Denis Korkodinov – Interview with Ahmed Kabal and Iyad al-Majali
Despite the apparent attempts by Washington and Tehran to begin negotiations, tension between the countries continue to persist. Experts note that there is a high risk of random factors that can provoke a military clash. The situation is complicated, in addition, by the position of Israel, which strongly opposes any negotiations with the Ayatollah regime. Moreover, on October 30, 2019, the head of the Israeli Air Force, Amikan Norkin, brought the Israeli air defense systems to combat readiness out of fear of the threat of an attack from Iran. Meanwhile, such a development of events will obviously not contribute to the softening of Iranian politics and diplomacy.
Specially for the World Geostrategic Insights, we talked about this with the Egyptian expert in Iran strategic studies, Ahmed Kabal, as well as with the Director of the Arab Democratic Center for Strategic, Political and Economic Studies, and professor in the Department of Strategic Studies of Mutah University (Jordan), Iyad al-Majali.
1. Recently, US Treasury Secretary Stephen Mnuchin said that the White House will increase economic pressure on Iran in connection with its nuclear program. What does this mean? What additional economic measures can Washington take in relation to Tehran? How long can Iran resist US pressure? Is Iran ready to abandon its nuclear program in exchange for easing US pressure?
AHMED KABAL: US Treasury Secretary Stephen Mnuchin promised to impose further economic sanctions on Iran, stressing that an emergency pressure campaign aimed at managing his country is working to stop Iran’s aggression, and Mnuchin seems to be planning his visit at the head of the delegation to Middle East and India to discuss economic ties and counter-initiatives. Terrorism, visit accompanied by Jared Kushner, adviser and son-in-law of US President Donald Trump.
The statements by US officials appear to have been the script for US sanctions and the possibility of forcing Iran to cease operations, as well as its desire to build nuclear capabilities and missiles. These comments are part of the vision of US President Donald Trump to impose sanctions against Iran as part of the toughest sanctions policy ever imposed on the country.
These sanctions have led to a reduction in Iranian oil exports due to the US adoption of a strategy to nullify Iranian oil exports, which have already brought about 2.7 million barrels per day from international markets, and US measures, from oil sales to shipping and financial activities, have hindered work a number of foreign banks. Working with Iran even on humanitarian deals, such as food supplies, even the few remaining banks still working to resolve Iranian deals face many obstacles as funding channels are frozen.
On the other hand, in response to statements by US officials and a policy of maximum sanctions that have already affected Iran’s economy, the Iranian regime is determined not to yield to American demands, relying on evidence that the unprecedented US sanctions against Iran are not the first sanctions that he came across. There were periods in history when the Iranian economy suffered from sanctions of a more serious international nature.
International parties do not want Iran to get out of the nuclear deal, even if it helps Iran overcome the consequences of US sanctions.
The Iranians believe that they have successes and experience as a result of many years of negotiations with the West in the “5 + 1” format, and that any concession at this stage will put them in a vulnerable position before any settlement with the American side, and that they should miss the opportunity and take advantage of the gap trend that exists in Western circles to provide Iran with more political and regional benefits.
IYAD AL-MAJALI: There is no doubt that the US withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear agreement in June 2018 was accompanied by a profound shift in the administration’s policy regarding the ruling political system in Tehran. This is all the more relevant because the US strategy has led to a package of pressure on Tehran, the most important of which is the tightening of economic sanctions.
The justification of the Iranian strategy in this political direction is to ask Iran to sit at the negotiating table and revise its nuclear program.
US Special Envoy to Iran Brian Hawk said Washington intends to impose new sanctions against Tehran. However, in his speech, Hawk did not specify the nature of these sanctions and when they will be announced by Washington.
The future of Iran-US relations in the coming months revolves around a series of mutual pressure, in which each side will try to weaken the other’s position or improve its position in order to maximize its benefits from the results of the dialogue. At the same time, a settlement of the conflict is not expected, at least in the short term, since the parties are not going to negotiate.
