By Atta Ullah
In Pakistan, some intellectuals have openly criticized the country’s nuclear program for various reasons. The critique has also entered into the debate for some time. The arguments lack of logic and rationality, and are based on unfounded grounds.
Traditionally, the criticism against nuclear weapons has often been based on the exaggeration of unfounded “fears about humanity bringing its extinction” with nuclear weapons, among other associated risks.
This criticism has existed since the Manhattan Project and has largely been by idealistic physicists disconnected from the ground realities. Most physicists, including some in Pakistan, only focus on the technical aspects and the scale of destruction these weapons pose. However, these tech experts do not consider the zero-sum political dynamics, and the interests of states, in driving their security interests and survival. Moreover, they also ignore the political value and psychological deterrent effect of these weapons. They fear using these weapons in extreme conditions, which every country defines by considering its security interests. However, they ignore the fact that the greatest usefulness of nuclear weapons lies in their not being used.
Conversely, the critique has also come up with more criticism in continuation of traditional propaganda against Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.
In August 2024, a research paper titled “The Limits of Anti-Nuclear Critique in Pakistan”, was published in the Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament. The authors of the paper aim to ‘strengthen’ the nuclear disarmament movements by highlighting the limitations of anti-nuclear critique. They criticize the idea of nuclear risk reduction and co-existence with nuclear weapons as “dangerous thinking”, arguing that ‘real safety’ can only come from the “total elimination of nuclear weapons”. However, they do not provide answers as to who will achieve this and why. Throughout the paper, the authors in a self-explanatory fashion oppose the binary oppositions associated with nuclear weapons as ‘safe and unsafe’. Paradoxically, they end up favoring a non-possession of nuclear weapons instead of their possession, creating a contradiction in their argument.
Their article links the few social movements occurring in Pakistan as a critique of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, even though these movements may not be related to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons or its strategies vis-à-vis its adversary. The argument seems illogical and unconvincing, and it appears to be a continuation of traditional rhetoric against Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program disguised as a critique.
The authors use the term ‘Arms beast’ to refer to an arms race caused by Pakistan in South Asia, without giving a second thought to precisely what constitutes an arms race. Does an arms race involve excessive production of fissile material? Does it involve the conversion of all this material into warheads? If so, what size or yield of warheads are involved? Will all of them be deployed and ready to use, or will some be disassembled and de-mated, only holding symbolic value rather than being operationalized? The authors fail to specify at what point it becomes an arms race, or when it should be referred to as an ‘arms walk’, and at what stage this ‘walk’ transforms into a race. Because these factors are subject to utmost secrecy and never known to outsiders, even within the system only a handful of people are entrusted with confidential aspects of a nuclear arsenal. Most of the facts and figures about nuclear weapons, and related developments, are based on estimates, rather imperfect guesses, that lack authenticity. How do these authors claim and call it a nuclear arms race in South Asia, or especially caused by Pakistan, remains unjustified?
The authors argue that the security experts’ support is based on ‘social learning’, but they overlook the fact that they also may have been influenced by a biased tendency towards nuclear disarmament. The authors claim to have a critique of “Intellectuals and social critics committed to disarmament”, however, fail to present a successful case of nuclear disarmament between nuclear adversaries. They also fail to outline a systematic process for arms control, arms limitation, arms reduction, and other mutual measures leading toward disarmament, which has not yet occurred among any nuclear adversaries. Furthermore, they do not differentiate between forced disarmament and voluntary disarmament. Forced disarmament would involve eliminating a country’s entire nuclear arsenal through the use of force, a step no country has been willing to take due to fears that the target country may use them, rather than lose them. On the other hand, voluntary disarmament or abandonment of nuclear weapons has not resulted in the promised benefits, as seen in the case of Ukraine, which abandoned its nuclear weapons only to encounter ongoing conflict and devastation.
Similarly, the criticism is generally based on the notion that these weapons are “inherently dangerous, risky, and evil”. The critique does not accept any justification for risk reduction and fail-safe mechanisms that may prevent or mitigate such a scenario. As per this critique, total elimination of these weapons is the safest alternative possible!
