By Alfredo Toro Hardy
On May 16 of this year, Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping signed a 7,000 words-long joint statement.
In it, they agreed to deepen their “strategic partnership”, taking it to a “new era”, while scolding the United States for representing a threat to their countries and to the existing world strategic balance. (Reuters, 2024).
This represented the 43rd meeting between both chiefs of state and delved upon the Joint Statement of their February 2022 meeting, on the sidelines of the Beijing Winter Olympics. The 5,000-word document signed, on that occasion, stated that “the friendship between the two States has no limits” and that there were not “forbidden areas” of cooperation between them. (Saxena, 2024).
Referring to the 2022 joint statement, David E, Sanger wrote: “The two dictators (…) released a five-thousand-word document that suggested the two longtime rivals were forming a true alliance (…) A new China-Russia condominium had the potential to be the most consequential change in the geopolitical landscape in decades. If it succeeded -even if it was only a partial success- it would create an alternative axis of power unlike any that existed in the Cold War (…) ‘It’s a strong partnership’, Bill Burns told me later, choosing his words carefully, ‘that is born of a shared interest in chipping away at an American-led international order’” (Sanger, 2024, pp. 224,226).
Geopolitical and Economic Realignment
The deepening of bilateral ties between these two countries, is accompanied by a joint push towards an anti-Western global realignment. Such realignment is both geopolitical and economic. The former is taking shape through what has been called a “revisionist axis”. An axis where these two superpowers represent the first tier, Iran, North Korea or Belorussia the second, and countries such as Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua or Myanmar, the third tier. This emerging block presents itself as a competing center of geopolitical gravity, where countries dissatisfied with the American led international order can turn to.
The economic realignment, on its part, takes shape through non-Western multilateral institutions such as the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Conscious that economy and not geopolitics becomes the best way to enlist in their anti-American aims a reluctant Global South -who relishes its autonomy of action- they have emphasized these two organizations. In Bonny Lin words: “But the most promising venues are BRICS and the SCO, established to exclude the developed West and anchor joint Chinese-Russian efforts to reshape the international system. Both are set for expansion – in terms of scope, membership, and other partnerships. They are the primary means for China and Russia to create a web of influence that increasingly ties strategically important countries to both powers”. (Lin, 2023). It is doubtful, though, that two consensus operated organizations, of which India is also part, would easily bend to Chinese-Russian efforts to “reshape the international system” in their own terms. However, by weakening the dollar as the world’s leader currency much can be accomplished in the attainment of their ends.
Mao Zedong and Russia
Independently of the degree of success that the alliance between these two countries might obtain, the evolution of their convergence process deserves close attention. Especially so, as it was preceded by divergences that almost led to an armed conflict between them. Although Mao Zedong and Stalin had gotten along reasonably well, the dream of a great socialist alliance between China and the Soviet Union was shattered upon the Soviet leader’s demise. Nikita Khrushchev’s arrival to power and his denunciation of Stalin’s rule, put an end to the closeness between both countries. Henceforward, nationalism in the two nations took precedence over their common ideology, and their relationship began to sour with every passing year.
So much so, that in 1964 Mao warned, “We cannot only pay attention to the East [the United States] and not to the North, only pay attention to imperialism and not revisionism, we must prepare for war on both sides”. (Sanger, 2024, p. 229). Actually, Beijing picked fights with the USSR and the U.S. at the same time, under the assumption that the main concern of both superpowers was each other and that the defeat of China would throw their rivalry out of balance. (Gaddis, 2005, pp. 109, 110).
Approaching the Less Threatening Barbarian
By the summer of 1969, however, the clashes between the USSR and China around the Ussuri river seemed to signal an impending war between them. Soviet troops along the Chinese borders had reached 42 divisions, which represented more than one million soldiers. The possibility of a Russian preemptive attack looked so imminent that, in October of that year, Mao ordered the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership to disperse across the country, while putting China’s small nuclear forces in state of alert. It was upon this background that in an interview with American journalist Edgar Snow, in October of 1970, Mao stated that President Nixon would be welcome to visit China and that a dialogue between them would be the best way to solve the problems among their countries. In doing so, Mao followed the ancient Chinese formula of negotiating with faraway barbarians while confronting those nearby. (Toro Hardy, 2020, pp. 17, 18).
