By Eslam Abdelmagid Eid
Since the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, and more than 40 years after the Revolution, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard has been, and still is, one of the most important institutions that were born from the radical changes made by the revolution.
Over the years the Revolutionary Guard was in the first line in the defense of the principles of the revolution and in the protection of the jurist. The presence of the Revolutionary Guards gave a different impact to the revolution, as it remains in a renewed position, not influenced by the temporal dimension. Undoubtedly, the export of the Islamic revolution was its most important priority, despite the obstacles faced by the new Iranian regime in its early years: the siege of Americans in the American Embassy in Tehran in 1979, the following breaking off of the diplomatic relations of United States with Tehran, and then the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, in which both sides suffered heavy losses .
However, these events were later on a very important factor for the formation of the doctrine and principles of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, and helped its nascent military apparatus to gain military and field expertise, meanwhile the former Iranian army, with its various branches, was at the disbandment.
Thereafter, Iran’s key regional role began to slowly impose, starting in 1980, with its support for the Hezbollah in Lebanon, following the invasion of Beirut, as well to the opponents of the Saddam Hussein’s regime, the Shia religious groups in Iraq, that were under the supervision of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and its leaders.
However, the decisive factor for Tehran’s great regional role in the region was the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, following the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, which gave Iran the gold opportunity to penetrate deeply in the Arab Region through the eastern gate of Baghdad, via Damascus, Beirut and Sanaa in the recent period. The leaders of the Revolutionary Guard, in order to protect the revolution, are using what is known as the theory of “advanced defense”, which means the removing of any problems or conflicts at the borders of other countries, distancing them from the Iranian sphere, thus justifying the interference in their territorial environments.
The leadership of the Revolutionary Guard is currently taking a very sensitive role, overseeing Iran’s allied armed groups in the Arab region, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip, as well as the Houthis in Yemen, Through these groups, they can guarantee their influence and regional power is in the region, and also exert a major pressure card regarding Tehran’s nuclear program.
Our analysis will cover the following questions:
1- How were the Iranian Revolutionary Guards born?
2- What is the role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in the formation of the Iranian regional power?
3- What is the constitutional position on the Revolutionary Guard?
4- What is the role that the Revolutionary Guards playsin (Iraq-Syria-Yemen)
The historical dimension of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard
The Islamic Revolution of 1979
Certainly, it could be difficult to explain in details the roots of the revolution. However, the popular discontent with the Shah’s regime has taken us upward since the overthrow of Mosaddegh’s ministry, in the 1950s, after his courageous decisions to issue social guarantees and agricultural reforms, that caused his removal from office. Following the nationalization of Iranian oil, the revolutionary forces of all stripes began to appear on the political scene in the country,. Their presence increased after the arrest of Khomeini in 1963, and the demonstrations, with a large number of victims, condemning his arrest by the students of the religious seminaries in Iran. But the real beginning of the revolution come from the city of Qom (with the religious status of the Shiites), with a protest by religious seminary students against an article entitled “Iran and the Red and Black Colonization” which was published in the daily Tala’at newspaper on January 7, 1978. The article contained offensive content about Ayatollah Khomeini, who was described as a foreign agent. The bloody clashes between the demonstrators and the Shah’s intelligence service (SAVAK) in early 1978, showed the influence of Khomeini and his followers, despite at that time he was in exile.
The events escalated on August 9, 1978, on what was called the Black Friday, because many people were shot by the army in front of the Iranian parliament building. Khomeini found here the opportunity to pounce the revolution and lead it, especially after the Shah left the country for Aswan, Egypt, on January 16, 1979, and a trusteeship council was formed under the leadership of Jalaluddin Tehrani. Khomeini announced, from Paris, that the Guardianship Council and the government lacked from the necessary legitimacy, and that he was returning to the country
Indeed Khomeini returned on February 1, 1979. Nearly three million people welcomed him on the streets of Tehran, until the monarchy collapsed completely ten days later, specifically on February 11, 1979.
The emergence of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard
The Revolutionary Guard, or the Pasdaran, was formed on May 5, 1979, after the overthrow of the Shah’s regime, as the fledgling regime needed a new military force in order to include a number of paramilitary forces (militias) and unify them in one force to protect the new regime, and dispense with the services of the former regular army, that was loyal to the Shah.
A decree was issued by Khomeini establishing the Revolutionary Guard, with the mission to protect the revolution and the country’s independence, preserving its regional security, and assisting the clergy in their mission to establish a new government for the country.
