By Andrew K.P. Leung  (International and Independent China Strategist. Chairman and CEO, Andrew Leung International Consultants and Investments Limited)

    At a time of paranoiac anti-China confrontations, it is instructive to re-visit Fareed Zakaria’s insightful analysis in Foreign Affairs dated January/February, 2020. In sum, we need to ask whether China is really such an existential threat to the United States and the global liberal order.

    Andrew-K.P.Leung_First, is China trying to take over the world as portrayed by Michael Pillsbury’s The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpowe(New York, 2015)?

    Yes, China has become the world’s second largest economy and is growing to become first within a decade or so. But regardless of anxieties about relative decline, the United States remains dominant in many matrices of world power, including global military presence, leadership in cutting-edge science and technology, alliance systems with leading advanced countries, and the mighty dollar.

    While China may be able to challenge some of these matrices, at least regionally, there is no indication that China will be able to take over the world anytime soon.

    Moreover, according to the latest survey of 6 October, 2020 of Washington D.C.-based PEW Research Center, Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries, at the end of the day, few countries want to embrace China’s political system. Nor does China want to rival American’s military presence in more than 70 countries around the world.

    Second, consider China’s perceived assertiveness in the South China Sea.

    As these waters are vital sea lanes of communication for China’s economic and strategic lifeblood (energy and trade), is it surprising that a growing China will want to guard against encirclement by US military assets in the so-called First and Second Island Chains and the Malacca choke point ?

    As China’s economy remains heavily dependent on these waters, of necessity they will remain free and open for international shipping. In any case, China is unlikely to be able to impose a “Monroe Doctrine” on the United States as a long-established Pacific Power, unlike the relative power position of the United States in 1823 vis-a-vis its European rivals, both geographically and militarily. This reality seems unlikely to change substantially in the foreseeable future. At least, geography is immutable.

    Third, since accession to the World Trade Organization, China has been the biggest beneficiary of the liberal world order founded by the United States. Despite perceived malpractices, China remains a staunch supporter of free trade and a multilateral system underpinned by global institutions including the United Nations.

    Instead of pushing for needed reforms of the existing liberal order, should the United States throw the baby out with the bathwater? Would unilateralism and rule of the jungle serve America’s best interests when the whole world’s supply and value chains are intricately intertwined, and power becomes more diffused, even with America’s allies.

    Fourth, as regards human rights and democracy, despite perceived transgressions, there is little evidence that the vast majority of the peoples in Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, let alone the rest of China, are demanding regime change.

    Not forgetting that the United States has its fair share of human rights infringements (systemic racism, and extrajudicial detention camp at Guantanamo Bay come to mind), compared to the West, the Chinese Communist Party has been enjoying increasing support by the people, according to a July 2020 Harvard Kenney School Ash Center survey Understanding CCP Resilience: Surveying Chinese Public Opinion Through Time. All seem to support the nation’s trajectory towards the China Dream of historic renaissance as a Great Power, bringing better and more dignified lives for its people.

    Fifth, with 56 different ethnic groups, and great divergence of development between provinces, Western democratic models based on multi-party adversarial electoral systems can only lead to fragmentation, if not disintegration. Unlike former Communists, China is not imposing its ideology on other countries, or gunning for regime change.

    Sixth, as for alleged belligerence, since the end of World War II, the United States has waged wars 57 times in 75 years. By comparison, China has waged few wars to speak of in recent decades, always pleading for peaceful coexistence, despite differences.

    Last but certainly not least, the world is big enough for diversity of political models, including China’s and those of Arabic kingdoms. While substantial corrections are in order and differences or conflicts with Western political values remain, there is no reason to cancel cooperation or partnership in defined areas, such as regional peace, denuclearization, anti-terrorism, and Climate Change.

    Indeed, measured cooperation will at least serve to calm down nerves, build trust for negotiations, and avoid a self-fulfilling security dilemma spawning unintended consequences that may spiral out of control.

    To put US-China power competition in a structural context, John Mearsheimer’s webinar on 15 October 2020 with the University of Chicago – The Clash of Great Powers: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Primacy is opportune. The above run-down may help to answer, some, of not all, of the vital issues he raised.

    Click here for an alternative view in Foreign Affairs (November/December, 2020) on how the United States should respond to China’s perception of America’s “hastening decline”. And here to listen to an American YouTuber living in China why an American patriot can love both America and China.

    Author: Andrew K.P. Leung (International and Independent China Strategist. Chairman and CEO, Andrew Leung International Consultants and Investments Limited)

    (The views expressed in this article belong  only to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy or views of World Geostrategic Insights). 

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