By Anton Evstratov
Recent protests in Iraq and Lebanon, the increasingly serious consequences for Iran from US sanctions, already expressed in massive anti-government actions on the territory of the country itself, obviously undermine Iran’s influence in the Middle East, but also raise the question of the future of the Iranian regime itself.
The events mentioned are perhaps the most serious test of the strength of Iranian foreign policy and the military-political influence of Iran in the region. Earlier, since 1979, the Islamic Republic has successfully and consistently built a Middle Eastern security architecture tied to itself.
Focusing generally on Shiite communities, Iran was able to attract Lebanon to one degree or another, where the Shiite Hezbollah movement became increasingly powerful, Syria, where Alawite presidents Hafez Assad and his son Bashar Assad demonstrated not only confessional loyalty but also political pragmatism, post-Saddam Iraq (60-70% of the population are Shiites), Yemen (where the Shiite group “Ansar Allah” serves as a support for Iran). The Islamic Republic in Afghanistan’s Herat, as well as the Shiite communities of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, have a serious influence.
Enormous resources, both financial, ideological and organizational, were required to form and develop this structure. Iran spends billions of dollars to support loyal governments. Moreover, in Syria he did not stop before armed intervention in the conflict for the sake of preserving the Assad regime, and in Yemen – before the military support of Ansar Allah. In addition, Iranian instructors form, and the treasury contains pro-Iranian police in Iraq and several other countries.
For operations abroad, a special unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Al-Qods Brigade, led by Major General Kassem Suleimani, who is currently the peculiar leader of Iranian foreign policy, at least in the Middle East, has been specially formed. Iran is actively developing a system of Shiite religious education on its territory (primarily in Qum), making it accessible and free for students from all over the world. And this is not counting information resources, television channels, radio stations, Internet portals and other infrastructure in dozens of languages, also developed by Tehran for its political and ideological purposes.
All this requires enormous financial costs, and until recently, Iran, rich in oil and gas, dealt with them. However, the last round of anti-Iran sanctions initiated by the United States after the failure of the “nuclear deal” put Tehran in an extremely difficult position. Currently, a serious and very dangerous recession from the point of view of future prospects is observed in the Iranian economy. Some experts predict a fall in the country’s GDP in 2019 up to 9% despite the fact that in the past there has been an increase to 4.8%. According to American economists, Iran has already lost $ 50 billion due to sanctions.
All this raises the question of reducing the Iranian military-political presence in the Middle East, and it is in this context that it makes sense to consider the latest regional upheavals. Firstly, Iran, actively investing in the military sphere, politics and ideology of the allied countries, practically did not deal with social issues, as a result of which they “lost” their society.
The only exception here is the Hezbollah movement, which built in Lebanon a system of hospitals and schools, mostly free of charge. However, the decrease in Iranian financial opportunities immediately raised questions for Hezbollah, which had previously been negatively perceived by non-Shiite communities in the country, but had recently lost the opportunity to operate on a social plane. Moreover, a significant part of the protesters and dissatisfied with the influence of the movement are Shiites, who had previously used all the benefits discovered through Iranian aid and now have lost them. This explains the anti-Iranian slogans and accusations of the Hezbollah movement of corruption, despite the fact that in fact it is the least corrupt structure of Lebanon.
Shiite protest is dangerous for Iran and in Iraq, where it is also noticeable and obvious. Unlike Lebanon, the pro-Iranian forces there completely and completely missed the social sphere, focusing on control over law enforcement agencies and departments. Moreover, the pro-Iranian police in Iraq turned out to be so powerful and influential that they duplicated the army more than once. This was especially evident in the battles for Tikrit in 2014, where the aforementioned Kassem Suleimani personally commanded pro-Iranian formations that foiled the IS attack and, in fact, turned the tide of the war in favor of the Iraqi government.
At the same time, the country’s political field is full of pro-Iranian figures, who, in the context of their movement towards confessional homogeneity and ousting Sunnis and Kurds from the political process, felt more and more relaxed and did not stop at the odious manifestations of corruption and nepotism. As a result, there have been protests of recent days, which have received much more than Lebanese actions, anti-Iranian character.
The participation of Shiites in the anti-Iranian protests (despite the fact that the traditionally anti-Iranian Sunnis and Kurds of Iraq, for example, refrained from expressing their position clearly) testifies not only to Tehran’s serious financial and political problems, but also to the need to correct ideological approaches. The Shiites of Iraq and Lebanon are increasingly expressing the idea that “Shiism is not equal to Iran,” which threatens the entire concept of the “Shiite Crescent” from Beirut to Herat, built for decades by the Islamic Republic.