2. Iran has renewed its militaristic rhetoric against Israel. In particular, on October 27, 2019, the head of the armed forces of Iran, Motjab Zannur, warned U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that Israel “will not live longer than twenty or thirty minutes” if Tel Aviv or Washington make a mistake. This statement is part of the Iranian strategy to deter an “asymmetric war,” aimed at deterring the United States and Israel from attacks on Iran. In this regard, a number of Israeli officials have publicly expressed fears that Tel Aviv may soon enter a war with Iran. How likely is the Iran-Israeli war to become a reality? Should Iran really be destroyed by Israel?
AHMED KABAL: The threat of Iran’s strike on Israel is repeatedly repeated by senior Iranian military and IRGC commanders as part of a slogan-based regime policy. Recently, however, these threats have been heard more often due to a confrontation with the United States. Similar threats are also being raised by officials in Israel and the United States as part of open opportunities to limit Iran’s nuclear and military capabilities.
We can say that slogans such as “death” to Israel, America and support for the oppressed are slogans and statements that have always been raised and repeated by Iranian officials and constitute one of the most important pillars of the revolution and the Iranian regime. Thanks to such slogans, they gained their legitimacy within the country, attracted regional supporters.
These slogans were used to achieve the regime’s goals, while the banner of protecting the Islamic Ummah and the cause of the Palestinians remains a tool for fulfilling the dream of a Great Shiite empire and the emergence of the last prophet Mehdi, in line with the vision of a clerical power system.
Recent Iranian threats, when international parties are divided between supporters and opponents of US sanctions, pursue a pragmatic vision to annoy the international community and make the attack on Iran a humanitarian and international catastrophe. But, on the other hand, continuing to make such statements, Iran or Israel may be faced with a situation over which the Ori will lose control. And then a global war can begin.
IYAD AL-MAJALI: Iranian military rhetoric against Israel is part of the ongoing conflict between Israel and Iran. Iranian forces in Syria support the government of Bashar al-Assad, while Israel provides assistance to the Syrian opposition.
This is a long confrontation, from which Tehran and Tel Aviv are probably tired, but it, in some way, stimulates them to further development. Moreover, the parties are unlikely to ever decide to use weapons of mass destruction against each other, since everyone understands that this will lead to a world war, where there will be no winners.
3. Eric Mandel, director of the Middle East Political Information Network, said in a recent interview for Ahval news agency that “the ambitions of Iran and Turkey may one day lead to their conflict with each other.” Is this statement true? How likely is the conflict between Ankara and Tehran, given the fact that these countries act as strategic allies within the Astana and Sochi formats? What position will Russia take if the conflict between Iran and Turkey threatens regional security?
AHMED KABAL: Iran and Turkey have independent regional projects and expansionist goals that run counter to the interests of many regional and international parties. However, at the current stage of history, both sides have many points of contact when it comes to the Syrian crisis, the actions of the Kurds and the United States.
Collaboration between both sides prevailed in Astana and Sochi with the participation of Russia, which seeks to reduce the US presence in the region and to intensify its more influential role through an alliance with both Persians, Taa and Turks. Meanwhile, such a triple alliance, despite what has recently been described as strategic, is not long-term and can collapse at any time.
Given the ideological difference between Turkey, one of the most powerful Sunni Muslim countries, Iran is the only Shiite power that accepts an Islamic vision in accordance with the religious system. In addition, Iran’s ambitions extend to the Mediterranean Sea, as well as to Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, where the ayatollah regime will undoubtedly clash with Turkish interests.
In this case, the Russians are likely to adhere to the status quo, formally giving preference to none of the parties to the conflict. At the very least, Moscow will try to profit from the confrontation between the two powers.
IYAD AL-MAJALI: Turkey’s need for Iranian energy and rich reserves of oil and natural gas has become an important driving force for expanding Turkish-Iranian cooperation. Iran is the second largest supplier of natural gas to Turkey after Russia.
The interaction between Turkey and Iran seems close to some economic and security interests. Meanwhile, the two countries have different political identities, as well as radically different ideologies, which gave the “Arab spring” a big impetus. Thus, the fall of authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, as well as the revolution in Syria, Yemen and Bahrain helped to undermine the political system in the Middle East, which both Turkey and Iran sought to take advantage.
There is no doubt that tensions between Turkey and Iran were caused by a number of problems, and the most important factor contributing to the growth of tension in relations is Turkey’s support for the Syrian opposition against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, especially since Syria is Iran’s only real ally in the Middle East.
