Dragan Vitorovic
“Future shock is the shattering stress and disorientation that we induce in individuals by subjecting them to too much change in too short a time. The illiterate of the 21st century will not be those who cannot read and write, but those who cannot learn, unlearn, and relearn. You can use all the quantitative data you can get, but you still have to distrust it and use your own intelligence and judgment. (A. Toffler, famous futurologist)”
What does it mean to be rational nowadays? Is homo-economicus real, and do we live in the postsocieties, fully attached to notions of efficiency, effectiveness, and precision? Many voices are claiming that we are slowly adopting the role of “consumer” as a dominant. Wrapped-up in technology, we become overwhelmed with (dis)information, confusion and fear.
Despite the current situation (or, actually – because of this situation), societies ought to be reminded that people are emotional, often irrational and that politics could not be designed around principles of full rationality and net profit. Especially not in a long-term.
The rearrangement of people’s identity could be costly, and technological advances should be praised with caution.
The market forces are well aware of what role emotions and identities play in decision-making. Policy-makers should learn from the market forces, in order to defend the common good and well-being of citizens (and not consumers), acting as responsible leaders, instead of profit and interest-maximizers.
[The text below is a part of the author’s Master of Arts thesis, defended some months before the “official” start of the COVID-19 pandemic. It is worth pinpoint that the change is an only inevitable process, but not the change at any cost. Ethical principles, on a macro scale, ought to be relearned.]
Politics is about multiple sensitivities, according to Ian Bremmer (2018). The technological adoption, extensive use of predictive algorithms, and frequent mentioning of the need to digitalize social processes ironically re-established the importance of emotional dimension in politics (Bremmer, 2019). The perspective of inherently rational states, significantly differing from the individuals who display the principles of bounded rationality, has been challenged (Moïsi, 2007). After the end of the Cold War, emotions have become very important for policymaking, during periods of both war and peace, on individual and state level, although being often publicly neglected (Prevelakis, 2017). The popular article of Dominique Moïsi (2007), following the unorthodox French school of geopolitics and insisting on the emotional foundations in international relations, titled “The Clash of Emotions,” proposed that the understanding of global politics would eventually move from the exploitation of cultural interaction to the exploitation of emotional interactions (Moïsi, 2009).
In other words, the clash of cultures exchanged place with the clash of emotions, and this is not only theoretical consideration. It is already happening, as can be seen in the news and reports (Hatemi and McDermott, 2011). Surprisingly, one of the most critical dimensions in the policy-making process, the security dimension, is becoming more related to the emotional aspect in the contemporary national strategy design of many states. Emotions may even disturb the rational self – interest when it comes to trade between nations if enmities and hostilities from the past remain as the component of the broader policy design. The notion of identity, which also may amplify the emotional dimension, is described as the most pressing political issue nowadays, as presented by Prevelakis (2017). According to the Ambassador of Greece to OECD, identity sets the lines of separation, provides a sense of belonging, and extends the cultural and emotional dimension in many directions. Nations today demand recognition and respect, as the main drivers of present and future relations with other political entities (Prevelakis, 2019).
Both the politics of emotion and the politics of identity are essential for the understanding of the fast-changing and contemporary political and economic environment. People are attached to hope, fear, anger, and nations are operating in the same space and time, despite the inequality between them. The use of emotions in politics can range from the relatively straightforward to highly distorted adoptions, while the politics of identity can be drawn not only through the ethnic lines but can expand swiftly into the geopolitical realm (Prevelakis, 2017).
In short, emotions and identity are offering the anchor for the analysis of linked phenomena and their consequences. Paradoxically, both aspects are displaying significant levels of flexibility while having the capacity to shape, nudge, and influence. For that reason, emotions and identity have a significant influence on policymaking (Hatemi and McDermott, 2011).
Τhe emotions and politics
Despite the increased emphasis on the role of emotions in politics, and plenty of examples showing that policy-making cannot be fully designed using only the principles of rationality, not many voices support this approach publicly. The discourse which emphasizes rationality as the dominant force has been further strengthened through the indiscriminate use of technological developments and the opportunity to measure almost anything. However, society is still far from absolute rationality. It is possible to argue that societies are built on organic principles so that biological, as well as the psychological dimension, cannot be excluded from the politics (Hatemi and McDermott, 2011).
European countries used a variety of racist theories for the development of the institutional and psychological base, galvanizing the emotional domain within the society, and using it as the cohesive force in times of need. Ironically, as in the case of Social Darwinism, racist theories applied in European politics have been empowering mainly the negative emotions and the notion of nostalgia, while the insistence on cohesion mainly took the trajectory of destruction (Crook, 1994, p.160). Nostalgia for the times past, constructed in the present-day, offers to the nation the world that is invented by that nation, the world that did not exist, the world where the nation fully controlled its destiny (Moïsi, 2009).
