World Geostrategic Insights interview with Neeraj Singh Manhas on how water policy affects China-India relations.
Neeraj Singh Manhas is the Special Advisor for South Asia at the Parley Policy Initiative, Republic of Korea. He has previously worked as the Director of Research in the Indo-Pacific Consortium at Raisina House, New Delhi. He has authored and edited six books and has various research interests covering India-China border issues, Transboundary Rivers, Water security in South Asia, and Defence studies. His latest edited book, “Analysing the Current Afghan Context,” was published by Routledge (2023).
Q1 – Both China and India have limited hydric resources, compared to their growing need for water. The two countries share a number of rivers that flow through their respective territories, especially the Brahmaputra, Sutlej, and Indus, which are vital to both nations as they provide water for drinking, irrigation, and hydropower. However, China controls the upstream section of all the major rivers that flow into India, and therefore has a significant advantage in managing the water supplies. What is the current situation? Is water sharing still a crucial question in Sino-Indian relations? What are the main issues of friction and discord?
The India-China relationship has been significantly impacted by the border incidents that began with the Doklam in (2017), Galwan Valley in (2020), and mostly recently in Tawang (2022), all of these major events has resulted in trust deficit relations between both the countries over the years, and has also impacted the people who are residing near the Line of Actual Control (LAC). As quoted by Dawn McGregor, “water, war and peace are inextricably linked; it is literally a life-or-death matter. Water can be a “trigger,” “casualty,” or “weapon” of violence.” This situation with water sharing remains a significant and contentious issue with both countries and their bilateral relations. They share three transboundary basins –the Ganges–Brahmaputra–Meghna, the Indus, and the Irrawaddy. Due to the increasing demands for water due to population growth, agricultural needs, and economic development, the shared rivers such as the Brahmaputra, Sutlej, and Indus have become crucial sources of freshwater.
China, controlling the upstream sections of these rivers, holds a strategic advantage in managing water supplies. This upstream dominance has led to concerns in India over potential water diversion or storage projects by China, which has impacted the water flow into downstream regions in India. The primary issues of friction include China’s construction of dams including plans for a large dam just north of the line of control in Medog County, have raised concerns in downstream India, and water diversion projects on the Brahmaputra River, which India fears that will reduce water availability, impact agriculture, and affect livelihoods in its northeastern states. In January 2022, China released a plan to improve the country’s capability to safeguard its water security during the 14th Five-Year Plan period (2021-2025), which was also termed as the “Umbrella Plan” by the report of China Water Risk.
Additionally, the lack of a comprehensive bilateral water-sharing agreement and limited transparency in China’s hydrological data sharing exacerbate mistrust. Despite occasional cooperative measures, such as agreements on hydrological data sharing during the flood season, water sharing continues to be a crucial and unresolved question in India-China relations, contributing to broader geopolitical tensions and necessitating more robust and transparent mechanisms for cooperation and dispute resolution.
Q2 – There are several memoranda of understanding between India and China on water control and sharing, but there is no specific treaty binding the two countries. What are the prospects? Do you think China and India will be able to reach a legal agreement for an equitable sharing of water resources?
India and China’s transboundary water cooperation has faced many difficulties, including historic border disputes and rivalry, mutual mistrust, and a lack of regional frameworks that could act as a springboard for negotiations. Both share transboundary water resources, which are regulated by international law through a set of customary rules, treaties, and non-binding (‘soft-law’) instruments that have evolved over the last century. The key customary laws are encapsulated in two major global water conventions: the 1997 Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses (Watercourses Convention) and the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (Water Convention).
However, neither India nor China, nor many of their neighbouring countries, are signatories to these conventions. Both countries have established various bilateral agreements concerning transboundary waters, including some that cover basins extending beyond their borders. China’s water-sharing agreements are primarily concentrated in the northeast and west regions and often involve non-binding instruments for transboundary waters in the south. Whereas, India has entered into around 20 transboundary water agreements, including several treaties focused on specific hydropower projects. While neither India nor China is a party to the global water conventions, their agreements generally incorporate the fundamental legal principles of transboundary water management.
However, the prospects for a binding treaty on water sharing between India and China face significant challenges but are not entirely out of reach. Both countries have a history of cooperation through various Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) on hydrological data sharing, particularly regarding the Brahmaputra and Sutlej rivers. These MoUs, while beneficial for managing flood risks and ensuring data transparency during critical periods, do not address the broader issues of water allocation and long-term resource management.
An MoU for the provision of hydrological information on the Brahmaputra River during the flood season was signed in 2002 and renewed in 2008, 2013, and 2018. Similarly, an MoU on the Sutlej River was signed in 2004 and updated in 2010 and 2015. Under these MoUs, China sends India real-time data on water levels, discharge, and rainfall from hydrological stations along the two rivers during the flood season (June-October). India uses this data to manage its water supplies better and reduce the risk of flooding. Both MoUs ended in 2023; however, China continues to provide data on the Sutlej River. The two countries are now in the process of renewing their MoUs. However, these agreements are not legally enforceable, and there needs to be a mechanism in place to resolve disputes between the parties. In addition to the MoUs, India and China have established an Expert Level Mechanism (ELM) to address transboundary water issues. The ELM has been meeting on a regular basis since 2006, but it has yet to address any of the two countries’ main disputes.
