Interview by World Geostrategic Insights with Suzana Grubješić on the results of European Commission President Von der Leyen’s tour of the Western Balkans, the posture of the new Serbian government amid Moscow and the West, and the likelihood of a reversal in Serbia’s foreign policy to advance EU accession steps.
Suzana Grubješić is a Serbian politician who served as the Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia from 2012 to 2014 under Ivica Dačić and also served on the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia as both a G17 Plus member and United Regions of Serbia. She was involved in negotiations with the European Union and has actively sought integration of Serbia with the EU.
Q1 – European Commission President Von der Leyen began a tour of the Western Balkans on Oct. 26 in Skopje, stopping the next day in Pristina and Tirana, in Oct. 28 she was in Belgrade and Sarajevo, and concluded her trip to the region on Oct. 29 in Podgorica. According to the European Commission, the purpose of the trip was to reinforce the message of the EU’s solidarity and cooperation with the region, reiterate the importance the EU attaches to relations with the region, and confirm the willingness to continue on the path of EU accession negotiations. What is your view on Von der Leyen’s visit and results achieved?
A1 – The purpose of this visit was to reboot the Western Balkans’ stalled enlargement process in the time of geopolitics, and to deliver support to the energy sector amidst ongoing crisis provoked by the Russian aggression of Ukraine. The EU pledged 500 million euros of grants from the existing Economic and Investment plan. Serbia will receive 165 million euros of direct budget support to ease the impact of high energy prices. The visit was also important in the light of security concerns as there are still some open issues in the region that could create problems, and Russia continues to exert its geopolitical influence in the Western Balkans.
Two of the most vulnerable areas in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine are Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. During the tour, the European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen repeated that the EU would not be complete without the Western Balkans. Ten of fifteen years ago this message would resonate throughout the region, but not today. Despite numerous promises, the region is far from being fully integrated into the EU and no country has joined the bloc since 2013 when Croatia became an EU member state. In the meantime, we have witnessed the growing interest of Russia, China, Turkey and some other actors. If the EU wants to become a real geopolitical player, it has to start with the nearest neighbor, by restoring its credibility in the Western Balkans.
Q2 – Vulin, the former Serbian interior minister considered a leading voice of the pro-Russians, said in an interview with Vecerni Novosi published Oct. 14 that Belgrade should accept the fact that the EU does not want to admit Serbia. Vulin also criticized the EU as an institution, commenting, “With the loss of political independence, EU members began to lose their economic strength, which was the main reason for the EU’s attractiveness……The question is not whether we want to join the EU, but whether the EU wants Serbia. Judging by the crazy blackmail they expose us to in order to recognize Kosovo, abolish Republika Srpska and impose sanctions on Russia, they don’t want us,” he said. What do you think of these statements by Vulin? President Vucic’s new ministerial lineup has excluded Vulin and other prominent pro-Russian figures, though not all of them. Can this be seen as a sign of a slight tilt of policy toward the West? Or, as Brnabić, the PM of the new Serbian government assures “Neither for Moscow nor for the West, the executive will be philoserbo”?
A2 – Seven months after general elections, Serbia has finally got the government. One of the main challenges will be how to persevere with the hitherto balanced foreign policy, that is – threading on a delicate balancing act, on one hand pursuing the EU integration process and on the other, maintaining close historical and in some way political ties with Russia.
The composition of the new government does not give a clear answer to this difficult geopolitical position. Although Vulin is no longer a cabinet minister, unofficial information says that he could become the head of Intelligence and Security Agency (BIA), which would, with some other positions within the government, demonstrate that Serbia does not want to break with Moscow and become fully harmonized with the Western stance on the Russian aggression of Ukraine.
Given the official narrative and the message box, it is not very likely that there will be Serbian zeitenwende in the foreseeable future. But in the light of the war in Ukraine, Serbia, seen as the staunchest ally of Russia in the Western Balkans, will have to reconsider the quality of relations with Russia if it wants to make progress in the EU accession process.
Q3 – Serbian authorities have not condemned the Russian military intervention, nor have they endorsed the sanctions. Therefore, Serbia continues to raise concerns in the European Union for its non-alignment with EU foreign and security policy. The Serbian balancing policy is considered unacceptable and could lead to the effective halting of Serbia’s accession talks. Therefore, it seems that Serbia, in order to make progress in the EU accession steps, must make a U-turn in its foreign policy and, among other things, clearly demonstrate solidarity with Ukraine. In your opinion, is this a realistic option, considering also that Russia, and the attack on Ukraine itself, enjoys the support of much of Serbian public opinion?
A3 – Although it voted in favor of the Ukraine Resolutions in the United Nations, Serbia is still refusing to join the EU in their sanctions against Russia. The government, the largest part of the opposition and most of the general public share the same view on sanctioning Russia. The calculation is clear: not to damage the relations with Russia because of the Kosovo issue, but at the same time trying to remain on the road of the EU integration process.
In addition, Serbia is predominantly dependent on Russian gas and oil, although it will not be able to import Russian oil as of December this year, because of the EU sanctions. It has made concrete steps in energy diversification, building a natural gas interconnector with Bulgaria which will allow the gas supply from other sources. The Serbia-Bulgaria gas interconnector has been financed by the European Union and the European Investment Bank with the blending of €49.5 million EU grant (Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance – IPA II) and €25 million loan.
The issue of Kosovo, the EU accession process, the question of neutrality, the reform process, democratization and strengthening of state institutions, the fight against corruption and organized crime, inflation and energy crisis are just a few of the issues the new Serbian government needs to address so as to propel the country into developed and prosperous state.
The choices it makes in the months ahead will likely determine Serbian trajectory, and not having the European imperative at heart could be detrimental to its future, as the EU has been the biggest donor, the main investor and the most important trade partner of Serbia. But the glowing coverage of Russian president Putin in almost all Serbian media in last decade or so, as well memories of NATO’s bombing of Serbia during the 1999 Kosovo war, and cemented pro-Russian sentiment in the population that the ruling elite needs to appease, leave not much room for optimism that the U-turn in foreign policy is around the corner any time soon.
Suzana Grubješić – Former Serbian Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration, Senior Consultant