The guard also included thousands of young volunteers organized in a force known as Basij. The Guard has a structure independent from the regular army, and possess land, air, sea and geospatial units, with own security composition of intelligence and reconnaissance apparatus, which was established during the era of former Iranian President Ahmadinejad, who also appointed dozens of Revolutionary Guard commanders in positions of leader in the various state institutions in order to assure their grip on the joints of the state. Ahmadinejad was not satisfied with only that, so he transferred a large number of government contracts, valued at billions of dollars, to the account of the Revolutionary Guards, which reflects the extent of the current influence of the Revolutionary Guard on the Iranian economy. Also the Revolutionary Guard has the control over the Iranian strategic missiles and missile force.
The Revolutionary Guards, one of the most important factors of Iran’s regional power and influence, which is known as the “Quds Force”, as it operates extensively outside the Iranian borders, is one of the main pillars in the funding operations of Iran’s arms in the region and their training in various martial arts.
According to estimates by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, the number of members of the Guard forces is 350,000, while the Institute for Strategic and International Studies in Washington believes that the number of its members does not exceed 120,000.
Undoubtedly, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard had a great role in giving legitimacy to the regime and its populist character, and its presence served as a catalyst for building a state capable of spreading its ideas to the neighborhood, and even controlling the decision making in some of these countries.
The regional role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard
Since the inception of the Revolutionary Guards as one of the main pillars of the Iranian armed forces, its regional dimension was clear, especially because it took upon itself the responsibility to export the revolution, In order to understand the bases of Iran’s regional policy and the role of the Revolutionary Guard, we must focus on two important points that can be considered determinants in the Iranian foreign policy, especially in dealing with its regional depth, and in shaping Iranian political and media doctrine:
1- Iran’s use of the sectarian dimension, which is represented in the propaganda of Wilayat al-Faqih, to mobilize the people of the Shiite sect in the region, and to make it easier for Tehran to recruit its followers and its soft forces in those countries to serve Iranian interests.
2- Iran adoption of what is known as the axis of the Islamic resistance against Israel and its major ally, the United States, which is exploited by Iran in the media of the Arab region, to gain popular sympathy, especially with the great value that the Palestinian cause represents for the Arabs.
The role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in Iraq
The beginnings of the relationship between the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and its current branches in Iraq go back to the Iran-Iraq war, in the 1980s. Iran sheltered the opponents of the former regime, especially from Shiite Islamic groups, headed by the Islamic Dawa Party and Badr Corps. These elements fought in that period in favor of Iran against the Iraqi army in the war that spanned over eight years.
In that period, Iran was able to strengthen the ties and relations with these Iraqi elements, and use them to serve Iranian interests, and even recruit them into the Iranian Revolutionary Guard for their complete loyalty to the Islamic Republic in Iran, and their desire to export the revolution to their motherland Iraq and topple Saddam Hussein’s secular regime. Indeed, these elements ( among them the well knownDawa Party) rebelled against the Iraqi authority in the popular uprising in 1991, after the return of the Iraqi army from Kuwait, in the aftermath of the Second Gulf War, and in some southern Iraqi governorates, specifically in Najaf and Karbala, where there are Shiite religious seminaries, But soon they were suppressed by the regime of the time.
However, the most important moment was the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Nevertheless, the United States did not get the support of factions and elements that could guarantee them the control over the decision-making in Iraq. After the invasion, opponents of the Iraqi’s regime returned in Iraq after years of residing in Iran, where thy gained the necessary expertise and experiences to implement in Iraq the Iranian agenda, So the American invasion was a golden opportunity for Tehran to emerge as a major player in the region, and perhaps the Iranian benefit was greater then the America benefit, also because the war increased the troubles of the United States, as Iran supported armed factions in order to resist the American occupation.
Among the Iraqi armed organizations linked to Iran, that were established in the post-2003 period, we can mention the “Iraqi Hezbollah Brigades”, to which the Revolutionary Guard provided all forms of financing, arming and training support. Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandism, head of the organization, was killed in an American air attack in Iraq, on January 3, 2020, together with the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Qasem Soleimani.
After the expansion of ISIS, and its occupation of a third of the area of Iraq, in 2014, these organizations began to gain official status with the formation of the “Popular Mobilization Forces” to confront the terrorist organization. These forces also acquired official status with the Iraqi parliament’s approval of the Popular Mobilization Authority’s law (2016). Thus, as in Iran, there are semi-regular military forces in Iraq, gaining influence and power and competing with the official institutions and army forces.
