World Geostrategic Insights interview with Rohith Sai Narayan Stambamkadi on the fundamental elements of Taiwan’s “Denial Defense” and “Porcupine Strategy, and the prospects for defense cooperation between the U.S. and Taiwan.
Rohith Sai Narayan Stambamkadi (Rohith Narayan) is the founder, director of the Indian Forum for Public Diplomacy (IFPD), a not-for-profit, non-partisan, youth-driven think-tank, that advocates civilian-led-strategic studies in India. He is a graduate in law and also works as the co-convenor at the Global Policy Insights (GPI). His areas of interests include conventional and sub-conventional warfare, US-China relations, strategic dimensions of terrorism and competitive political violence, and Game Theory.
Q1 – What are the fundamental elements of Taiwan’s “Denial Defense” and “Porcupine Strategy,” and how do you assess the contributions of these strategies to regional security?
A1 – Given the extreme imbalance in defense resources across the strait, Taiwan’s reliance on traditional methods to deter China will fail. Traditional capabilities require a long lead time and do not address the pressing needs of Taiwan, which are existential. To effectively address a full-scale Chinese assault, experts often stressed the need for Taiwan to adopt a ‘porcupine strategy’.
The strategy was originally articulated by Prof. Murray of U.S. Naval War College and emphasizes Taiwan’s reliance on a large number of dispersed, mobile, lethal ‘asymmetric systems’ to deter a potential invasion. The central idea of this strategy is that Taiwan must focus on developing and assimilating defensive capabilities to ensure that a possible invasion would be difficult and costly for China. The strategy aims to change or alter the expectations that China derives out of a possible invasion of Taiwan. Using a metaphor, Taiwan’s defense planners were advised that their defense posture must resemble a ‘porcupine’- a large rodent or a mammal that protects itself from predators with the help of its sharp spines.
This strategy also influenced the Overall Defense Concept (ODC) of Taiwan. The ODC is a series of ideas by Taiwan’s former Chief of General Staff , Admiral Lee Hsi-ming. The ODC defines ‘winning the war’ as ‘failing the enemy’s mission to occupy’, as Taiwan does not have the strength to go toe-to-toe in a traditional symmetric war with China.
In absence of extended or punitive deterrence, Admiral Lee argues that the only option for Taiwan is ‘Deterrence by denial’ or a defense that is capable of physically blocking an attack by the invader. Lee argues that traditional systems or large weapons like warships and fighter planes are easily detectable, and would suffer damage from overwhelming missile attacks staged in the early stages of an invasion. Contrarily, smaller mobile weapon systems that can be deployed in a dispersed manner will survive the bombings and inflict serious blows, increasing the cost and difficulty associated with an invasion. Hence, deterring China crucially depends on the ability of Taiwan to demonstrate proficiency in asymmetric defenses required to defeat an invasion force.
Q2 – What changes do you believe need to be made within the U.S. foreign policy and its defense industrial complex to support Taiwan’s defense?
A1 – In recent times, several dynamics have contributed to deficiencies in the US’s defense industrial complex and hence inefficiencies in the arms sales process to Taiwan. One of the primary reasons being increasing assistance to Ukraine, which entails allocating asymmetric capabilities that might otherwise be used for arming Taiwan.
Congressional officials fear that Ukraine’s war is exacerbating the nearly $19 billion backlog of weapons bound for Taiwan. The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission similarly argued that ‘diversion of existing stocks of weapons and munitions’ to Ukraine is delaying efforts to arm Taiwan.
Asymmetric weapons sent to Ukraine including HIMARS, NASAMS, javelins, stingers, harpoon anti-ship missiles, patriot air defense systems etc. have rendered reduction in the existing stockpiles, limiting aid to Taiwan, even as U.S. defense industry struggles to produce replacements.
Considering these factors, restoring deterrence requires an immediate trade-off for the U.S, since the current U.S. defense industrial capability is not equipped to accommodate the needs of both Ukraine and Taiwan. America’s support to Israel in the light of its recent conflict with Hamas, it’s ongoing operations in the Red Sea against Houthis, are likely to worsen this situation, and these trade-offs are likely to worsen as war in Ukraine wears on and the situation in the Taiwan strait becomes more precarious.
To ensure effective deterrence, the United States must accelerate its arms sales to Taiwan. Unfortunately, the recent depletion of U.S. stockpiles due to aid provided to Ukraine means that Taiwan must rely on the slower foreign military sales process. To expedite this transition, Taiwan should be prioritized in foreign military sales.