There are several factors that influence the potential for a comprehensive treaty. First, the geopolitical tensions between the two nations, including border disputes and strategic rivalries, complicate negotiations. Second, China’s upstream position on major rivers gives it a strategic advantage and less immediate incentive to enter a binding agreement that might limit its developmental and infrastructural projects. Conversely, India, being middle riparian and in case of lower riparian to Bangladesh, has a greater need for assurance on uninterrupted water flow, making it more eager for a formal treaty. Third, the internal water management policies and priorities of each country can impact negotiations. China’s ambitious hydropower and water diversion projects, like the South-North Water Transfer Project, conflict with India’s need for consistent water flow for agriculture and drinking purposes.
Q3 – In the absence of a ” willingness” from China to really implement a new water sharing scheme, what could India do to strengthen its water position vis-à-vis China?
In the absence of a willingness from China to implement a new water-sharing scheme, India should strengthen its water position through a combination of diplomatic, technical, and domestic strategies. Diplomatically, India can raise the issue of transboundary water management at international forums such as the United Nations, emphasising the need for cooperative and sustainable water sharing, thereby garnering international support and applying diplomatic pressure on China. Strengthening regional alliances with other South Asian countries that share water resources with China, such as Nepal and Bangladesh, can create a collective bargaining position, amplifying their concerns and demands for equitable water sharing. Additionally, India should continue bilateral dialogues focused on water issues to build trust and incrementally address concerns through regular meetings of joint river commissions to enhance transparency and cooperation.
Technically, India should invest in advanced satellite and ground-based hydrological monitoring systems to independently assess water flow and potential upstream activities by China, providing accurate data crucial for water management and diplomatic negotiations. Developing and upgrading infrastructure such as reservoirs, dams, and canals will help manage water resources more effectively, including enhancing storage capacity to buffer against potential reductions in water flow from upstream. Implementing modern water conservation and irrigation technologies, such as drip irrigation and rainwater harvesting, can optimize water usage in agriculture, significantly reducing water wastage.
Domestically, India should diversify its water sources by developing alternative sources such as groundwater recharge projects and desalination plants to enhance water security. Encouraging community-based water management programs and raising public awareness about water conservation will lead to more sustainable water use at the grassroots level. Policy reforms promoting sustainable use, pollution control, and efficient distribution can strengthen India’s overall water security.
Q4 – How is India addressing its hydropower development strategy in the northeastern Himalayan state of Arunachal Pradesh, and what are the implications of these actions on its relationship with China, particularly in light of China’s claims on the territory and its own infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)? Include details on the investment plans, the role of state governments, and the strategic importance of these projects for both civilian and military purposes.
According to government sources, India intends to invest $1 billion to speed the building of 12 hydropower units in the northeastern Himalayan state of Arunachal Pradesh, potentially raising tensions with China, which claims it as its own territory. This effort is part of a broader strategy by India to assert its sovereignty and strengthen its infrastructure in the sensitive area.
The Indian finance ministry, led by Nirmala Sitharaman, recently sanctioned financial support of up to 7.5 billion rupees ($89.85 million) for each hydropower project in the northeastern area. This strategy is anticipated to benefit northeastern states by allowing them to fund ownership stakes in enterprises they host. Having state governments on board often helps to speed up regulatory approvals, local rehabilitation, and talks to share power with the host state. Moreover, In the last 20 years, India has constructed hydropower facilities with a capacity of fewer than 15 gigawatts. However, the number of new coal and other renewable energy installations is roughly going to be 10 times more than the number of new hydropower projects.
On March 9, 2024, PM Modi inaugurated the foundation stone of the 2,880 MW Dibang Multipurpose Hydropower Project by NHPC Limited in the Lower Dibang Valley district of Arunachal Pradesh. This event took place during the “Viksit Bharat Viksit North East Program” in Itanagar, Arunachal Pradesh. He quoted “the Dibang dam will be India’s highest dam,” emphasising the dedication of both the highest bridge and the highest dam to the Northeast region, and set to generate 11,223 million units of clean and green energy annually, which will be integrated into the Northern Grid. The construction of the project is expected to span 108 months, with a planned commissioning date in February 2032.
The Indian Government maintains Arunachal Pradesh as a vital part of the nation, while China argues it is part of southern Tibet and has opposed numerous Indian infrastructure projects there. Following fears that Beijing may build dams on a stretch of the Brahmaputra River, known in China as the Yarlung Tsangpo, which flows from Tibet through Arunachal Pradesh, the Indian government is promoting projects in the eastern area. India is worried that Chinese initiatives in the area may cause flash floods or water shortages. However, the construction of power plants is also a response to China’s extensive infrastructure projects in its own claimed territories and neighbouring countries under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). India seeks to counterbalance China’s influence and ensure that its own interests are safeguarded. Moreover, the infrastructure projects, including power plants, often have dual uses, serving both civilian populations and military needs. Enhanced infrastructure can support the deployment and logistics of Indian armed forces stationed in these disputed regions, which will state that New Delhi will not compromise on the territorial integrity part.
India’s efforts to build power plants in contested regions underscore the complex and multifaceted nature of its relationship with China. These actions are part of a larger strategy to assert territorial integrity, enhance energy security, and maintain a balance of power in the region.
Neeraj Singh Manhas – Special Advisor for South Asia at the Parley Policy Initiative, Republic of Korea. His writings has been published by renowned institutions such as the Institute for Security & Development Policy, (ISDP) in Sweden, the Pacific Forum in Hawaii, the Lowy Institute in Australia, the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore, the Jamestown Foundation in Washington DC, the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), the Centre for the Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS), and other online platforms. He is a regular commentator on water security and transboundary river issues in South Asia. He tweets on X (formerly Twitter) @The_China_Chap.