By Anton Evstratov
The ceasefire brokered by Russia between the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides in Karabakh, on November 9, 2020, has very controversial implications for one of the main regional players, Iran, as reflected in its approach to the situation.
At first glance, given Tehran’s emphatically equidistant approach to Armenia and Azerbaijan, the situation has not fundamentally changed for Iran. Moreover, the ceasefire alleviates to some extent the tension on the Islamic Republic’s northern borders, where additional military contingents of the Iranian army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps were brought in during the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. For this reason, Iran officially supported the 9 November agreement. Furthermore, despite the de facto support of the Armenian side, de jure Tehran has repeatedly expressed its loyalty to Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.
It should also be noted that in reality, outside of official formulas and platitudes, the outcome of the 44-day war for Iran is by no means the worst option. Turkey, Iran’s main regional rival, is not an unconditional winner, being counterbalanced by Russia. The latter has not only moderated the negotiation process and the peace agreement, but has also deployed 2,000 of its peacekeepers in Nagorny Karabakh, thus significantly increasing its already powerful military presence in the region. Russian influence has also been reinforced by the Russian military infrastructure in Armenia – the 102nd base of the Russian Armed Forces with 5,000 soldiers has been deployed in Gyumri, Armenia. In addition, Russian border guards control the Armenian-Iranian and Armenian-Turkish borders.
It should also be recalled that the Iranian settlement plan for Karabakh, with which Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Arakchi visited Yerevan, Baku and Moscow during the war, was substantially similar to the terms of the November 9 ceasefire (not including, however, the Armenian concession of Hadrut and Shushi).
The unblocking of transport corridors is also useful for the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), as it is part of Tehran’s policy of rapprochement with the EAEU and the creation of a common Eurasian space. In particular, the possibility of deliveries of Iranian goods to Armenia through Azerbaijan’s railway network, which was recently integrated with Iran’s through the Rasht-Astara branch.
As a result, Iran welcomed the agreement through the mouth of President Hassan Rouhani and his Foreign Ministry spokesmen.
For the Islamic Republic, however, the fact that the Baku victory was achieved entirely thanks to Turkey, a NATO member, and Israel, America’s main ally in the Middle East (and therefore Tehran’s enemy), is extremely unfortunate. The latter has previously used Azerbaijani territory as a base for its drones engaged in reconnaissance of Iranian borders, and the former has seriously strengthened its already powerful military and political influence over Azerbaijan. In fact, the Azerbaijani armed forces are now part of the Turkish army, as from the first days of the war, control of the Azerbaijani army staff has been taken over by Turkish officers.
This has been actively opposed by the former chief of the Azerbaijani General Staff, General Najmeddin Sadigov, which has cost him his position, his career and perhaps his peaceful and secure life in his homeland. According to some reports, he has been arrested or forced into hiding in Russia.
Not only does Turkey control the Azerbaijani armed forces, but during the war it managed to transfer several thousand adherents of the Syrian Islamist and pan-Turkish movements to Nagorny Karabakh, and it is obvious that their appearance near the Iranian borders is an alarm factor for the Islamic Republic.
Furthermore, it is known that Turkey plans to repopulate the districts of Zangelan, Kubatly, Lachin and Shahumyan with loyal Syrian Turkmen, changing their ethnic composition. It is no coincidence that for Tehran the most important condition for the resolution of the conflict is the withdrawal of the mentioned formations from the territories of Nagorno-Karabakh and, preferably, from all of Azerbaijan. It is precisely to counter their possible activity that reinforced military contingents are still present on the Iranian-Azerbaijani border. For Turkey, they in turn become an important resource for further negotiations with Iran and for the realisation of its pan-Turkish idea, which contradicts a priori Iranian pan-Iranianism.
This concern is not just a fantasy, as Turkish-hired militants based in Azerbaijan have repeatedly declared that Iran is the next direction of their efforts after Karabakh and President Erdogan read an outrageous poem alluding to Turkey’s ambitions for Iranian Tabriz at the “victory parade” over Armenia in Baku.
The transport route linking the Azerbaijani-occupied territory of Nagorno Karabakh with the Azerbaijani enclave of Nakhchivan seems no less dangerous for Tehran. On the one hand, some Iranian experts believe that it could cut Iran’s ties with Armenia and even contribute to Azerbaijani or Turkish occupation of Armenian Syunik in the future. Such a scenario would not only close all issues with the Armenian-Iranian border, but also entangle northern Iran in a belt of states loyal to Ankara and its pan-Turkish policy. It would also isolate Iran from the economic and energy arteries of the South Caucasus, leaving the Islamic Republic of Iran out of the region.
On the other hand, even if nothing of the sort happened (which is more realistic), the opening of the corridor reduces the extent of Iran’s influence on Azerbaijan, because previously Nakhichevan communicated with Azerbaijani territory through the IRI. An alternative route, even if guarded by Russian border guards, would still diversify the enclave’s supplies, depriving Tehran of an important lever on Baku.
In addition to the geopolitical risks, the threat of Azerbaijani separatism in the northwestern provinces has taken on greater urgency for Iran. The success of the Turkish-Azerbaijani terrorist alliance inspires and gives a boost to local Iranian pan-Turkish activists funded and supported by Ankara and Baku.
Thus, despite a number of more or less localised positive factors, the outcome of the 44-day war generally goes against Iran’s national interests. Indeed, Tehran is deprived of its previous leverage over the situation in the region, and of a significant part of its authority, facing the deprivation of opportunities for Eurasian integration, as all transport routes in the South Caucasus will be to some extent controlled by metaphysically Turkish states hostile to Iran.
It is no coincidence that Tehran declares that for it the “red line” in the question of regional settlement is the inviolability of state borders. Undoubtedly, Ankara and Baku have something to offer Iran in return: non-adherence to US sanctions, inclusion in their regional projects and trade and economic preferences. However, on the whole, the structure being built in the South Caucasus puts Iranian interests in an inherently dependent position, and will pose much more serious economic, political and military problems for the IRI in the future.
Author: Anton Evstratov (Russian historian, publicist and journalist living in Armenia, lecturer at the Department of World History and Foreign Regional Studies at the Russian-Armenian University in Yerevan).
(The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of World Geostrategic Insights)