Simultaneously, the U.S. should increase security assistance to Taiwan, strategically facilitating the withdrawal of outdated equipment and the acquisition of new assets. Improving the arms sales process and adjusting export controls to allow for joint production of systems with Taiwan would also help address these challenges. Nevertheless, such assistance should come with strict conditions, requiring Taiwan to increase defense spending and adopt an asymmetric defense strategy.
Additionally, the U.S. needs to accelerate investment in its defense industrial base. This involves securing supply chains, supporting modernization efforts, expanding capacity, and mitigating concentration within the defense sector.
Q3 – What are the risks and Challenges associated with this approach for the U.S and how does this affect U.S’s promises to Ukraine and its European Allies?
A3 – None of the propositions I mentioned mean an abandonment of European defense; rather, they underscore the imperative for European allies to assume principal responsibility for their conventional defense against a weakened Russia, relying on the U.S. primarily for its extended nuclear deterrent.
Equipping Taiwan could likely exacerbate already strained relations between the U.S. and China and impede recent attempts to ease tensions. Nevertheless, these diplomatic efforts could only inadvertently validate Beijing’s aggressive tactics and reinforce the notion that its assertive maneuvers are effective in compelling the U.S. to the negotiating table.
Blinken’s recent visit to China followed by Janet Yellen came in the light of events like the spy-balloon incident and aggressive maneuvers by the PLA in South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. In one instance, a Chinese Navy Ship cut sharply across the path of a U.S. destroyer, narrowly avoiding collision.
By extending an olive branch without addressing China’s gray zone activities against Taiwan and in the East-China Sea, the U.S. risks signaling acquiescence to Beijing’s coercive strategies, potentially emboldening further hostile actions. If the U.S. comes to the table with China in ways in which it is favorable to Chinese interests, such diplomatic overtures may inadvertently signal weakness, and undermine U.S.’s resolve for Taiwan’s defense and its ability to confront China.
In this context, as a part of balancing its relationship with China, the U.S. can vary the quantity and type of arms sale to Taiwan in response to Chinese provocations across the strait by invoking its doctrine of ‘strategic ambiguity’ as it has conventionally done for years. In this manner, the U.S. would ‘NOT’ be deviating from its adherence to the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), as Taiwan would be in the market only for its ‘defensive’ weapons.
Q4 – What predictions can you make about the future of defense cooperation between the U.S. and Taiwan, and what innovations could this cooperation bring to regional security?
A4 – The US Departments of State and Defense, prompted by Congressional pressure, are now implementing various strategies to hasten the delivery of weapons to Taiwan. These approaches range from reviewing policies and processes to utilizing Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA). However, these changes would not suffice and there won’t be immediate and consistent deliveries of all backlogged weapons.
There will likely be a tiered approach to the delivery process in the near future. Firstly, items designated under PDA, comprising weapons, platforms, and capabilities sourced from existing U.S. stock, will take precedence. PDAs were primarily intended for emergencies such as disaster relief, but have now been extensively employed to counter Russian aggression in Ukraine, with 37 PDAs totalling USD $21.1 billion since August 2021. Under the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Taiwan was allocated USD $1 billion in PDA funds, with the initial tranche valued at USD $500 million, a figure comparable to medium-sized PDAs for Ukraine. This initial allocation for Taiwan may bolster Taiwan’s capabilities to some extent, but it may not be sufficient to address all of Taiwan’s defense requirements.
Secondly, items from the backlog prioritized by both US and Taiwan political leadership will follow. Considering heightened concerns about potential all-out invasion, this tier might include critical capabilities such as the Harpoon anti-ship missiles and other asymmetric systems.
Operationally, Taiwan’s military will initially receive a modest influx of new platforms, weapons, and capabilities from PDA and the U.S foreign military sales. Over the next few years, this flow is expected to intensify significantly, providing Taiwan with approximately three years to optimize its military training programs for the rapid and full integration of these assets, according to some experts. However, it’s important to acknowledge that expediting Taiwan’s foreign sales necessitates trade-offs from Ukraine and other parts of the world and structural changes in the defense industry as mentioned above.
Prioritization is a challenging task, yet it is overdue for the U.S. While China is acknowledged as an existential threat to Taiwan and the foremost threat to U.S.’s interests by the administration and the congress, their actions have not matched the requisite focus and immediacy. Admiral Philip Davidson, former commander of USINDOPACAM in his March 2021 congressional testimony stated that the PLA could be capable of a full-scale maritime invasion against Taiwan in six years i.e by 2027-28. This assessment is reinstated by recent simulations and wargames by experts. In this context, the timeframe to deter China is rapidly diminishing and the U.S. needs to act immediately by shielding the porcupine. Failing to do so could lead to the most consequential war since World War-II.
Rohith Sai Narayan Stambamkadi – Founder, Director Indian Forum for Public Diplomacy (IFPD)