In the case of Pakistan, there has been criticism of the economic cost of the nuclear program, military control of the weapons arsenal, and nuclear safety and security concerns. However, the latter concerns have not been fully substantiated. Questions about technical and operational management, particularly of tactical weapons and sea-based submarines, as well as the possibility of extremist ideologies posing internal threats, and the risk of these weapons falling into the hands of terrorist organizations, simply remain unjustified. It seems this criticism is simply a continuation of Western narratives against Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Moreover, even the critique presented by these authors, intentionally or unintentionally, seems to serve the same agenda as that of a few anti-nuclear activists pushing for nuclear disarmament in Pakistan.
On the economic cost of Pakistan’s nuclear program, the critique fails to mention that Pakistan’s main objective of obtaining nuclear weapons was to avoid economically ruinous large-scale wars and deter external aggression. This would ultimately lead towards economic development and divert focus from wars to national development. Although, the latter goal has not been realized yet. But for the former case on the economic cost of a nuclear weapons program, it would be easier to understand by using Ukrainian losses in the ongoing conflict as a point of reference. A report, for instance, published by the World Bank within a few months of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, estimated the scale of destruction and suggested that the cost of reconstruction could be well between $300 to $500 billion, and could reach $1 trillion in case war continues: which continues to the day. In its update, as of December 2023, the report places the cost of reconstruction at around $486 Billion, which is much more than Pakistan’s total GDP at around $345 Billion as of 2024. This is again for a war limited to eastern parts of Ukraine, on merely some 25-30 % of its territory. Pakistan may have hardly invested a fraction of this amount in its nuclear weapons arsenal which deters large-scale war and destruction. If it has been, rather it is, able to avoid the above level of destruction from full-scale wars, the investment has been worth it.
On the safety and security of nuclear facilities, the authors fail to mention one of the worst nuclear disasters that took place in Japan, in 2011 called the Fukushima Disaster, which is not a nuclear weapons state. The power plant was used for electricity generation. Presently, there are some 440 nuclear plants run by around 32 countries. Why are the safety and security concerns directed only against Pakistan, but not the remaining ones? Do the critics ignore and oppose the peaceful use of nuclear technology? Or don’t they think the nuclear plants used for power generation also pose similar risks to safety and security in more than 32 countries?
Likewise, the Physicist may technically draw the silver line by separating the peaceful uses of technology from Weaponization but fail to realize that it is politics that drives scientific innovation. Technology/strategy always remains subservient to politics. Additionally, the political and security interests of countries that blur the line between peaceful uses of nuclear technology from its Weaponization are dictated by the political interest of major players in international politics, not by isolated cases of idealism and imagination of a few physicists. For instance, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty(NPT), in its article 4, says that it is ‘the right of member countries to pursue peaceful uses of nuclear technology’, but fails to prevent countries, including its former member North Korea and non-members such as India, from deviating nuclear technology from peaceful uses towards weaponization. In this treaty, it is the politics, not the physics that fails to explain the Western opposition to even Iran’s peaceful nuclear program, which it being a member of NPT has the right to pursue. The critics fail to realize that it is politics, rather than physics, that fails to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is also politics, not physics, that designates certain countries as legitimate nuclear weapons states while others are labeled as non-nuclear weapons states, despite the equally destructive potential of the weapons possessed by both sets of countries.
In summary, both the critics in general and the authors of the article above-mentioned, have tried to come up with a critique out of the limits of another critique, but ultimately ended up supporting anti-nuclear narratives in Pakistan. Their critique of the ‘limits of critique’ has its own limitations and sometimes devolves into a criticism, without logical grounds. It is puzzling why these authors seek to create an anti-nuclear movement in Pakistan while overlooking countries like India and others that possess and modernize nuclear weapons. Additionally, they attempt to link such movements to strengthening the “anti-nuclear critique” for nuclear disarmament, despite the absence of evidence of nuclear disarmament among nuclear weapons states. These authors appear to be anti-nuclear activists without realizing the value of nuclear deterrence and its significance in deterring potential adversaries.
Author: Atta Ullah – Research Assistant at Balochistan Think Tank Network(BTTN), Quetta.
(The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of World Geostrategic Insights).
Image Credit: AP