A long time ago, in a world not so far away, one controversial strategic thinker wrote a thesis that dealt with the possibility of nuclear annihilation, its consequences, and – what is more critical for this brief reflection – what cascade of events would lead to such unfortunate circumstance of using the nuclear weapons. His name was Herman Kahn, initially from the RAND Corporation, later known as a founder of the Hudson Institute.
After more than 60 years, Kahn’s work has become popular, albeit not in a direct manner (fortunately). On 21st November, Russia launched a medium-range ICBM with allegedly significant destructive potential against Ukraine, named Oreshnik. The Russian President issued a public warning in his speech the day after the launch. Global decision-making circles were not delighted after such an event, despite the Russian pre-announcement regarding the missile launch, which allegedly follows the international conventions and treaties related to such circumstances. The Russian President forcefully stated that the use of such weapons is a direct response against the use of long-range ATACMS and Storm Shadow against Russia.
The Oreshnik-related analysis spans from claims describing it as an insignificant and relatively outdated technology system with limited destructive potential (the example: Professor Ted Postol from MIT provides a robust technical analysis of the missile, stating that the rocket’s impact is Ma 10) to an analysis stating Oreshnik is a highly developed and devastating weapon that can penetrate subterrane areas. Dr. Stephen Bryen provides an example for the second claim.
According to Dr. Stephen Bryen from the Center of Security Policy, the missile is a game changer in missile technology. It has a speed of 20 Ma and slowly decreases before the impact when the speed is halved to 10 Ma (one of the points congruent with Professor Postol’s analysis), making it a formidable weapon. Both analyses are publicly available.
The fact is that the use of the weapon when paired with the announcement of the Russian President, forms a political message consisting of explicit threats and ambiguous intentions of Russia if there is to be an escalation in this unfortunate conflict, which is now in a stalemate position. The Oreshnik is undoubtedly raising controversies, especially after videos where it could be seen that its impact almost looks like an otherworldly attack.
Under the basic game theory, the Russian move is the most rational. Russia has responded to an escalation by escalating it further after including a constraint in informing the international partners (the US) regarding the launch. This could be the first perspective, the most rational one, where the launch of the ICBM will not fundamentally change the course of the conflict that takes the shape of a stalemate. It is a move by Russia that should fine-tune the further responses while showing the additional war-raging capabilities. It aligns with the simplest form of theory devised by Thomas Schelling.
As for Herman Kahn’s theory, the second perspective could be disturbing. This perspective is related to media narratives based on the “rattling of nuclear saber.” This perspective is rich in constraints; however, many things could go wrong in a cascade of events. Randomness is always an essential factor to consider.
The possible use of nuclear weapons in the conflict would present Russia as an utterly irresponsible stakeholder, and the course of history would enter a very dark area. The probability of such an occurrence is very low, as it would require a series of highly adversarial and unfortunate events, potentially leading to the extreme level of the confrontational ladder (level 15 and level 16, corresponding to the nuclear strike and aftermath, respectively, as theorized by Kahn). Despite the narrative stating otherwise, Russia and China are two states highly susceptible to the image they project in Western-based policy-making circles and media. Using an overriding force would impose a different worldview on Russia, possibly long-term detrimental. Furthermore, the Collective West, primarily the US, is hardly inferior regarding nuclear potential, which is an additional constraint in the overall position.
A famous policymaker, Kennan, noticed almost seven decades ago that using tactical nukes in Europe would be catastrophic. Nothing has changed about that.
The third perspective: To Stretch the Market
Schelling and Kahn had a knack for economic reasoning, and it would be a pity not to include the additional perspective that operates in the adjacent domain to security. Namely, a so-called concept in the managerial sciences is “to stretch the market.” It is a well-developed market strategy to create demand and nudge customers into making decisions, paired with the intent to encircle other market segments and, eventually, expand the overall market.
As the duration of the war in Ukraine surpassed one thousand days, it has slowly built momentum, taking the shape of a particular global conflict, where Ukraine and the Collective West oppose Russian intentions (and, possibly, vice-versa) supported by Iran and North Korea (the Chinese involvement in this conflict is conspicuously silent). In terms of military spending, innovation, technological developments, and civil-military cooperation, this conflict will likely represent the most comprehensive case study in the tech-military analysis of the XXI century. The Great Powers, as could be noticed, are exploiting the international system’s plasticity to expand the military and security spending market.
Perhaps the global zeitgeist returns to the “it’s the economy, stupid” moments. And yet, the European security framework is far from stable. Leveraging security against economics has always been daunting and confusing.
Author: Dragan Vitorovic – International affairs analyst based in Serbia.
(The views expressed in this article belong only to the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of World Geostrategic Insights).