From the very beginning of its independent life, the United States set its sights on what was later to be called Latin America, as a natural space for projection and influence.
According to Brian Loveman: “Thomas Jefferson worried in 1786 that Spain might be too weak to hold onto to its colonies ‘till our population was sufficiently advanced to gain it from them piece by piece’ (…) Six years later Alexander Hamilton advised: ‘Beside eventual security against invasions, we ought certainly to look to the possession of the Floridas and Louisiana, and we ought to squint at South America’”. (Loveman, 2016).
Much foresight
These assertions undoubtedly required much foresight as at that point in time the Iberian empire in the Americas showed, at least on the surface, great strength. Not only were their universities one or two centuries older than those of the United States, but their cities were much larger and magnificent. In 1790, while Philadelphia had 28,000 inhabitants and Boston 18,000, Mexico City had 137,000 people. Fortunes in Hispanic or Portuguese America were also much larger than those in the North. It was difficult to foresee that the correlation of power between these two spheres would be reverted in the way it did. As Felipe Fernandez-Armesto explained: “The independence wars were the making of the United States and the ruin of much of the rest of the Americas”. To this he added that, in every department, the countries of Latin America receded in stature while the United States towered. (Fernandez-Armesto, 2005, Chapter 4, Loc 1449).
This same sense of self-assurance was on display in 1823, when President James Monroe warned the all-powerful European powers that the American continent was off-limits to their imperial appetites. According to Henry Kissinger: “The Monroe Doctrine proclaimed in 1823 (…) Daringly, warned the European powers that the new nation would go to war to uphold the inviolability of the Western Hemisphere (…) America was at one and the same time turning its back on Europe, and freeing its hands to expand in the Western Hemisphere”. (Kissinger, 1994, pp. 45-46). Again, the United States was anticipating what it aimed to become and, under those circumstances, was clearly delimiting its sphere of influence…and expansion.
Abuse of a dominant position
The latter began in the 1840s within what was labelled as the Manifest Destiny era, when part of Mexico came into U.S. hands. In 1845, President James Polk manipulated the independence of the Texan colonists from Mexico to declare war on his southern neighbour. In General Ulysses S. Grant words, this was “one of the most unjust wars ever waged by a stronger against a weaker nation”. (Ferguson, 2004, p. 39). As a result, the United States considerably enlarged its territory, while reducing Mexico’s by half.
The year 1898 would allow a further step in the same direction, when President William McKinley declared war against another weaker country. In this case, Spain. This would translate into taking possession of Puerto Rico and establishing a protectorate in Cuba. Four years later, this time under President Theodore Roosevelt, Washington would promote the secession of Panama from Colombia, as well as the perpetual transfer from the former to the U.S., of the adjacent area to the interoceanic canal that was to be built there. In 1905 the “Roosevelt Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine was issued. This, explicitly justified not only unilateral intervention and military occupation but also the imposition of protectorates, upon countries of the region that according to U.S. judgement had behaved in a delinquent manner.
President Woodrow Wilson went even further. According to Niall Ferguson: “The implicit Wilson Corollary was that only certain types of government would be tolerated by the United States in Latin America… Against unacceptable regimes the United States reserved the right to use force”. (Ferguson, 2004, p. 53).The determination of which regimes were to be “tolerated” fell unilaterally on the United States, of course. Not surprisingly, during the years that followed U.S. troops invaded countries from the Caribbean Basin on thirty-four occasions. In the process, they occupied Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala and Costa Rica for short periods and remained in Cuba, Nicaragua, Panama and the Dominican Republic for longer stays.
Moreover, one of the two main reasons why the American Congress rejected the country’s adherence to the League of Nations, after World War I, was because it constrained the unilateral imposition of U.S. will upon Latin American countries. According to Henry Kissinger: “The League was believed to be incompatible with the Monroe Doctrine because collective security entitled, indeed required, the League to involve itself in disputes within the Western Hemisphere”. (Kissinger, 1994, p. 372).
In Greg Grandin words: “By the late 1920s, then, the United States had apprenticed itself as a fledgling empire in Latin America, investing capital, establishing control over crucial raw materials and transit routes, and gaining military experience…”. (Grandin, 2006, p. 23).
From obsessively controlling its own hemisphere to suddenly stop caring
During the Cold War, however, invasions (except that of Grenada in 1983) became out of fashion. Instead, dissent or too much independence would be punished by orchestrating the overthrow of the bothersome governments involved. Insurgence or revolt against friendly governments would also invite harsh reply. The CIA was to acquire important expertise in both areas. Nonetheless, just when the Cold War chapter was ending in 1989, the invasion of Panama took place. This invasion, though, did not respond to ideological reasons but to was to become one of the main characteristics of the new period: The fight against drugs.
