By Slaviša Batko Milačić
At a time when Turkey is having serious difficulties in relations with many countries of the Western world, especially with US and the EU, and with a complex situation on the Middle East, relations with Russia are moving in a direction contrary to this picture.
In fact, to see how Russian-Turkish relations are developing, it might be worth recall a statement of Russian president Vladimir Putin. At a conference on October 22, 2020, a Russian analyst asked Russian president about Erdogan’s desire to expand Turkey’s zone of influence on the borders of the former Ottoman Empire. Putin gave the following answer: “I don’t know what Erdogan is planning, how he treats the Ottoman legacy. Ask him that. I know that today our trade turnover is more than 20 billion dollars… ”
There is no doubt, that this trade is extremely profitable for Russia due to Turkish purchases of natural gas. The next main area of energy cooperation is Russia’s Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant project.
One of the most important steps taken in relations between the two countries over the past year was the implementation of the Turkish Stream gas pipeline project, which transports Russian natural gas across the Black Sea to Turkey and further to the South East of Europe. The pipeline launch ceremony was held on January 2020. Thus, Russia connected with the Turkish market through another gas pipeline and acquired a new route that will allow it to diversify natural gas supply lines to the European market.
In addition, it should also be noted that from now on, Russians are the largest group of tourists coming to Turkey. In 2019, the number of Russian tourists visiting Turkey exceeded 6.7 million In 2020, due to a pandemic, that number has dropped.
As a result, in one way or another, there is a colossal intensification of cooperation between the two countries in the spheres of economy, trade, energy and tourism. Of course, as a new strategic factor, we must add the fact that with the purchase of the S-400 air defense system by Turkey in the amount of $ 2.5 billion, the defense industry also entered the list of these relations.
At the same time, however, there are issues on which, as Putin said in describing his work with Erdogan, the two sides disagree, primarily in the context of regional crises and disputes…
First of all, Syria. A particularly severe crisis between Turkey and Russia in early 2020 was triggered by the controversy over Idlib. This was prompted by a military operation launched in February by Assad’s army to liberate the M-5 highway in the Idlib region. Russia has provided strong support to the Syrian army with its fighter jets. Turkey has also deployed its military force to the battlefield to support armed opposition groups trying to stop the advance of Syrian forces. This situation brought Turkey and Russia to the pre-conflict in the city of Saraqib.
On February 27, when Syrian and Russian warplanes jointly carried out an air strike that killed 34 Turkish soldiers in Balyun, 10 kilometers south of the M-4 highway, was a very difficult event for Turkish-Russian relations from all points of view.
This event was followed by a visit by President Erdogan to Moscow on March 5, in the difficult environment created by the mentioned attack, however, an agreement was reached in the Russian capital. Relations, which plunged into a serious crisis after the attack on Balyun, found a different foundation with the formation of a new status quo, in which Idlib was divided into two parts under the control of the Syrian and Turkish armies. The result was that, on TV screens, we began to watch the Turkish and Russian armies march in joint controls on the M-4 highway.
Even the Syrian dossier is a stunning reflection of the paradoxical structure of Russian – Turkish relations. Turkey supports the armed opposition, Russia supports the regime, but at the same time the two countries are also cooperating on Syria in the Astana format.
While in Syria, Turkey and Russia are cooperating and confronting each other, they are more in conflict on the Libyan front. Russia sent Wagner Group mercenaries to Libya, to help that Khalifa Haftar won the country’s civil war. And Turkey intervened on the battlefield from a military point of view and hindered Haftar’s victory.
Later last fall, relations between Russia and Turkey passed a sensitive stress test in Karabakh, where Azerbaijan achieved great military success in the war against Armenia. Turkey has also intervened in the conflict that has erupted on the battlefield in the region, which Russia considers its “backyard”. Eventually, however, the crisis developed into cooperation between Turkey and Russia. The Turkish and Russian armies will jointly monitor the ceasefire.
Compared to the Caucasus, the examples of Syria and Libya are particularly evident in the conflict model. Likewise, it is not difficult to guess how Turkey’s rapprochement with Ukraine is also creating unease in the Kremlin. However, from all the above, it can be concluded that relations between Turkey and Russia can withstand the pressures of crises on the battlefield, conflicts and competition.
In any case, Erdogan’s economic policies are creating turmoil too, and Turkey’s people are now suffering real economic pain. Inflation and unemployment are rising. The coronavirus has taken a toll. The currency has hit historic lows against the dollar. And the continuing turbulence that Turkey’s relations with the West have recently entered could lead to an increase in Russia’s weight in Turkish foreign policy. In this case, one cannot ignore the likelihood that in the balance sheet on which Russian-Turkish relations are based, Russia will have stronger cards to negotiate with Turkey.
Author: Slavisha Batko Milacic (Independent historian and analyst from Montenegro)
(The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of World Geostrategic Insights)