Hence, after more than two decades of bitter quarrel between the Chinese and the Americans, Richard Nixon arrived in Beijing in February of 1972. As a result of their agreement, as Henry Kissinger explained: “From then on, Beijing no longer sought to constrain or check the projection of American power in the region (…) Instead, China’s avowed goal became to enlist the United States as a counterweight to the ‘polar bear’ by means of strategic design”. (Kissinger, 2012, p. 279).
However, once the common Soviet threat disappeared at the beginning of the 1990s, both Beijing and Washington continued its strategic partnership. Once again, Kissinger explained the reasons: “Both the United States and China were edging away from the previous alignment in which they saw themselves as strategic partners facing a common existential threat.
Now (…) China and the United States and China were in effect partners of convenience on selected issues in which their interests aligned”. (Kissinger, 2012, p. 394). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States also maintained a close relationship with the emerging Russian State. The same, though, began to sour after a few years, which prompted Moscow to approach Beijing, with which it had maintained a far-flung relationship.
Disregarding Moscow’s Geopolitical Sensibilities
To understand the reasons why Russia began leaning towards China, when in the aftermath of the URSS’ collapse it had done so towards Washington, requires some historic background.
One of the most painful moments faced by Gorbachev after the dissolution of the Soviet’s Eastern and Central European block, came with Germany’s reunification in 1990. This implied Moscow’s acceptance of a reunified Germany within NATO. To make this bitter concoction more palatable, the U.S. “promised, in the words of Secretary of State James Baker, that ‘there would be no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction one inch to the east’ – a commitment later repudiated by Bill Clinton’s administration”. (Gaddis, 2005, p. 2015). This, under the argument that such promise had been made to the Soviet Union, a country that no longer existed.
By successive stages, hence, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latonia, Lithuania, Rumania, Croatia, Albania, Montenegro and Northern Macedonia, would all be incorporated into NATO. Russia’s traditional sphere of influence became, as a result, a hostile territory for it.
On top, Belgrade’s bombardment and Serbia’s occupation by NATO forces, in addition to the West’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence, all at countercurrent to Moscow’s strong objections, kept adding up. And then came “American and European material and symbolic support for ‘Color Revolutions’ (…) in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan”. (Cooley and Nexon, 2020, p. 52). That is, in Russia’s backyard.
To add injury to insult, The United Nations’ Security Council, the only institution where Russia retained parity with the United States, was downgraded by Washington. From Iraq to Libya, the Security Council was bypassed, or its resolutions manipulated in order to obtain different results from those agreed upon. Within another but highly symbolic context, for 18 years and until finally succeeding in 2012, Russia fought for its admission to the World Trade Organization. This was the longest of any such negotiations within the WTO. The reason behind this delay was Washington’s objection, which resulted from the application of the 1974 Jackson-Vanik Amendment: A relic from the Cold War.
A Bridge Too far to Cross
Step by step the U.S., duly accompanied by the European Union, pushed Russia into a corner. This process not only overlooked the rapprochement intentions towards the West that Yeltsin initially harbored, but Putin’s support for America’s Global War on Terror, and his wish of becoming an essential partner to the U.S. within that war. Moreover, it ignored the fact that shortly after entering the Kremlin Putin, as Yeltsin had also done before him, suggested the possibility of Russia’s joining NATO. (Toro Hardy, 2022, p. 90). In 2013-2014, though, the West manifestly overstepped. Its intent to incorporate Ukraine into its own sphere of influence was a bridge too far to cross. One, that generated a strong Russian response, which included the annexation of Crimea.
