World Geostrategic Insights interview with Hazem Salem Al Dmour on what the regional situation looks like after the announcement of the restoration of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the foreseeable impact of the agreement on the role of the United States and China in the Middle East.
Hazem Salem Al Dmour is a Specialized Researcher in International Relations and Strategic Studies, General Manager of the Amman-based Think Tank STRATEGIECS – ستراتيجيكس
Q1 – On March 10, Saudi Arabia and Iran announced that they had agreed to reestablish diplomatic ties in a deal brokered by China. The Shiite Islamic Republic of Iran and the Sunni Saudi kingdom are ideologically bitter rivals, and this rivalry is one of the underlying elements that has characterized Middle Eastern geopolitics for decades. What are your thoughts on the significance of this seemingly unexpected agreement? Could the agreement reached in Beijing between Iran and Saudi Arabia open up changes of scenery at the regional level, for example on dossiers such as Yemen and Lebanon? What might be the consequences for Israel? Does Riyadh’s decision to renew ties with Tehran represent a blow to Israel’s efforts to increase international and regional pressure against Iran? In general terms, what does the regional situation look like after the announcement of the restoration of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran
The region’s crises and conflicts continue to prove the region’s need for a foreign party, in order to establish peace between the region’s countries, or to impose balances between its actors. While the announcement of restoring the Saudi-Iranian relations put China in a space that has been seen for decades as a role managed by the United States, it is too early to judge the outcome of that announcement. It is also too early to judge China’s ability as a mediator between two countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran to maintain those relations. Accordingly, affecting the regional situation is related to many dimensions and factors. Herein are the three most important.
First, the dispute goes beyond diplomatic, technical, or even political approaches. It is a dispute between two projects with different ideological backgrounds, according to which each side adopts a regional view completely different from the other’s.
Iran’s expansionist efforts involve spreading its influence and supporting armed groups in various countries as a means to protect its national security from potential attacks by the United States, similar to what happened in Iraq in 2003. While this strategy is not primarily aimed at Riyadh, it has become part of a larger confrontation with Israel known as the “axis of resistance.” This strategy involves creating an armed perimeter around Israel’s borders with the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, and Quneitra, with supportive forces in Yemen and Iraq, to counterbalance Israel’s technological and air superiority.
Second, there are other influential actors in the regional scene, especially Türkiye and Israel. While the scope of restoring the Iranian relations seems to be minor for Türkiye, but it intersects with the regional situation that Israel is seeking to establish, in terms of Israel’s desire to expand both peace agreements and integration with the countries of the region, and in terms of Israel’s attempt to establish a regional alliance against Iran. Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid described the peace agreements in the region as a collapse of the regional defense against Iran.
On the other hand, observers in Israel believe that Saudi Arabia’s continuation in its relations with Iran would not have been possible if countries of the region had confidence in Israel’s military capabilities to fatally strike Iran’s nuclear facilities or to enter into a wider war with Iran’s network of allies in the region. Therefore, Saudi Arabia chose not to bet on the capabilities of others, especially after it tested the American position during the attacks on Aramco petroleum facilities on September 14, 2019. Despite blaming Iran for such attacks, the administration of former U.S. President Donald Trump did not take a serious position that matches the danger.
Third, the U.S. point of view on restoring Saudi-Iranian relations is still unclear. On the one hand, America benefits from the fact that the agreement is commensurate with Washington’s desire to calm Middle East conflicts through diplomatic frameworks. Since its early days, the Biden administration encouraged adopting diplomatic frameworks in resolving disputes, and it authorized the countries of the region to follow procedures and steps aimed at reducing escalation.
