World Geostrategic Insights interview with Jean Paul Perruche on the effectiveness of EU measures aimed at strengthening member states’ defense industries, the possibility of configuring a common European defense instrument, the feasibility of extending French nuclear deterrence to the whole of Europe, and whether a European defense system, a real army, should replace NATO’s security system or simply be complementary.
Lieutenant General (Ret) Jean Paul PERRUCHE is a consultant in defense and security strategy. He was director general of the European Union General Staff (DGEUMS) and president of EuroDefense-France.
Q1 – In the EU, the arms industry reached a turnover of 135 billion euros in 2022 (up 10 percent from the previous year) and employed about 516,000 people (up 4 percent from the previous year). However, no company from an EU country appears in the ranking of the ten largest companies by turnover worldwide. The defense industry in the European Union still appears to be characterized by “duplicative” development investments, collaborations outside the EU’s borders, and capacity shortages. For example, the increased demand for war materiel following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led to European manufacturers being unable to meet government demands and, in some cases, unable to meet their commitment to supply munitions to Kiev. The European Commission recently launched a program to strengthen the European defense through a close integration of the continent’s defense industries in order to rationalize the acquisition of strategic materials, eliminating waste, duplication and inefficiency and achieving considerable economies of scale. Specifically, by 2030, EU countries should jointly purchase at least 40 percent of defense equipment; spend at least half of their defense procurement budgets on European-made products; and trade at least 35 percent of defense goods among EU countries rather than with other countries. Goals that will depend mainly on the good will of member states and national defense industries. What is your opinion on such a strategy? Is it an important step toward a common European defense?
A1 – The observation you make is correct with regard to the European defense industry. The measures taken by the European Commission to correct the deficiencies you point out are in the right direction. On this subject, the EURODEFENSE association (think tank) in which I participate, has just addressed the following recommendations to our national and Brussels political authorities:
We propose that strengthening the common defense and security of member states should focus on
- Strengthening our capacity to act through establishing military planning and truly respective operational capabilities as well as strengthening the cooperation of our further instruments of power such as diplomacy, intelligence, police and economy to respond adequately to conventional and hybrid challenges to our security and defense;
- Advancing the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) at the level of prime contractors; cooperative programs must serve consolidation and integration of European champions with sustainable critical mass compared with international competitors;
- Building defense innovation clusters at SME level in close cooperation with science and research institutions, focusing on highly agile software architectures and taking advantage of disruptive technologies such as 6G, Al, digital twins, data centers, space and quantum technologies;
- Promoting a European regulatory framework that gives non-discriminated access to financial markets for the European defense industry in order to invest in innovation needed by our armed forces in a changed environment- overcome unfair EU’s Sustainable Finance Taxonomy or other sustainability/ESG-related initiatives.
- Enhancing the supply chain (European Defence Equipment Market – EDEM), while spreading production across Europe to ensure adequate resilience;
- Establish a “European first” policy as a prerequisite for critical mass, thus ensuring the need to prepare for future joint developments, while of course not excluding US solutions through comprehensive comparisons;
- Enhancing our capacity to act through a robust export strategy as another prerequisite for critical mass. To this end, the trilateral Franco-German-Spanish Agreement on Arms Export Controls should serve as a key element of our – and other European partners -arms cooperation.
Now is the time for the Franco-German engine to deliver in European security and defense, thus building a second line of defense against critical global challenges to our security, prosperity and way of life.
This sums up what we think necessary to improve significantly performance of the EDTIB in a very competitive context.