As Henry Kissinger explained: “Ukraine was part of Russia for a long time. You can’t accept the principle that any country can just change the borders and take the province of another country [as Russia did with Crimea]. But if the West is honest with itself, it has to admit that there were mistakes on its side (…) Europe and America did not understand the impact of these events, starting with the negotiations about Ukraine’s economic relations with the European Union and culminating in the demonstrations in Kiev. All these, and their impact, should have been the subject of a dialogue with Russia (…) Ukraine has always had a special significance for Russia. It was a mistake not to realize that”. (Kissinger 2014). John Mearsheimer went even further when arguing: “The West’s triple package of policies -NATO enlargement, EU expansion and democracy promotion- added fuel to a fire waiting to ignite (…) A huge expanse of flat land that Napoleonic France, imperial Germany, and Nazi Germany all crossed to strike at Russia itself, Ukraine serves as a buffer state of enormous importance to Russia. No Russian leader would tolerate a military alliance that was Moscow’s mortal enemy until recently moving into Ukraine (…) nor stand idle by while the West helped install a government there that was determined to integrate Ukraine into the West”. (Mearsheimer, 2014).
“Atlanticist” vs. “Eurasianist”
When that happened, 2014, all the conditions for Russia to seek a close strategic alliance with China were more than evident. However, rapprochement with Beijing had begun much earlier. It was Boris Yeltsin who had put that process in motion. After the emergence of the Russian State, indeed, there was an internal struggle inside the Kremlin between two groups: The “Atlanticist” and the “Eurasianist”. While the former pressed toward Washington, the latter led by then Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov pushed towards the Asian powers. Initially, the first group had the upper hand. The straw that broke the camel, and tilted the balance towards China and Asia, came as a result of the clash between Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton at the meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, held in Istanbul in November 1999. Clinton’s strong criticism of Yeltsin’s handling of the Chechen war, on that occasion, topped up Russian resentment against Washington’s disregard of its geostrategic sensibilities. One month later, Yeltsin visited the People’s Republic of China with the intention of cementing Sino-Russian strategic ties. (Nazemroaya, 2012, pp. 169-172 and 279-282).
The year 2014, however, not only represented the moment when Moscow and Washington overtly moved in conflicting directions, but when Beijing and Moscow had significantly advanced in consolidating strong common denominators against the West. Until Xi Jinping’s arrival to power in 2012-2013, the United States and China had essentially maintained a converging relationship. One, that had dissuaded Beijing from establishing closer strategic links with Moscow. Henceforward, though, their geostrategic objectives began to align rapidly.
An important distinction
There was, nonetheless, an important distinction between Russia and China. From the perspective of the realist school of international relations, which had included towering American figures such as George Kennan, Henry Kissinger, John Mearsheimer, Kenneth Waltz or Stephen Walt, Russia had been mistreated by the West: Being repeatedly bullied. Meanwhile, China has bullied, once and again, its weakest neighbors, abusing of its regional dominant position.
Nonetheless, of the two it was Russia which broke all the rules, behaving in an overtly delinquent manner. It waged war against Georgia in 2008, backing the separatist regions of Ossetia and Abkhazia; it took Crimea from Ukraine in 2014; and it invaded Ukraine in 2022 in open violation of the international legal order. Whatever valid grievances Moscow could have possessed; its actions have been inadmissible.
Whatever the circumstances in the case of both China and Russia, the fact remains that these revisionist powers “increasingly identify common interests, match up their rhetoric, and coordinate their military and diplomatic activities. Their convergence is creating a new axis of upheaval – a development that is fundamentally altering the geopolitical landscape (…) Their growing cooperation (…) is fueled by their shared opposition to the Western-dominated global order, an antagonism rooted in their belief that that system does not accord them the status or the freedom of action they deserve (…) Their collective aim is to create an alternative to the current order, which they consider to be dominated by the United States”. (Kendall-Taylor and Fontaine, 2024). Meaning, their avowed aim is to knock-down and replace the U.S.’ led international order.