At the same time, the potential fall of the Assad regime could be a serious strategic blow to Iran and could increase Turkey’s influence in Syria.
4. Amid social unrest in Iraq, Tehran expressed its intention to send 7,500 troops to this country formally in order to protect Shiite pilgrims. However, many political experts believe that Iranian troops can take part in suppressing the protest movement in Iraq. Is this information true?
AHMED KABAL: Iran’s influence in Iraq after the collapse of the Ba’ath regime in 2003 was based on the formation of an “incubator” of Iraqi Shiites in accordance with the doctrinal vision and influence of authorities close to Iran.
The IRGC has an impact on government agencies and Iraqi political movements. However, the municipal authorities in Najaf are under the influence of official Baghdad and do not adhere to the theory of velayat-e fakih, which Iran seeks to spread among Iraqi Shiites.
Iran continues to collaborate with Iraqi security agencies, Shiite authorities, Revolutionary Guard cells and the Quds Forces, in particular, to deter popular anger in the streets in Iraq. For this, the Ayatollah regime used Hezbollah, whose task is to suppress the protest movement.
IYAD AL-MAJALI: The current riots in Iraq are the deadliest since the end of the civil war against the Islamic State in December 2017.
The field indicators of these unrest are that the participants in the Iraqi protest put forward uniform demands, despite the religious differences between the demonstrators and their political preferences.
Iran’s role in Iraq is not determined by the strength of Iran, but by the result of internal, regional and international changes that paved the way for this influential role.
Ali Yonsei, Advisor to the Iranian President for Nationalities and Religious Minorities at the Iranian Identity Forum, noted that “Iran today has become an empire, as it has been throughout history, with Baghdad as its capital, the center of our civilization and culture.” This statement very accurately emphasizes the importance of the Iranian regional strategy for Iraq.
Iran’s political role in Iraq was illustrated by several forms that were observed on the Iraqi political scene, in particular: the empowerment of Shiite political Islam, where Iran’s political strategy was to unite Shiite political parties in Iraq.
On October 1, 2019, several intelligence sources described the secret visit of Quds commander Kassem Suleimani to southern Lebanon, where he met with Hezbollah leaders. The reason for the visit is the desire to maintain Hezbollah’s military and political presence in the Lebanese arena, because the party is part of the Iranian regional equation that goes beyond the internal political differences in Lebanon and Iraq.
Meanwhile, whatever the results of the protests in Iraq and Lebanon, Iran will not allow its power structures to collapse without a fight. For this reason, Hezbollah, backed by Iran, is likely to resort to force to quell protests.
5. Last week, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs made an official proposal to the United States to exchange prisoners, thereby opening a potential new channel with Washington amid recent growing tensions. Does this mean that Tehran is making efforts to normalize relations with Washington? How can Donald Trump react to the Iranian proposal?
AHMED KABAL: The issue of the exchange of prisoners and prisoners between the US and Iran has been repeatedly raised by Iranian officials. In 2016, Iran released five American prisoners, including a Washington Post reporter. In turn, Washington pardoned seven prisoners. However, the recent proposal by the Iranian Foreign Ministry to exchange prisoners in the NWS was for the first time an official proposal, which, first of all, concerns American and Western public opinion in order to resolve this issue from a humanitarian point of view.
This was a signal that the Iranian regime was ready to make concessions and begin a round of negotiations. However, this proposal has very important consequences, primarily because Iran’s concessions must be accompanied by similar concessions from the United States and be able to negotiate.
The question now is whether the Iranian regime agrees to a comprehensive settlement with Washington, which is consistent with the regime’s ideological vision. And the answer to this question brings us back to the files that formed the basis of cooperation between Iran and the United States in the past, especially with regard to Afghanistan and Iraq.
The Iranian regime, despite its ideological image, was considered pragmatically at many historical stages, but it is difficult to predict the extent to which the Iranian regime will bear the concessions or benefits that the US will offer.
IYAD AL-MAJALI: The political messages transmitted at the suggestion of Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammed Jawad Zarif to the United States on the exchange of prisoners between the two countries are an attempt to open the way for diplomatic dialogue on issues and sensitive issues between the two sides. It is difficult to judge how Donald Trump will react to this, but if he really wants negotiations with Iran, he will accept the proposal.
Image Credit: AP