Q2 – There is broad support, especially in the face of global geopolitical upheavals and the war in Ukraine, for the idea of establishing a “Common European Defense,” even a “European Army,” a project that now appears necessary, feasible and inevitable. However, the difficulties that hindered the creation of a common European Army in the past remain. For example, to what supranational authority would a European Army be answerable, what powers should such an authority have in formulating urgent military directives in the event of conflict? In a realistic scenario of differing opinions and conflicting interests among sovereign states, how would the European military instrument and its politico-military leadership be positioned? National vetoes could greatly reduce its operability. If we look at the war in Ukraine, we see that beyond formal unity in countering Russian aggression, there are significant differences between states, such as France and some Baltic countries now proposing the deployment of European troops in western Ukraine, while most European countries categorically rule it out. What is your opinion, how could a real common European defense instrument be configured?
A2 – It is true that most citizens of the EU countries wish intuitively to see Defense conceived and set up at the EU level (i.e EuroBarometer of the EU Commission on this issue). It makes sense while the balance of power of EU Member States with emerging countries show that they are less and less able to deliver all defense capabilities they need at national level.
Nonetheless it is unrealistic to think of an European Army as long as a Federation of European Countries has not been created and even if we may wish it, it can only be a goal for the long term which will not happen soon. However that doesn’t mean that the Europeans should stay unable to act collectively in defense out of the US leadership if necessary. The recent blocking of aid to Ukraine by the American Congress and the prospect of a re-election of Donald Trump as President next November is enough to show the risk of total dependence of Europeans on the American security guarantee in the future. What Europeans can do without delay is to plan in anticipation of collective operations to be launched to respond to common threats as identified in the strategic compass approved by the European Council in 2022 (including against Russia). From these scenarios, these contingency planning should plan in advance the operations to be launched, the political and military command systems as well as the forces that the nations would be ready to commit. This is how NATO has worked for decades under American leadership. This flexible approach makes it possible to take into account the interests and sensitivities of the different Member States in the various situations without blocking a collective capacity of action.
Q3 – In defining a common European Defence structure, the issue of nuclear deterrence assumes relevant importance. Should Europe be equipped with its own nuclear deterrent system? And who should have the power, and key, to decide on its possible use? There is only one nuclear power in the European Union, namely France. Nuclear deterrence is at the heart of France’s defense strategy and the quintessence of its sovereignty. Could it be extended to the whole of Europe?
A3 – It is certain that an autonomous defense of the European Union cannot be conceived without nuclear deterrence. For the moment this is supposed to be ensured by the American security guarantee. But it is not certain that this guarantee will be eternal.
France is the only EU member state with a nuclear deterrent , which is linked to the vital interests of France and cannot therefore be considered as a European deterrent, even if, as several French Presidents have pointed out, these cannot be limited to French territory and therefore extend to threats against other European countries. In addition, a solid European conventional collective defense capacity is likely to strengthen the credibility of French deterrence extending to other EU countries, with possible association measures comparable to those underway in NATO. (NPG and deployment of resources in other countries, but under implementation controlled by the US)
However, the credibility of nuclear deterrence remains linked to the speed of decision of the person in charge who has the key and who can only be unique.
This is why a purely autonomous European nuclear deterrent cannot exist unless a European federal government exists.
Q4 – Should a European defense system, a real army, replace the NATO security system or simply be complementary?
A4 – So far, the EU CSDP has been censored because of the existence of NATO. Most EU member states that were also NATO members feared that the development of European autonomous capabilities would affect the American security guarantee.
This is why the ambition of the CSDP was limited to the management of low intensity crises outside European territory, the EU does not have a permanent complete operational chain of command and the volume of projectable forces is limited at 5000 troops.
It goes without saying that this does not correspond to the Europeans’ need for operational autonomy in the event that the Americans cannot or do not wish to intervene in Europe.
It is therefore urgent that Europeans can develop collective capabilities for high-intensity operations. This is possible in NATO by creating a European pillar capable of acting with the Americans or autonomously if they do not wish to get involved; If this were impossible in NATO, it would have to be achieved in the EU. It’s a question of political will.
Lt General (Ret) Jean Paul PERRUCHE – Consultant in Defense and Security Strategy
Image Credit: Frederick Florin (AGP)