Europeans understood well their trauma from World War I and World War II. From positive anticipation of the possible resolution of the first great war, and the philosophy of the indestructible and superior human species, European nations encountered nightmares and violent deaths, spreading from the shores of Normandy to the frozen wastelands in the Eastern Front. The culture of fear was established in Europe a long time ago, and nowadays, although due to reasons much different than in the 20th century, it has been reactivated (Crook, 1994).
On the other side of the Atlantic, the similar theories positioned around Social Darwinism in the United States found its use as the founding blocks for the business efforts and the economic opportunities that can be used as the condition to reach higher consciousness. The significant difference between Europe and the USA in the initial adoption of emotional considerations, is to be found in the historical trajectories. Namely, the wars were occurring more frequently in Europe.
World War I brought havoc and destruction that gave birth to a multitude of negative emotions. Terrifying memories further led to the societal trauma that could not disappear, and that could not be adjusted or transformed into something pleasant. World War II had reinforced and brought various innovations in managing the destructive and overwhelming emotional aspect (Crook, 1994).
The war creates long-term emotional waves, shocks, and traumas that do not disappear but remain hidden, depending on the general economic and political climate. The irony is that the United States, for that matter, have developed a culture of fear originating from sources that are different from European and that, so far, do not bear societal traumas of such magnitude. Fear of the global power transition, the evaporation of optimism that was the main characteristic of American culture, and the remodeled underlying philosophy putting “America first”, are just some of the manifestations of the growing anxiety in the most powerful state in the world (Fukuyama, 2019). Fear of “Other” and fear of the future, however, did not unite Europe and the USA at the beginning of the 21st century. On the contrary, it has set the two main pillars of the West on the diverging policy paths that can be exploited by the challenging world powers, namely China and Russia (Rolland, 2019).
Even nowadays, in Europe, after relatively small-scale events, there is the occurrence of spirits full of dark emotions and aggressive intentions. One of the examples is seen during the Greek crisis, where many memories from the war events were brought forward as the overwhelming political discourse in the public sphere. Therefore, the emotional impact in Europe is powerful, and not even the intensive economic cooperation can easily override the emotional burden that accumulates through history. The emotional presence is an even stronger influencer on political designs in highly sensitive regions such as the Balkans (Ramet, 2004). Moreover, since the security dilemma cannot be resolved once and for all, there will always be the fear and the uncertainty of the future. Additionally, the political myths and the emotions will participate in the strategic decisions made by states, or nations, especially when the presence of the common fear is linked to the uncertainty (Anastasakis et al, 2016).
The uncertainty and fear are some of the most potent combinations that explain why states, in many cases, instead of choosing economic integration and business cooperation, counter-intuitively have the propensity towards the conflict that might extend their geopolitical goals. Only during the times of prolonged development, the long-term image of the possibility that economic cooperation and joint development becomes more important than the territorial and military power (Crook, 1994, p.80). Such a possibility can be offered by the emotion of hope, arguably present in China given the aggressive economic expansion and its long-term political design (Moïsi, 2010). However, even in the case of China, military power is not sidelined; on the contrary, it is firmly reassuring the other nations of China’s strategic intentions (Bremer, 2019). The military power can hardly have an alternative when addressing the security of the nation, as already stated previously. In consideration of the probabilities for lethal conflict, combined with the psychology of the masses, the notion of fear offers a reasonable basis for the understanding of efficient and dangerous political designs that were often used by states. The threat coming from “Other” unites the nation very quickly and in one alarming climate, closes the possibilities for shared development and efficient cooperation, even when there is no real threat (Crook, 1994).
In the climate of fear, governance modalities are limited, and the most common policy path is the extensive application of open or covert violent means. In such a climate, the emotional investment of the state mainly moves towards the demonization of the other nation, another state, another region, or other cultures (Darwin, 1998).
The Politics of Identity
During the recent protests in Hong Kong, the city-symbol of globalization, and one of the most important financial hubs in the world, there was a statement circling in the mass of protesters – “we are not Chinese.” Such a powerful message shows that the perception and the self-perception of a nation plays a vital role in current and future policymaking, as presented in the Vox’s reportage (2019). Namely, in one geopolitical system with imposed flexibility and distorted international rules of the game, the states are in need to have something substantial, that will, in times of increased risk, provide a psychological and cultural anchor. This anchor is the identity, as stipulated in the lecture delivered by professor Prevelakis (2016).