Q2 – The Biden administration’s Middle East policy has been driven by attempts to reenter the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Jcpoa) -the agreement to freeze Iran’s nuclear program- and to build on the Abrahamic agreements the Arab-Israeli normalization, including Riyadh. What does the Iran-Saudi Arabia deal represent for U.S. interests? Is it evidence of the Gulf countries’ perception that the United States is slowly withdrawing from the Middle East, leaving a power vacuum? Is the United States paying for the decision to look more to the Pacific? Is the Iran-Saudi Arabia deal, brokered by China, an example of a possible new post-American Middle East?
The U.S. administration is still committed to concluding the nuclear agreement with Iran, especially after the two countries have made great strides in the Vienna talks. China remains a strong guarantor of the agreement, as long as it remains the only way to break Tehran’s economic isolation. Reviving the nuclear deal would return Europe and the United States to the Iranian market, making Beijing lose its leverage on Tehran and, at the same time, renewing resources for Iran to overcome many of its problems, enabling it to restore momentum to its foreign operations, as happened after the previous agreement in 2015.
The United State’s ability to influence the course of Saudi-Iranian relations, as well as the Chinese mediation, through U.S. parallel or intersecting goals cannot be ignored.
The U.S goals can be summarized as follows:
In the context of the U.S. strategy of operating in a secure regional environment in Asia and the Pacific, the U.S. allowed China to play a greater role in the Middle East with a view to draining China in the region’s complex conflicts. It is true that the Chinese diplomats have achieved great success, but they are facing many challenges in light of the ideological and doctrinal disputes between Saudi Arabia and Iran. For instance, the return of tensions between the two states is still very likely to happen. This could bring China to the center of conflicts, deepening China’s role in a complex and interconnected cycle of instability in the region.
The U.S. administration has repeatedly confirmed its intention to complete the Arab-Israeli peace agreements. The United States is focused on Saudi Arabia as the next country to join this agreement. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed the same desire. Nevertheless, there is an awareness in Tel Aviv and Washington that Riyadh’s acceptance of normalization with Israel, after the agreement with Iran, will be with higher expectations by Riyadh regarding the gains and results of normalization with Israel, especially with the vanishment of the common threat factor that Iran represented to both parties, which constituted a factor in the Saudi-Israeli rapprochement.
Q3 – Last December, Xi Jinping traveled to Riyadh to attend the first China-Arab States summit. During the event, the sides agreed to build a “China-Arab Community” with a shared future in the new era, with closer economic and political cooperation. Is Beijing becoming a geopolitical heavyweight in the Middle East? A major diplomatic player and mediator in the region? Does this pose a threat to the United States, or could the latter also benefit from a more stable Middle East?
Nonetheless, some American political and media elites view the agreement as one of the most important breakthroughs of Chinese diplomacy in the Middle East, as it came at a time when Washington is exerting pressure on its allies in the region to restrict Chinese access, especially in economic, political, and technological affairs. In this regard, the Saudi-Iranian agreement is interpreted as a sign of the U.S.’s decline in its ability to limit China’s growing influence in the Middle East.
In addition, the three parties to the agreement—China, Saudi Arabia, and Iran—are united in rejecting the American discourse based on reviving democratic values and human rights concepts, deeming it an American recipe for interference in the domestic affairs of countries. Taking into account the growing Sino-Russian alliance, the Iranian role in supporting Russian military operations in Ukraine, and Riyadh’s neutral position on the Ukrainian crisis, we find that the Saudi-Iranian agreement is strengthening the anti-American front, not only at the regional level but also internationally.
However, the impact of the agreement on the U.S. role in the Middle East remains limited since the Saudi-Iranian agreement does not enhance China’s role outside the diplomatic framework. Nor does it eliminate the major American role at the security and economic levels, especially in its relations with Saudi Arabia. After the announcement of restoring the Saudi-Iranian relations, the White House announced that Boeing concluded two deals with Saudi Arabia to manufacture up to 121 of (Dreamliner 787) aircraft, with an estimated value of $ 37 billion.
Hazem Salem Al Dmour – General Manager of the Amman-based Think Tank STRATEGIECS – ستراتيجيكس