World Geostrategic Insights interview with Thomas Wuchte on the results of the Camp David summit between South Korea, Japan, and the United States, the ongoing “dialogue” between South Korea, Japan, and China, and the prospects for establishing a multilateral security structure in Northeast Asia.
Thomas Wuchte is the founder of the Multilateral Collaboration and Cooperation Leadership (GCMCC), based in Washington DC-Baltimore area and Bangkok. He has served as executive director of the International Institute for Justice and Rule of Law, Valletta, Malta, senior managing director at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), senior adviser to the U.S. Department of State, and as an official at the U.S. Department of Defense.
Q1 – On August 18, 2023, South Korea, Japan and the United States set a “new milestone” in cooperation at a historic summit at Camp David, Maryland. The United States President Joseph Biden convened this summit with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol to consolidate a common security agenda among the three countries to deter China and North Korea. The summit produced a joint statement nicknamed “The Spirit of Camp David,” as well as separate trilateral principles and a joint commitment to consult each other on security threats. What is your view about the results of the summit? Was it aimed at forming a “mini NATO”? In general, what will this summit and the resulting commitments mean for security in the Northeast Asia region?
A1 – The summit is a logical outcome after years of little to no progress under the Six-Party Talks formula. Without a degree of direct knowledge of the long-term expectations and funding, forming a “mini NATO” would be nearly impossible as a resource based approach. And not a needed approach as a first step to ameliorate long-standing challenges. When I often discussed this at a policy level in the early-to-mid 2000’s and the Six-Party Talks had some periodic engagement, a more developed regional structure along the lines of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was exhaustively examined, debated, but lacked the political will to reach agreement. My answers to these questions draw from this and where we are today, namely in applying European models to other regions. When proposed quite formally such a model after the OSCE, policymakers like-minded with the U.S. then saw the Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as the better security policy alternative and not a new structure. I see that the summit recognizes a more focused and smaller cooperation agreement could make more traction today and that the ASEAN Regional Forum cannot solely address Northeast Asia adequately. The current security environment predicts that it would be difficult to institutionalize confidence- building measures in the region soon beyond the USA, Japan, and Korea—albeit one could include Taiwan as a silent partner for areas such as maritime collaboration. There are many barriers and challenges impeding security cooperation among even those three countries with recognition that then to include China as an adjacent regional linchpin. These challenges include but are not limited to long-lasting bilateral maritime disputes, historical issues, and power competition between and among the alliance relations of each country. The contemporary public impression toward relations of each country is episodic and at times unfavorable, but better today than in the early 2000’s.
At the outset, I hope this summit renews a focus on why a more robust multilateral cooperation structure along the lines of the OSCE has not developed. In my opinion, there are countless permutations on why this has not occurred. Primarily, it takes a significant collective decision to carve out a confidence-building or cooperation structure. The reality is that one must first have the political will to start such a process and then the resources devoted to pushing such an idea forward over the following years. This summit in many respects is a great strategic choice in my opinion and my enthusiasm accompanies the recent political will among Japan, South Korea and the United States. I am enthusiastic to know some form of multilateral collaboration has a foundation. Yes, there is a crisis everywhere, along with Ukraine, Israel, and elsewhere, but the task of strengthening constructive engagement among the countries of Northeast Asia is nevertheless especially timely and important long-term. Another conflict flashpoint in especially the maritime environment of Asia would be almost an insurmountable barrier to global growth because of the supply chains.
Our leaders can think strategically while addressing current crises and must. Europe benefited from a regularized process to interact and there is already a long history behind the Helsinki Final Act principles and the OSCE experience. I remain steadfast that multilateral collaboration is the only long-term win-win—while recognizing that the OSCE has many challenges now to implement its own confidence building approaches. The affected parties are aware of these models and perhaps are simply not ready to make the degree of political sacrifice necessary to join a more collective approach to security considerations. We should not abandon hope and the summit is a fresh start.
Q2 – On Sept. 26, 2023, South Korea hosted senior diplomats from China and Japan for a rare trilateral meeting, seen as an attempt to ease Beijing’s concerns over Seoul and Tokyo’s growing security ties with the United States and to revive a long-dormant trilateral leaders’ summit. What is your opinion? Could South Korea and Japan achieve good relations with China despite their strong partnership with the United States?
A2 – My experience over time of our efforts and discussions within the international arena revealed that a central question/objection to an “OSCE for Northeast Asia” and developing security ties starting with Japan and South Korea was that it would be seen as a means of “limiting China” (for the reader as background, the OSCE outreach partners in Asia are – Afghanistan, Australia, Japan, South Korea and Thailand). These partners were primarily viewed as either American allies or closely aligned with the United States. Afghanistan has significantly changed in that respect, and I recognize North Korea is ever present but far from any partnership with any of the summit parties. Mongolia was an Asian outreach partner that the OSCE participating States reached agreement to add as the 57th member, geographically between Russia and China. So, “how to dialogue with China?” is the other important question. In some ways, addressing the topic of a trilateral organization of which China is a member makes that question less of an issue, it seems to me. China already has a seat at one trilateral table, and so discussing the OSCE or other processes/mechanisms in that context does not have to appear and need not appear exclusionary. They are already in the mix at one level, and I think that helps a great deal and shows real promise. I refer here to the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) with China, Japan, and South Korea. This is simply a point to note and the Secretariat largely convenes discussion that is neutral in topic and approach. The TCS has many trilateral mechanisms that are generally socio-economic confidence building and not security per se.