In the post-2003 period in Iraq, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard was led by General Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard, who was killed early this year with Abu Al-Mahdi Al-Muhandis in an American raid targeting them near Baghdad Airport. Soleimani was able to create and develop a wide network of relationships with Iraqi authorities. personalities and parties, in all the spectrums of Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds, He also had a prominent role in the coordination between the Shiite and Sunni political blocs present in the Iraqi government, directly or indirectly. That was also evident by the presence of the former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi, of the Sunni component, to the funeral of Qassem Soleimani’s mother in Tehran, reflecting the extent of the role that Qassem Soleimani and the Revolutionary Guard in general played in political decision-making in Iraq.
The role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in Yemen
In Yemen, the situation was completely ripe, to extend Iranian influence there through the Iranian Revolutionary Guard for several factors, the most important of which are:
1- The weakness of the central authority and the fragility of institutions in Yemen over many decades. Moreover, the resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh (2011) led to a complete collapse of the foundations of the regime in the country.
2- The domination of tribalism and tribalism in Yemen at the expense of the country’s national interests.
3- The large sectarian conflicts and divisions in the country, specifically with the presence of a Shiite sect called Zaydis, which facilitated the process of association with the regime of the Wilayat al-Faqih in Tehran.
In the beginning in the eighties, the Iranian embassy in Sana’a paid great attention in inviting Yemeni youths to visit Iran to directly see the experience of the Iranian Islamic revolution, trying to attract in particular the youth of the Zaidi component. Among these youth there was one that emerged after, that is Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi. Together with a group of returnees from Iran, like Muhammad Azzan and Abdul Karim Jadban, he founded what was known as the “Believing Youth”, organization, in 1992, The stronghold was in the Saada governorate, in northern Yemen. It later developed and became known as the “Houthi” group, from the name of its founder, Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi.
In the founding stage, the extent of the great influence of Hussein Al-Houthi emerged in his speeches and writings with the model and principles of the Islamic revolution, and its leader Imam Khomeini. These principles are still present with the movement until now, with the slogans “Death to America and Death to Israel”.
The escalating confrontation of the Houth with official government of Sanaa, has its roots in the state of marginalization and exclusion of the northern province of Saada.
Since the year 2004, an armed confrontations began between the Houthi group and the Yemeni government, in what was known as the “Six Wars”. In the first war Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, the founder of the organization, was killed. The leadership of the movement passed to his younger son, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, and the war continued until 2010. Since the fourth war, in 2007, the model of the Lebanese Hezbollah began to appear in the methods of fighting of the Houthis, as well as on the organizational hierarchy of the group.
With the Yemeni youth revolution, in 2011, the movement’s strategy changed completely. It was relying on skirmishes and hit-and-run operations in its struggle with the government. The Houthis chose to overthrow the national dialogue path, and from Saada began to enter militarily in other Yemeni governorates, until their arrive in the capital Sanaa, in September 2014.
There are some indications about the modality of the Iranian consulting and training support tor the Houthi group. The Iranian Chief of Staff Muhammad Bagheri had stated on more than one occasion, that “The Yemenis today managed to shoot down many modern aircraft, and this is of course because the sciences of the Islamic revolution and our moral support were behind them, ”as well as his statements, in an interview with the Chinese” Phoenix “station, in which he acknowledged the existence of a role for the Revolutionary Guard, described as one the responsible for the Yemeni affairs.
With reference to the armament, Yemen’s President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi (head in exile of the country’s internationally-recognised government) has repeatedly said about the stopping of boats and ships bound for Yemen carrying weapons coming from Iran, like the Jihan ship, which was seized in January 2013, when it was on its way to the port of Midi. at the time iunder the control of the Houthis.
The role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in Syria
The beginning of relations between Syria and the regime of Velayat-e faqih in Iran dates back to the early eighties of the last century, especially with the dispute that existed between the Baathists of Syria and Iraq, which coincided with the Iran-Iraq war, and the tension in relations between Damascus and the rest of the Arab countries during that period.
Despite the ideological contradiction between the two countries, the Syrian Ba’ath regime is a secular, nationalist system, while the Iranian regime is a fundamentalist religious system, they were united by their conflict with Saddam Hussein in the 1980s, and for the fact of being the axis against United States and its ally Israel in the region.
