World Geostrategic Insights interview with Kenneth Bell on nuclearization, actor proliferation, and risk of potential conflicts in space, as well as on global powers’ alleged plans to militarize the Moon and the role of commercial space actors in the weaponization of space.
Major Kenneth Bell (Lt Col select) serves as Deputy Chair of the Global Security Intelligence Studies (GSIS) Department at the National Intelligence University, where he teaches applied International Relations theories and China military capabilities and strategy to mid-career intelligence professionals. He is a career US Air Force intelligence officer, having held unique assignments in space operations, the Joint Staff, and multiple civilian intelligence agencies. He is a frequent commentator on space policy and international affairs. Bell received his commission from Texas A&M University and completed graduate studies at The George Washington University and the National Intelligence University. — LinkedIn
Q1 – Last May, the Pentagon accused Russia of deploying a space weapon in the path of an American satellite, while Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Maria Zakharova said the White House wants to turn space into “an arena for military confrontation.” At the UN, each side then vetoed the other’s proposal to reaffirm the ban on placing weapons in orbit. In fact, the militarization of space already exists. Many objects in orbit have military targets, such as observation or listening satellites. Space is now already part of the military operational domain. But the fundamental issue is the deployment of weapons in space. For several months, the United States, the Europeans and the Japanese have been concerned that Russia is preparing to take the next step by deploying nuclear-powered or even nuclear-armed anti-satellite weapons in space. What is your opinion? Do these concerns have any real basis? Will escalation in the confrontation between the West, Russia and China inevitably lead to a nuclearization of space?
A1 – As your question rightly points out, the cat’s already out of the bag when it comes to the weaponization of space. In fact, as far back as the anxious days following the launch of Sputnik 1, the United States was already scrambling to figure out how to defend itself from what felt like a whole new level of sovereignty infringement. While the world watched the public race to the moon, there was an equally high-stakes, less glamorous race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union to develop counterspace capabilities to deny each other’s use of space — both for surveillance and the limitless warfare applications. After the Soviet Union collapsed, there was a brief lull, but under Putin’s leadership, a resurgent and belligerent Russia, coupled with China’s growing ambitions, has sparked new competition in space.
Today, many countries have arsenals of counterspace weapons: ground-based jammers, direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles, lasers, and even co-orbital weapons. US adversaries are particularly focused on these technologies because they’ve correctly identified the center of gravity in US military dominance abroad — space support. Think about it: GPS, satellite communications (SATCOM), long-range linkages, precision targeting — these systems are now critical to how the U.S. fights wars afar from its own shores. I dive into this a bit more in my recent SpaceNews article, where I discuss how the extension of space-based capabilities has played a key role in Ukraine’s ability to fend off Russia’s ongoing invasion.
What’s less commonly understood, though, is nuclear weapons in space are not the “next chapter” in the militarization of space—they were actually among the first chapters. Right after Sputnik, the U.S. jumped headfirst into developing direct-ascent ASAT missiles, but it quickly became clear the technology of the day wasn’t up to the challenge (you know, like trying to hit a bullet with a bullet). So, they turned to what seemed more feasible at the time: nuclear detonations in space. This led to a testing program which culminated with Starfish Prime in 1962, where we detonated a nuclear weapon in space. As you could imagine, the results were disastrous. Not only did it render every satellite over the hemisphere non-operational — granted, there weren’t many up there back then — but we also fried electronics on Earth nearly 900 miles away. If something like that happened today, with over 9,000 active satellites in orbit, the consequences would be unimaginable. It could even trigger the infamous theorized Kessler Syndrome — a chain reaction of collisions in orbit, knocking out access to space for decades.
Furthermore, it also became clear that even simply stationing nuclear weapons on-orbit as a delivery mechanism to ground targets would be catastrophic. The moment any country placed nuclear weapons in space, other nations would become obligated to follow suit, leading to a situation even more dangerous than the worst bouts of Cold War brinkmanship. Missile-warning times would effectively drop to zero for all parties. This would completely obliterate the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) — which, for all its faults, has arguably been the only thing keeping the world from self-annihilation for the last 70 years.
The implications of Starfish Prime and the prospect of nuclear weapons in space were so terrifying they even contributed to the world’s major powers’ willingness to negotiate the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Just about the only thing everyone agreed on in terms of space weaponization during those negotiations was that nuclear weapons in space were a bad idea — for everyone, for humanity, really. Remarkably, that understanding, and the associated international norms have held, even through the darkest moments of the Cold War.
So, what’s changed? The big difference, especially if you ask anyone in the space community, is the advent of proliferated constellations like Starlink. These systems are making traditional counterspace weapons less effective by the day. Essentially, they are fortifying the West’s center of gravity in space with redundancy, and ensuring space support for military operations remains solid no matter what. Russia, and particularly Putin, is in a bind. They know their current counterspace capabilities will soon no longer threaten Western space assets in any meaningful way. This is why we’re hearing reports of Russia reconsidering nuclear options in space — something even Putin’s advisors must know is a dangerous road.
But why even consider it? Dr. Aaron Bateman recently wrote a great piece for Foreign Affairs where he posits this could ultimately be a negotiation tactic — a way to force the West into some kind of concessions package in exchange for abandoning the effort. It’s an interesting theory, and given history’s lessons, it is certainly valid. But I’m not totally convinced those concessions will even be necessary. Why? Because China — Putin’s “no-limits” friend — has more to lose. China is increasingly reliant on space for its own military ambitions, and I am doubtful they would be too keen on Russia pushing the nuclear envelope in space. With a hyper fixation on Ukraine, Putin may be willing to take risks with Russia’s space capabilities, but China has far more at stake. I have a hunch the “no-limits” friendship could find one of its first major limits.