Too Late to Change What Should not Have Been Induced to Happen
From an American perspective, though, China and Russia should have never coalesced in the way they did. Common sense should have advised Washington to act as Mao Zedong did at the beginning of the 1970s, when he approached the United States in order to contain the Soviet Union. This would have led Washington to prioritize objectives by approaching and befriending the lesser of the two rival threats. By having to simultaneously confront the second largest power of the day and a relatively modest economic power that nonetheless possesses more than 5,900 nuclear warheads, the U.S. finds itself in a hugely difficult predicament.
After 2008 the danger implicit in this dual rivalry became visible, even obvious: China’s assertiveness began to take shape, while Russia invaded Georgia, leaving no doubt that it would not tolerate further Western encroachments in what it considered to be its natural sphere of influence. The U.S., though, chose to confront them at the same time: Opposing China’s geostrategic expansionist behavior, which after 2013 became bolder, while overtly challenging Russia’s assertiveness. By acting in such a manner, it not only invited both rivals to joint ranks, but propitiated its own overstretching.
Donald Trump looks eager to disassemble his country’s growing enmity with Russia, even at the price of abandoning NATO. This, with the avowed intention of distancing Moscow from Beijing. In his own words to political commentator Tucker Carlson, last October: “The one thing you never want to happen is you never want Russia and China uniting. I’m going to have to un-unite them, and I think I can do that”. According to Alexander Gabuev: “But early indications suggest that the coming administration might seek to damage the Chinese-Russian partnership by reducing tensions (and even improving ties) with Moscow…” (Gabuev, 2024).
The time for any attempt in disassociating Moscow from Beijing has long passed, though. At this point, the revisionism of the international order that their axis embodies, seems too entrenched to backtrack. Sobriety and sense of limits in dealing with this axis, would of course be welcome news. However, trying to befriend Russia at the expense of abandoning or damaging NATO, would only weaken the U.S. and embolden its rivals. Trump, indeed, cannot expect to have any success by meddling in the unshakable bromance between Putin and Xi.
References:
Gabuev, Alexander (2024). “Can Trump Split China and Russia?” Foreign Affairs, December 6.
Gaddis, John Lewis (2005). The Cold War: A New History. New York: The Penguin Press.
Kendall-Taylor, Andrea and Fontaine, Richard (2024). “The Axis of Upheaval”. Foreign Affairs. April, 23.
Kissinger, Henry (2012). On China. New York: Penguin Books.
Kissinger, Henry (2014). “Interview with Henry Kissinger”. Spiegel Online. November 13.
Lin, Bonny (2023). “The China-Russia Axis Takes Shape”, Foreign Policy, September 11.
Mearsheimer, John (2014). “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault?”. Foreign Affairs. September/October.
Nazemroaya, M. Darius (2012). The Globalization of NATO. London: Clarity Press.
Reuters (2024). “What is Putin and Xi’s ‘new era’ strategic partnership”, May 16.
Sanger, David E. (2024). New Cold Wars. New York: Crown.
Saxena, Anushka (2024) “75 Years of China-Russia Relations: Indeed a ‘No Limits’ Partnership”, Institute for Security & Development Policy, May 27.
Toro Hardy, Alfredo (2020). China Versus the US: Who Will Prevail? New Jersey: World Scientific.
Toro Hardy, Alfredo (2022). America’s Two Cold Wars. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
White, Hugh (2012). The China Choice. Oxford; Oxford University Press.
Author: Alfredo Toro Hardy, PhD – Retired Venezuelan career diplomat, scholar and author. Former Ambassador to the U.S., U.K., Spain, Brazil, Ireland, Chile and Singapore. Author or co-author of thirty-six books on international affairs. Former Fulbright Scholar and Visiting Professor at Princeton and Brasilia universities. He is an Honorary Fellow of the Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations and a member of the Review Panel of the Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Center.
(The views expressed in this article belong only to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy or views of World Geostrategic Insights).