A favourite ally of the CIA during the Cold War period, Panama’s Manuel Noriega believed that his services to Washington within that context, shielded his dark businesses with drug lords. And probably it would have, had it not been for the fact that the Cold War was reaching its end. According to the Wall Street Journal: “Noriega had been a drug trafficker for years but [the U.S.] didn’t act against him because he was helpful in the Cold War’ said Michael Shifter, president of the Washington-based Inter-American Dialogue. “When the Cold War ended, and the drug issue became more salient, Washington ousted him ”. (De Cordoba, 2017).
In sum, through most of its independent history the U.S. aspired and imposed a firm grip over its Southern neighbours. The thorough control over its hemisphere became one of the central themes of its foreign policy. Until this suddenly ceased to be the case and Washington relaxed, in an unexpected manner, such grip. Moreover, it stopped caring much about what happened in its hemisphere. Since the beginning of the millennium, indeed, China appeared out of the blue in Latin America and, in the face of an unreactive U.S., increasingly occupied more and more space within it. In the words of Lawrence Paverman: “One could say that China jumped the fence that guarded the U.S backyard in an attempt to capitalize on the impressive inventory of natural resources that the region offers”. (Paverman, 2011). On the same manner, referring to the trip made by President Xi Jinping to Latin America in may 2013, Constantino Urcuyo pointed out: “Indeed, this trip shows that the Chinese are willing to interact with the United States in a global manner and that they will no longer show the deference of the past towards the American backyard”. (Urcuyo, 2014).
The United States’ reaction to the above process has been surprisingly timid and sparse. True, the head of the U.S. Army’s Southern Command, General Douglas M. Fraser, alerted before the House Armed Services Committee on March 6, 2012, that the country was losing its “positional advantage in the hemisphere” and that “immediate action was needed to reverse this trend”. His successor in the job, General John Kelly, made similar remarks before the same Congress Committee on March 20, 2013. Meanwhile, several American scholars have warned, in appearances before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, about the risks of allowing an open-door policy towards China in the region. (Urcuyo, 2014). However, such words have not been followed by deeds. No doctrine, formal complaint or overt friction ever materialized in this regard. In fact, this has not been a relevant issue in the highly complex relationship between China and the United States.
China’s encroachment
When President Xi Jinping, meeting in Beijing with the troika of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States in January of 2015, offered the region investments of around 250 billion dollars and trade of 500 billion dollars for the incoming decade, he was sealing the end of the United States predominance in most of Latin America.
As had been the case during the precedent decade, when China was becoming the region’s largest lender as well as South America’s largest trade partner (and number two for the region as a whole), Washington assumed a lay back attitude. One, essentially unmoved by the fact that the unprecedented margin of political manoeuvre resulting from this potent economic counterweight to the U.S., translated into a regional pink wave. Indeed, according to Jorge I. Dominguez “China thus widened political opportunities for Latin America (…) but it did so mainly through trade-created prosperity, not by countering the United States in Latin America – it would allow U.S. influence to implode on its own”. (Dominguez, 2016, p. 12). Not surprisingly, several hemispheric multilateral institutions, that excluded the United States from membership, were created during those years. They became a good expression of a new found assertiveness in relation to Washington.
Does the above mean that the U.S. lost its interest in Latin America? Certainly, there were two groups of countries from Washington’s point of view: Mexican type economies and Brazilian type ones. The first, basically Mexico and to a much lesser extent Costa Rica, had transformed their economies into U.S.’ export oriented assembly lines, profoundly dependent on America’s industry. On top, Mexico was a member of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Brazilian type economies, on the contrary, emphasized commodities production. Washington’s interest in the former was manifestly superior that in the latter. On the other hand, the United States’ focus on the region was essentially directed to security issues that might affect it. As Jorge I. Dominguez puts it: “When security concerns were not salient in a specific relationship (…) the U.S. government gradually downgraded its attention (…) the U.S. security obsession with terrorists and criminals became a dominant element of the relations between them and the United States. The United States ‘saw’ those bilateral relations through a security “lens”. (Dominguez, 2016, p. 23). In other words, when issues fall outside those security lens America’s attention and interest waned.
From “Chimerica” to Cold War
A presumptive reason for this historical out of context attitude, for this “abandonment” of Latin America, could have responded to the logic imposed by globalization. Especially so, as the U.S. essentially retreated unto services and left China in charge of manufactures. Indeed, within the notion of “Chimerica”, coined and developed by Niall Ferguson and Moritz Schularick, East-Chimericans (Chinese) did manufacture and West-Chimericans (Americans) services, East-Chimericans exported and West-Chimericans imported. (Karabell, 2009, p. 256). Under this symbiotic vision of the U.S.-China relationship, also shared by Zakary Karabell under the notion of “superfusion”, the redirection of Latin American commodities towards Chinese factories made economic sense. (Karabell, 2009). At the end of the day, a “de facto” triangulation materialized between them, with Latin America exporting its commodities to China, China exporting its manufactures to the U.S., and the U.S. importing China’s manufactures and exporting services to both.
