military leader. However, Robert Kocharian has been acting strangely lately – he has simply disappeared from the media sphere – he does not criticize the current government, as he did before, and he does not speak out in support of his opponents. Perhaps Robert Sedrakovich intends to come into play later – as an unexpected, immaculate in the present stage, with a reputable, decisive, authoritarian leader, capable of dealing with the economic crisis, political problems and moral disappointment in the country.
Artur Vanetsyan is a former leader of the National Security Service of Armenia. It was he who detained and sent to prison the corrupt general Manvel Grigoryan, and arrested numerous crime bosses and representatives of the government overthrown by the Velvet Revolution. Then he was accused of treason and working for Russia, and then – fired by Nikol Pashinyan, turning into his relentless opponent. Currently, Vanetsyan leads his own party and is stuck on the basis of the situation by the Dashnaks and the RPA (Republican Party of Armenia) overthrown by the revolution, but he does not intend to keep up with them all the time. Vanetsyan is perceived by many as an effective manager and decisive leader who has good relations with Russia and, therefore, is able to turn the tide in Karabakh – by military or political methods. However, at the moment, Arthur Vanetsyan’s rating is still relatively low and his role in the war in Karabakh (and the detachment he led) is ambiguous and perhaps even needs investigation.
Zhirayr Sefilyan is probably the most popular opposition leader right now. Furthermore, he is an opponent of both current and past authorities, as well as a well-known opponent of Armenia’s pro-Russian orientation. He asks Armenia to withdraw from the UAE and the CSTO, not considering them as effective and advantageous structures for Yerevan. He did not recognize the terms of the armistice in Karabakh. Speak for the continuation of the war – until victory. He has a reputation as a military officer and hero of the First Karabakh War. Crystalline and uncorrupted, his “Sasna Tsrer” party recorded a rapid rise in its rating. If in the parliamentary elections of 2018 they won 1.84% of the votes, now they can count on 5-10%. At the same time, the option to lead Armenia from Sefilyan is illusory, as in this case Armenia will not be able to count on Russia’s support, and at the moment there is no alternative to Russian military and economic projects in the region.
Samvel Babayan is a former secretary of the Artsakh Security Council. Lieutenant General, founder of the Artsakh Defense Army and hero of the First Karabakh War. One of the first to speak openly about the need to urgently end the war and to invite the Russian peacekeepers (the recording of his words directly from the Security Council meeting leaked to the network), acknowledging the dramatic situation at the front. After signing the truce, he refused the title of Hero of Artsakh. He has a reputation as a pro-Russian leader, a talented commander and a staunch politician. At the same time, he is known for his corruption during his tenure as Artsakh Defense Minister (mid-1990s), as well as for his authoritarian methods of leadership and abuse of power. Babayan also served a prison sentence for the attempt on the life of Artsakh President Arkady Ghukasyan. All this does not work in his favor and, in general, his assessment is now insufficient for the leadership of Armenia. Moreover, it is not convenient for both the current government (due to his pro-Russian orientation) and the pre-revolutionary one (it was under this government that he was condemned and then expelled from the country).
Karen Karapetyan is a former pre-revolutionary Armenian prime minister. A top manager of Gazprom and certainly a Russian creature. However, it had a string of economic successes from 2016 to 2018. It was overthrown by the revolution and has had a disastrously low rating ever since. His candidacy has become more or less relevant in parallel with the talks on the need for a qualified and pro-Russian figure from the diaspora to appear as Prime Minister of Armenia. In the debate initiated by the Russian media, Karapetyan fits these definitions, but clearly lacks popularity.
Ruben Vardanyan is a Russian businessman of Armenian origin, billionaire. Co-founder of the humanitarian initiative and the Aurora Prize, as well as promoter of numerous large social, economic and humanitarian projects in Armenia: the international college of Dilijan, the Tatev cable car, etc. He is very popular in Armenia, despite tense relations with Nikol Pashinyan after the “Velvet Revolution” (these relations subsequently improved, but not enough to consider Vardanyan an ally, or friend of the head of government). Vardanyan’s candidacy for the post of Prime Minister of Armenia takes the same name, as in the case of Karapetyan, in connection with the speeches about an effective diaspora manager. In general, his popularity is higher than that of Karapetyan, however Ruben Vardanyan has far less political ties and experience, and therefore, his hypothetical presidency raises very big questions. Moreover, the businessman himself did not explicitly previously state his intention to take part in the political life of Armenia.
Therefore, the power in Armenia, despite its failure in Karabakh, has a chance to remain in office, using Moscow’s unexpected, albeit situational, support and the absence of strong and popular opposition. In this case, Pashinyan’s team will most likely become pro-Russian, being dependent on Russia in everything. It is guaranteed that a number of key members of the government will change, and this change has already begun: Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan has lost his post. In this sense, this option is convenient not only for the Russian Federation, but also for its allies: Armenia will remain in the CSTO, accept all necessary Russian peacekeepers and fulfill its ceasefire obligations.
The most likely leader of Armenia, in the event of a change of power, will be one of the members of the Russian diaspora – the most famous here are the formerly called Karapetyan and Vardanyan, but there are other options as well. In this case, Armenia’s policy will be equally pro-Russian, Eurasian and reliable for the other members of the EAEU and the CSTO. The unblocking of borders in the South Caucasus can be a positive factor for the development of the economies of the regional countries and of the EAUE countries as a whole, but only in the medium term, as the Armenian side will not soon dare to use the potential of the Nakhichevan railway to Iran, according to the terms of the Karabakh truce. Yerevan’s loyalty can be highly valued by Moscow, including for strengthening the position of a loyal leader. This appreciation can be expressed through pressure on Azerbaijan and Turkey with regard to the concessions obtained on Karabakh. In particular, the city of Hadrut, the Karvachar region, or, in the most favorable scenario, the city of Shushi, near which the Russian peacekeepers are already stationed, can be returned to the Armenian side.
Author: Anton Evstratov (Russian historian, publicist and journalist living in Armenia, lecturer at the Department of World History and Foreign Regional Studies at the Russian-Armenian University in Yerevan).
(The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of World Geostrategic Insights)
Image Credit: Stepan Poghesian/Reuters