Ironically, technology has enhanced identity politics, making the world small, distorting the geography, and establishing the feeling of claustrophobia, thus reinforcing the perspectives that nations already held relative to other nations. Since the fixed identity is what people are born with, and creates rigidity in terms of cultural considerations, there is a reasonable possibility that policymaking can influence the notion of identity, remodeling or enhancing it, if this would be one of its goals. However, the identity is not permanently fixed, and despite the rigidity, it does have the notion of plasticity, and there is a possibility to change it (Kaplan, 2013). The identity can adjust through time, and it can be developed or narrowed through the experiences of the past generations. The national identity is essential since the nation-state provides and drains legitimacy through the shared national identity of its citizens. The nation-state is the locus of politics since it is the unit that deploys the power and power without the national identity is impossible to construct (Fukuyama, 2019).
For professor Prevelakis, the political and cultural identity helps people to adjust their thoughts on the living space, to find the perception of connection with the other states and with other nations. Additionally, it is one tool that helps, under general circumstances, to define the relationship with the environment, which is fluid and in constant change. It is also imperative to outline that identity shapes and reshapes what nations have inherited from the previous generations, therefore it also has the power and the ability to present and to project the long-term fabric of the nation (2017). The political identity offers a sophisticated balance used to construct relationships with others. Combined with the geographical innovations and with the principles of political geography, the politics of identity can, through the dialectic approach, explain what people understand, how they observe the events in a broader environment, and how the nation looks upon itself. The issue of political identity is central, the most important contemporary political issue, according to professor Prevelakis (2016).
Especially nowadays, the political identity overrides the personal, individual interest and the interest of the group, when there is a question of who and what belongs to the same nation. Within this framework, the political identity defines the network of solidarity, which is stable, and a relatively open system of relations and relationships that surpass the short and long – term periods, and structures stable linkages between the members of the network. Since in a complex and dynamic world this network makes the survival of its members more possible, using a multitude of mechanisms, it is obvious why identity, as a political issue, is so important (Moïsi, 2009).
Additionally, the identity influences the strategic policy of the state, and in a case when the network of solidarity is under pressure or in danger, this network can be easily transformed into a relatively aggressive mechanism. This mechanism will support the collective identity and will design the political structure above identity politics, and then may find its use for various powerful and potentially destructive means (Prevelakis, 2017). One crucial issue that requires the explanation is – what is happening to the individual or to the group that is outside of the mentioned network, and that does not share the political and cultural identity while having similar political geography or physical proximity with a specific nation?
This dilemma is indirectly stressed in Darwin’s book “The Descent of Man” reprinted in 1998, stating that the common language, shared memories, and kinship offers the basis and the excuse not to accept “Other” within the network. Additionally, following the explanation, it is even permitted to create the enjoyment of aggression towards the other individuals, or at least the indifference for the troubles and torturing of others, who do not belong to the specific network (Darwin, 1998) In simple, and very pessimistic terms, the people and the societies, but even “another, different” nations can be annihilated or become the objects of violent practices, without the ethical considerations, “since they do not belong to us, they are not us” (Darwin, 1998, p. 70).
Even in the case of well-developed cooperation between the nations and states, this approach is not entirely excluded. For Gilpin, economic interdependence did not decrease the level of competitiveness between the states and, although overt violent practices in the developed world become less and less common, there are other means of expressing enmity (Crook, 1994). The absence of stability and the global disturbances are setting the stage for the acceptability and desirability of this type of behavior, so despite the prevailing economic interest and the possibility of improved business cooperation, states may decide to inflict direct or indirect damage to other international actors (Keohane and Nye, 1989).
Additionally, addressing the dark side of the identity, to prepare the surroundings for the war or conflict, the “Other” should be constructed. In doing so, the state can galvanize support for the various unpleasant future events. It has been recently seen in the design of the New Europe (Margaritis, 2011). Moreover, within those types of geopolitical designs, “the Other” is not only different from “us,” but further, the “Other” is not even a human. States are often in the position to deploy such designs very quickly, after the practical application of persuasive political discourse, where the elimination of “Other” should lead to the return of the belle époque.
The examples from Crete in the Second World War, describing the locals as cannibals in the German press after the resistance, while preparing the public for the various violent practices, are well – known. This policy has led to the adoption of the law which would allow for the execution without a trial. A similar law was introduced in the German occupation zone in Serbia during World War II.
Unfortunately, this practice was common during the last Yugoslavian wars, making the crime and violence acceptable after the intensive propaganda from many directions. The Balkans region has compassionate practices towards the political application of the identity considerations, given the significant historical burden, and therefore it is always a good example when it comes to an analysis of emotions in politics. (Margaritis, 2016).
Image Credit: Jim Borg/Reuters