Beyond the TCS and preceding point on the ASEAN Regional Forum, Northeast Asia does not have a comparable structure for another regional security forum or even agreement to initiate such an alternative mechanism—there will need to be an effective vehicle to formalize this intensified exchange—if the desire to move from transactional agreements to more collective partnership can be agreed. One would have to build from the summit slowly. The first step is to demonstrate that, like the OSCE experience and similar venues for security dialogue and cooperation, a small at first secretariat has direct relevance in addressing the persisting challenges unique to Northeast Asia. With so many pressing issues left unresolved, it makes best sense to concentrate on some elements of existing models to move multinational and/or multilateral diplomacy forward in Northeast Asia.
For example, one could start with attention on the security dimension approach of the OSCE; specifically, the dialogue exchanged within the framework of the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) or the Security Committee of the Permanent Council (PC). In a world today where strategic thinkers dwell on the “globalization” of ideas and issues, what has otherwise been unable to gain traction—the connection between established multilateral frameworks in Europe so they can be applied to a region with similar problems but less robust institutional frameworks for precisely this dialogue. International, regional and sub-regional organizations have an important role in endeavors to deal with global threats to peace and security, including from my background in counterterrorism.
The phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) is not new, although it has taken on a new significance and magnitude over the past 10 years, and more recently since Northeast Asia models were last closely considered. FTFs touch on several counterterrorism issues that the international community has sought to address and generally finds this one area of agreement. The ARF, ASEAN, and OSCE have been active regional contributors to these FTF efforts through promoting policy dialogue, exchange of experiences and capacity building. Over the past ten years, the OSCE significantly broadened its definition of security around counterterrorism and in many directions, including community policing, borders, as traditional FSC issues waned. Northeast Asia could start with such incremental co-operation that is specific to the region and I would suggest with a stronger border focus.
Q3 – Northeast Asia is a region characterized by tremendous economic dynamism and growing socioeconomic interconnectedness. At the same time, Northeast Asia, which includes China, Japan, North and South Korea, Taiwan, and adjacent waters, is arguably one of the most unstable and conflict-prone regions in the world. Strategic uncertainties and geopolitical tensions, exacerbated by unresolved historical issues and mutual distrust, hinder a common approach to regional security. How do you see the diplomatic and security environment in Northeast Asia? How to combine regional economic interdependence with regional political and security cooperation? How is the debate on multilateral cooperation in the region progressing? What are the prospects for the establishment of a multilateral security structure in Northeast Asia?
A3 – Over the years, different countries of the subregion have suggested proposals for establishing a more robust multilateral cooperative security structure, but none of them has yet become reality. The OSCE, as mentioned previously, may be particularly relevant to Northeast Asia where the interests of some of the world’s great powers intersect. This subregion of East Asia is a security complex of its own but as noted lacks a full-fledged institutionalized forum for discussing security concerns. The interest in establishing a security forum appeared to be linked at least potentially to the Six-Party Talks more than a decade ago. I am more optimistic to go beyond the Question’s premise: Northeast Asia is not unstable. North Korea is belligerent but understands that it does not have the conventional or asymmetric forces to truly threaten South Korea (except for nuclear weapons). And due to the sure retaliatory consequences, it does not make any sense for the North to use nuclear weapons, although it does make sense to threaten their use. Departing from this point, confidence-building measures (CBM) can be explored.
CBMs are security measures that were developed in the 1970s during the Cold War. CBMs were used to avoid military conflicts arising due to sudden incidents or misunderstandings about the intentions of the other side. They are now a legacy pillar of security policy in Europe and elsewhere that are admittedly overcome by the withdrawal from various treaties or agreements—take for example the Open Skies Treaty which embodied the spirit of transparency. Such measures as information disclosure, regulatory action, and improvements in communication are often the first steps. Moreover, they can be effective even in cases where sides are hostile towards the other party and those concerned wish to prevent the escalation of conflict. To build CBMs for prevention of maritime and air conflicts among the East Asia region, it is necessary for the three countries to start their efforts from working in common purpose and ameliorating the ongoing conflicts over disputed territories and waters, while long-term communication and cooperation are attached with equal significance.
I recognize the current environment points to a near total collapse of many of the European CBMs in practice. They did provide much collaboration when tensions were not fraught as today with Ukraine and a more diffuse multipolar competition. I still believe CBMs building among the three summit countries can be concluded in the following aspects (and perhaps others). Personnel exchange: The purpose of personnel exchanges is to show that even though their goals may differ, each has adequate professional control over their actions, and will make rational decisions while avoiding emotional, hostile reactions. In other words, it shows that both sides have the capability to work together for the realization of the common interest. Strengthening “Track II dialogues”. Due to the “sensitive” history and territorial issues among the three countries, dialogues at the government level are sometimes rather difficult to carry out. Therefore, great importance is attached to Track II dialogues established among scholars who are expected to carry out cooperative studies that would enhance mutual understandings and provide constructive suggestions to governments.
Moving ahead and beyond the Six-Party Talks was often echoed as a vague possibility resulting from some yet-to-be-reached success or breakthrough in the diplomatic conclusion. This summit perhaps places the Six-Party Talks aside and concentrates on how Northeast Asia could benefit the most from intensified exchange with trilateral partners (Japan, South Korea, United States), and to employ conflict prevention and crisis management tools to counter emerging challenges. While the surrounding nations, as well as the larger Asia-Pacific Region, are now embracing preventive diplomacy as it applies to intra- and interstate conflicts, the main effort worked primarily before the summit through the ASEAN Regional Forum. The summit opens new possibilities for a multilateral security structure, and I am hopeful the prospect that multilateral cooperation does progress can result in the formation of a standing secretariat.
Thomas Wuchte – Founder of the Multilateral Collaboration and Cooperation Leadership (GCMCC), based in the Washington DC-Baltimore area and Bangkok.
Image Credit: AP