Q2 – The United States, Russia and China are at the forefront of research and development of military space technologies. But other countries, such as France, India, Iran, Japan, and North Korea, are also actively investing in space programs with a military dimension. Could this proliferation of actors significantly increase the risk of potential conflicts in space?
A2 – It might sound counterintuitive, but aside from congestion issues, having more actors in space isn’t necessarily a bad thing. In fact, it could introduce some stabilizing features to the domain. To clarify, when we talk about military space capabilities, we’re generally referring to three big categories: SATCOM, Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) systems like GPS, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). What’s important to remember is that each of these categories is very much dual-use.
Take SATCOM: it’s not only used to coordinate military operations but also provides global connectivity. PNT doesn’t just enable precision strikes, it’s also critical for aviation safety and serves as the backbone for financial markets. And ISR isn’t just for military surveillance — it also has scientific and agricultural applications helping to tackle major issues like climate change. So, as more countries invest in space, they also become stakeholders with something to lose. Irresponsible actions, like those we discussed in response to question 1, become less appealing when more parties have skin in the game. More stakeholders mean more opportunities for cooperation, which can lead to the development of positive international norms for responsible behavior in space.
Currently, around 105 countries operate satellites, and a more exclusive group of about 11 countries possess mature space-launch capabilities. But when it comes to effective “counterspace” capabilities, there are prerequisites which are much harder to develop — a mature, comprehensive Space Surveillance Network (SSN). An SSN requires a massive global infrastructure of ground-based radars, optical sensors, ground stations, and space-based assets to collect and process vast amounts of data. Simply put, you can’t shoot at what you can’t see.
As it stands, only three countries have well-established global SSNs: the United States, Russia, and more recently, China — whose rapidly expanding SSN I will explore in an upcoming research piece. While countries like India have demonstrated rudimentary counterspace capabilities, the scale is nowhere near the level of commitment and investment seen in those three great powers. And rest assured, these three alone create enough friction and risk of conflict in space to keep any strategist up at night.
Q3 – There is growing concern about the militarization of the Moon. Major powers are racing to reach the Moon and attempt to control its rich areas. The U.S., Russia and China have decided to send missions to the Moon within the next decade, targeting the same area, the Moon’s southern polar region, for its valuable resources, particularly water ice and other natural resources, but also supposedly for its importance in military terms. NASA has already expressed concerns about the possibility of Chinese deployment of military equipment under the guise of moon exploration. What is your opinion on the alleged plans for militarization of the Moon by global powers? What might be their implications?
A3 – I’m sorry to disappoint your readers, but I’ll have to semi-pass on this one. Moon bases, militarization of celestial bodies, and conflict over them are so far beyond the horizon in terms of grand strategy today that anything I say here would be pure speculation. That said, China’s intentions in this domain have been made quite clear, and it’s evident we need to rise to the occasion — whether to protect national security or simply to maintain great power prestige.
While the 1967 Outer Space Treaty does surprisingly address these matters quite specifically, enforcement of international law or norms on Earth is already a challenge. Trying to enforce or even influence them on another celestial body without a significant presence is another story entirely. Simply put, you can’t influence what you can’t reach. If we’re truly concerned about the Moon becoming militarized, let’s start with the basics: give NASA the funding and support it needs to establish a meaningful presence! Without that, we risk falling behind before the race even begins.
Q4 – The exploitation of space today is increasingly driven by private sector space technologies, which can have dual uses, both civilian and military. Recent conflicts, such as the war in Ukraine, have highlighted the evolving nature of warfare in the digital age. The use of open-source commercial satellite intelligence has become increasingly widespread, and commercial space actors are also playing an increasingly important role, shaping military strategies. What is your opinion? Will private actors increasingly dominate the militarization of space? With what possible risks and consequences?
A4 – The role of commercial space actors will share some parallels with commercial actors in traditional domains of warfare throughout history (like the sea), but the differences will be significant. Innovations such as proliferated constellations (like Starlink) and increasingly efficient launch capabilities provided by SpaceX are already revolutionizing the domain with military applications, much like steam engines, gunpowder, and sonar once transformed naval warfare. Just as commercial ships became prime targets for militants during conflicts at sea, it’s only a matter of time before commercial satellites or civilian ground facilities are destructively targeted by modern military forces.
The tricky part lies with defining acts of war and determining proportionality. When a ship is sunk in a blockade and sailors are lost, it is straightforward for a government to justify retaliation. The electorate can understand the human cost of going to war. But what happens when a billion-dollar commercial satellite, supporting a foreign conflict, is destroyed without any direct casualties? How should a government respond? Would it be proportional to escalate with a response that could result in the loss of life? Imagine a US president, sitting in the Oval Office, explaining to the public on national TV why we are going to war over the destruction of mere hardware owned by some billionaire.
Alternatively, governments might choose a tit-for-tat approach — responding by destroying an adversary’s satellite. But this becomes far more complicated if your military is more reliant on space capabilities than your adversary. What if you have more to lose on-orbit? This dilemma is especially relevant when projecting power beyond one’s hemisphere. These are uncharted waters, and we haven’t yet established clear answers to these questions.
Unfortunately, we’ll likely have to learn these answers the hard way — through experience.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy, or position of the National Intelligence University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.