Iran’s financial problems were the result of protests in its own territory, which also took place in recent days and were accompanied by numerous casualties. Lacking money, the government tried to compensate for it by cutting fuel subsidies for the population, which led to a massive social explosion. The protest quickly drifted from the economic to the political plane, was marked by slogans about the need to resign the government, the resignation of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ali Khamenei and … the need to stop the costly military-political programs abroad, directing funds to the needs of ordinary Iranians.
Despite the suppression of protests in Iran and Iraq and the relative stabilization of the situation in Lebanon (albeit at the cost of resigning from the post of Prime Minister Saad Hariri, however, who was never considered the pro-Iranian leader), it is obvious that Iran is less and less controlling the situation in vast areas of the Middle East – even among his Shiite communities.
Iran’s influence is diminishing – and there is already obvious political evidence for that at the moment. In particular, if earlier in Syria a trilateral format for resolving the situation — Moscow, Tehran, Ankara — operated from Syria, then the last meeting in Sochi, where Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan arrived, were not invited to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani. This indicates the loss of Iran’s role as a leading player in the Syrian conflict – even Iran could not take advantage of the US withdrawal from the north-eastern part of Syria, losing these opportunities to the Turks and Russians.
This geo-political retreat of Tehran from Syria, on which he spent truly enormous resources, is apparently only the beginning. US President Donald Trump announced the formation of an anti-Iranian bloc, consisting of the United States and its allies in the Persian Gulf, traditionally anti-Iranian. Most likely, it will include Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Moreover, the seriousness of American intentions is evidenced by the invitation to the bloc of Qatar, previously personally defamed by Trump and all American diplomacy as an “accomplice of terrorism” for the confrontation of Saudi Arabia and pragmatic relations with Iran. Obviously, the return of Qatar to the family of American allies is a serious concession to this country by Washington, which cannot but provoke a reciprocal manifestation of loyalty. In the future, Kuwait and Oman should also join the bloc, according to Trump, but their membership is in question.
Here it is necessary to add the conclusions of a number of experts about the American trail in the protests in Iraq, Lebanon and Iran – this is evidenced, in particular, by the very good organization of actions, the availability of sufficient equipment, etc. This was especially evident in Lebanon (with tens of thousands of “umbrellas” ) and in Iran (with operational documentation of police victims and the spread of protests throughout the country).
Faced with such forced and echeloned pressure in various fields, Iran is likely to be forced to curtail some of its activity in the region. However, this can lead to unpredictably negative consequences. In Syria in particular, the withdrawal of Iran as a third party and a buffer between Russia and Turkey seriously increases the chances of a clash between these players. Moreover, a decrease in the activity of pro-Iranian militias and their replacement with the Syrian army and Russian PMCs may raise the issue of a clash between Russia and the United States, which left some of its troops on the territory of the country to protect oil fields.
The situation will become even more dangerous in Yemen, where Ansar Allah, having lost part of the Iranian funding, will lose the opportunity to fight the coalition of Arab states. On the one hand, this will make it possible to reduce the danger to the territory of Saudi Arabia, but on the other, it stimulates the growth of military potential, the development and expansion of the territory of the Al-Qaida Yemeni branch, which is largely restrained by the pro-Iranian Shiites.
The destruction of the confessional unity of Iraqi Shiites, in turn, will put the country again at risk of religious and confessional confrontation – Sunni figures and Kurds simply will not miss the chance to once again reconsider the confessional realities of the state and strengthen their position. In the context of the intra-Shiite confrontation, the Shiite majority may not be able to adequately resist such aspirations. As a result, political measures, in the face of a huge number of armed groups in Iraq and the absence of their single command and submission, will inevitably be exhausted, and a new civil war will begin.
The situation in Lebanon will be equally uncertain in the event of a decrease in Iranian influence – if the demands of some protesters to abolish the confessional system of distribution of power are satisfied, the struggle between the Shiite, Sunni and Christian communities of the country will erupt, just as it happened several times during the 20th century. . Such a scenario, in turn, could provoke another Israeli invasion in order to create a “buffer zone”. Given the decline in Iranian support and the weakening within Lebanon, Hezbollah is unlikely to be able to restrain the Israeli onslaught, as it did in 2006, which means that there is every chance of the region slipping into a large-scale and long-standing confrontation.
Is Iran able to counter this scenario? As the most relevant information can be considered available in unofficial sources on the negotiations of Iranian conservatives with the Americans in Iraq. The same Kassem Suleimani leads them all. They relate to his possible presidency in 2021. If this information is true, then, perhaps, in exchange for softening the American position towards Iran, Tehran and specifically Suleimani will make concessions in the territories of its sphere of influence, thus preserving not only stability within the country, but also global, albeit and a somewhat truncated security architecture.
(The views expressed in this article belong only to the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of World Geostrategic Insights)
Image Credit: Wana News Agency/Reuters