Things have dramatically changed, though, as Chimerica has been replaced by a Cold War between China and the United States. As the world embarks into a great power competition era, and China and the U.S. rival for supremacy, globalization rapidly erodes. The fracture of international supply chains ushered by Covid, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that brought back geopolitics through the big door, ended up turning the table against globalization. Moreover, White House-led industrial policies are returning manufacturing processes to the United States. Manufacturing’s on-shoring (but also near-shoring or friendly-shoring) are substituting long supply chains, as the U.S. and China decouple. Henceforward, both countries will not only compete for geopolitical, technological and military predominance, but also for manufacturing mastery, market control, spaces for the implantation of their technologies, interconnectivity, and access to strategic raw materials. However, as China reinforces its penetration of Latin America, pointing towards its insertion within its Belt and Road Initiative, while gaining control of its strategic raw materials, the United States remains unreactive.
Moreover, while China strived to win hearts and minds through the active support lent to Latin America during the Covid pandemic, Washington acted belatedly and insufficiently. (Roy, 2022). Currently, the U.S.’ approach to the region seems largely determined by its domestic agenda (mainly the impact of southern migration and drugs), with no vision or foresight as to the role that Latin America could play within a global changing scenario. This, notwithstanding the important reservoirs of strategic commodities held by the region, or the fact that three of the world’s ten largest food producers are in Latin America, or to the convenience of possessing close to home supply chains, or to the relevance of a consumer market of 650 million people. Moreover, this happens at a point in time when China’s high standing in the region converges with the consolidation of a revisionist geopolitical block integrated by China, Russia, and Iran. Thus, providing the latter two with an important entrance door to Latin America.
China’s orbit and Washington’s old bad habits
The United States’ seeming indifference to Latin America’s (particularly South America) drifting trend towards China’s orbit, amazes. This, essentially for the following fourth reasons. Firstly, because it dramatically contradicts its historical strive for the undisputed control over its own hemisphere. Secondly, because it substantially relinquishes the economic benefits that the region has to offer. Thirdly, because the region could become the U.S.’ soft underbelly within the emerging great powers rivalry. Fourthly, because the geopolitical priority shown to China’s periphery is inversely proportional to the attention given to its own periphery.
From a Latin American perspective, though, this lack of attention is immensely preferable to the former overbearing grip imposed upon the region by Washington. Within the context of a new Cold War, being left adrift is definitely better than being forcefully coerced upon, as it happened during the previous one. However, more American economic interest in the region would undoubtedly be welcomed. Being able to counterweight China’s growing preponderance, by way of U.S.’ larger investments, financing and trade, would certainly be highly desirable. Retaining the capacity to choose partners and good deals is always the best possible option. As it is, as well, the political empowerment that comes with it. Being drifted over to China’s shores is a dim perspective. Particularly, at a point in time when the revisionist block is shaking the boat of the international order. But, would it be possible to counterbalance this trend without putting in motion Washington’s old bad habits in relation to the region? In any case, so far the United States has not shown interest one way or the other.
References:
De Córdoba, José (2017). “Former Panamanian Dictator Dies at 83”, The Wall Street Journal, May, 31.
Dominguez, Jorge I. (2016). “The Changes in the International System Since 2000” in Dominguez, Jorge I. and Fernandez de Castro, Rafael, Editors. Contemporary U.S.-Latin American Relations: Cooperation or Conflict in the 21st Century? New York: Routledge.
Fernández-Armesto, Felipe (2005). The Americas: A Hemispheric History. New York: The Modern Library.
Ferguson, Niall (2004). Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire. London: Allen Lane.
Grandin, Greg (2006). Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism. New York: Metropolitan Books.
Karabell, Zakary (2009). Superfusion. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Kissinger, Henry (1994). Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Loveman, Brian (2016). “U.S. Foreign Policy towards Latin America in the 19th Century”. Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of Latin American History.
Paverman, Lawrence (2011). “China looks to Venezuela for energy security”, WordPress.org, October 11.
Roy, Diana (2022). “China’s Growing Influence in Latin America”, Backgrounder, Council of Foreign Relations, April 12.
Urcuyo, Constantino (2014). “La Presencia de China en América Latina: Dragon Consumista, Comerciante y Prudente”. Political Outlook de América Latina 2013. Bogotá: Observatorio Político de América Latina y El Caribe.
Author: Alfredo Toro Hardy, PhD – Retired Venezuelan career diplomat, scholar and author. Former Ambassador to the U.S., U.K., Spain, Brazil, Ireland, Chile and Singapore. Author or co-author of thirty-six books on international affairs. Former Fulbright Scholar and Visiting Professor at Princeton and Brasilia universities. He is an Honorary Fellow of the Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations and a member of the Review Panel of the Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Center.
(The views expressed in this article belong only to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy or views of World Geostrategic Insights).
Image Source: AP