After the death of President Hafez al-Assad, Tehran maintained its close relations with the new leadership of the son Bashar al-Assad. Iran was well aware of the importance of preserving the Assad regime for the strengthening of the Iranian influence in the region, at the expense of the armed Sunni groups that were supported by Saudi Arabia and Qatar at the beginning of the Syrian crisis in 2011.
Iran began to intervene since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, specifically in the first of 2012, when Iran, on the bases of a joint defense agreement with Syria, signed in 2006, sent in Syria hundreds of Revolutionary Guard military advisors, to provide consultations for developing military plans, and to supervise many of the loyal Shiite militias, with arms and training.
However, Iran’s intervention was not enough at the beginning, as Syria is not like Irak., where a great majority of Sunni Arabs was disgruntled with Bashar al-Assad’s regime. The Shiite Alawite sect, to which the President Bashar belongs, it represents only the 12% of the total population. Also the opponents of the Assad regime got the American military support and the huge financial support from the Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, not to mention the important role of Turkey.
Therefore, it was the Russian intervention in 2015 that reversed the equation of the conflict in Syria in favor of the Assad regime, when it was on the brink of collapse, ensuring the regime’s survival.
But the survival of the Assad regime did not guarantee Iran of something very important, that is has guaranteed in Iraq and in Yemen, which is to fully control the decision-making process. Russia has taken a predominant role in the Syrian arena, in order to regain influence in the Middle East as the legitimate heir of the former Soviet Union. But despite that, Iran was able to act as a major player in the negotiations to resolve the Syrian crisis side by side with Moscow and Ankara, whether in Astana or Sochi.
Concluding remarks
The Revolutionary Guard gained the necessary legitimacy that was guaranteed to it by Article 15 of the Iranian Constitution, which stipulates its role as a military institution affiliated with the state and carries it upon itself to protect the revolution. Over the years, the Revolutionary Guard has not only been a military institution, but it also interferes in political affairs, which is clear in President Muhammad Khatami’s era, through their constant indignation at accusations, and their constant threats to him.
During the era of President Ahmadinejad, the influence of the Revolutionary Guard grew to include the political and economic fields. Ahmadinejad appointed them to leadership positions in the state, and he entrusted them with huge investment contracts worth billions of dollars, which coincided with the economic crisis that the country is suffering from as a result of the economic sanctions imposed on Iran by the states United States of America.
The Iranian incursion into the region was based on two main elements: 1- The religious sectarian dimension, as it is the largest force that adopt the Shiite sect in the region, which it is used to attract many members of the sect in the Arab world to serve Iran’s interests, 2- Iran’s adoption of what is known as the axis of resistance against Israel and its major ally, the United States.
Iranian influence in Iraq was not a spur of the moment. Rather, it was prepared over the past decades. Iran has embraced a number of elements of the current Shiite parties and annexed them to the Revolutionary Guards during the Iran-Iraq war, which facilitated the process of loyalty and belonging to the Wilayat al-Faqih in Tehran, With the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, these elements returned to Iraq, and the constitution supervised by Paul Bremer, the military ruler of Iraq after 2003, facilitated the sectarian quota system, which placed the pro-Iranian Shiite parties in the hierarchy of power in the country, and the influence of the Revolutionary Guard in Iraq was not limited to this only, but rather took the form of close relations with the other sects in power, from the Sunnis and the Kurds.
In Yemen, the fragility of the state for decades in Yemen was an important factor in the implementation of many foreign agendas in the country, but later the Yemeni Youth Revolution transformed this model into the failed state model, which made the task of Iranian penetration and the presence of the Revolutionary Guard there easily, thanks to its support for the Shia zaydi sect there, or the so-called Houthis, which Iran began to recruit from the 1980s.
Regarding Syria, the situation was completely different. Iran did not need the fall of regimes or changing governments. The relationship between the Ba’ath regime in Syria since the era of the late President Hafez al-Assad and the Islamic Republic in Iran has always been strong, and the same with the arrival of Bashar al-Assad to power. Perhaps the most prominent evidence was the joint defense agreement between the two parties in 2006, meanwhile the defining moment was in the announcement of the Iranian intervention in 2012, and then the overt intervention in 2013 by the Revolutionary Guard and other Shiite militias loyal to Ira, from several countries, led by the Lebanese Hezbollah, in addition to Iraqi, Afghan and Pakistani militias.
Author: Eslam Abdelmagid Eid (Academic, political researcher, and specialist in Middle East affairs)
(The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of World Geostrategic Insights)