The war in Afghanistan decisively contributed to the economic exhaustion of the Soviet Union and to the need of substantial reforms that led to the implosion of its system.
There was, thus, a direct causation between events in Afghanistan and the demise of the USSR. Osama bin Laden, who had played a leading role in the Islamic jihad that confronted the Soviet might in that country, tried to replicate the same process against the United States a few years later.
By hitting the sense of pride and stability of a hegemonic power, through the September 11, 2011, terrorist attacks, he aimed at inducing an overreaction. One, susceptible of economically wearing out the United States as well. As expressed by Osama bin Laden in a videotape sent to Al Jazeera in 2004: “…our having experience in using guerrilla warfare and the war of attrition to fight tyrannical superpowers, as we, alongside the mujahidin, bled Russia for 10 years until it went bankrupt and was forced to withdraw in defeat (…) so we are continuing this policy in bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy (…) al-Qaida spent $500.000 on the event [Nine eleven hitting of the twin towers], while America in the incident, and its aftermath, lost -according to the lowest estimate- more than $500 billion. Meaning that every dollar of al-Qaeda defeated a million dollars…” (bin Laden, 2004).
During the months that followed September 11, 2001, however, it seemed that bin Laden’s purpose would be frustrated. Indeed, Washington acted with surprising moderation, apparently convinced that its fighting of Islamic terrorism required the construction of a web of alliances and the coordination of intelligence activities with its allies. Luckily for bin Laden, America’s moderation lasted little. The overwhelming but illusory initial military success in Afghanistan, appeared to stress the fact that the U.S.’ military superiority made diplomacy and international coordination redundant. The arrogance therein derived within the Bush administration, translated into the Doctrine of Preemptive War, indifference towards the U.N. Security Council and the world’s public opinion, and the invasion of Iraq. By putting in motion the gears of imperial might, Bush fell into bin Laden’s trap.
Although the combined economic costs of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq plus homeland security, did not lead to bankruptcy, they certainly triggered America’s fiscal deficits and public debt. According to Ezra Klein: “Bin Laden had a strategy that we never bothered to understand, and thus, we never bothered to defend against. What he really wanted to do -and more to the point, what he thought he could do– was bankrupt the United States of America. After all, he’d done the bankrupt-a-superpower before. And thought it didn’t quite work this time, it worked a lot better than most of us are willing to admit”. (Klein, 2011). David Henderson was in agreement with such assessment: “And with George W. Bush’s excessive spending in ‘homeland security’ and huge increases in spending of war, and Barack Obama’s keeping those programs in place and adding to them major escalation in Afghanistan, Bin Laden may have had the last laugh” (Henderson, 2011).
Truth is that in Afghanistan alone, between 2001 and the retirement of its forces twenty years later, the United States spent more than US$2.3 trillion. This included multiple thousands of billions of dollars in the training of the Afghan army, which instantly dissolved when the last American troops were about to leave the country. Moreover, taken together with Iraq and homeland security, America’s bill reached US$8 trillion. (Watson Institute of International and Public Affairs, 2021). Post nine eleven expenses, hence, decisively contributed to two overreaching consequences. Firstly, a substantial jump in the country’s public debt. Secondly, a serious downturn in fundamental domestic investments.
In 2018, in pre-Covid times, America’s public debt had reached 106.141% of its GDP, ranking 12 worldwide and only surpassed by countries such as Japan, Greece, Sudan, Venezuela, Lebanon, Italy, Eritrea, Portugal or Mozambique. Compounding the situation is the fact that much of that public debt is in foreign hands. In 2018, indeed, US$6.433 trillion of a total public debt of US$16.17 trillion, was held by foreign holders, with rival China representing the largest of them. (Global Finance, 2018; TreasuryDirect, 2018).
However, spiraling fiscal deficits resulting from war and homeland security costs not only skyrocketed public debt, but at the same time left no room for countless domestic investments. The latter were curtailed as a result. In Arianna Huffington’s words: “Beyond failing to make necessary investments for the future, we are actually cutting back on our current investment in people, with massive budget cuts in education, health care, and social services all across America (…) Keep in mind, all these services are being cut at a time when more and more people are finding themselves in need of them. It’s a perfect storm of middle-class suffering” (Huffington, 2010, pp. 9, 12).
The reverberations of the above have been of the utmost significance. On the one hand, the ratio of public debt to GDP, and the amounts of public debt in hostile hands, have seriously increased America’s economic vulnerability. On the other hand, diverting public investments from people’s needs has been a very important contributing factor in America’s current social and political polarization.
In sum, bin Laden’s strive for bankrupting the U.S. was certainly out of reach. However, the impact of having fallen under his trap is still resonating loudly in America’s life. Twenty-three years later, nine eleven’s effects are very much alive.
References:
Bin Laden (2004). “Full transcript of bin Laden’s speech”, Aljazeera, 1 November.
Global Finance (2018). “Percentage of Public Debt to GDP Around the World, 2018”.
Henderson, David (2011). “How Obama Won”, EconLog, May 4.
Huffington, Arianna (2010). Third Word America, New York: Crown Publishers.
Klein, Ezra (2011). “Osama Bin Laden didn’t win but he was ‘enormously successful”, Washington Post, May 3.
Trading Economics (2023). “United States Gross Federal Debt”, December 15.
TreasuryDirect (2018). “Debt to the Penny”, July 31.
Watson Institute of International and Public Affairs (2021). “Human and Budgetary Costs to Date of the U.S. War in Afghanistan, 2001-2021”. Brown University, August.
Watson Institute of International and Public Affairs (2021). “Costs of War”. Brown University, September.
Author: Alfredo Toro Hardy, PhD – Retired Venezuelan career diplomat, scholar and author. Former Ambassador to the U.S., U.K., Spain, Brazil, Ireland, Chile and Singapore. Author or co-author of thirty-six books on international affairs. Former Fulbright Scholar and Visiting Professor at Princeton and Brasilia universities. He is an Honorary Fellow of the Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations and a member of the Review Panel of the Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Center.
Image Credit: AP File Photo