By Nikola Mikovic
The era of Russian military presence in the South Caucasus seems to be coming to an end. The Kremlin’s decision to withdraw Russian peacekeeping troops from Nagorno-Karabakh could have severe repercussions for Moscow’s interests in the strategically important region.
When the Kremlin, in the fall of 2020, deployed 1,960 troops to the mountainous region of Azerbaijan, many analysts, both Western and Russian, portrayed that move as a huge Moscow’s “geopolitical victory.” Now that Russian forces are leaving the region, Russian media and officials do not pay much attention to that humiliating action.
But the Kremlin has a history of ignoring unpleasant moments. In 1999, following NATO aggression on Yugoslavia, Russia sent a peacekeeping contingent from Bosnia and Herzegovina into Kosovo to take control of the Pristina airport. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed to have played a “key role” in that military maneuver.
Only four years later, Russian peace-keeping troops left both Bosnia and Kosovo. The Kremlin and its media were silent. Ever since, most Balkan countries either joined the European Union and NATO or have been actively negotiating membership, while Moscow was crowded out of the region.
The same thing is now happening in Russia “near abroad”. Although the Moscow-brokered 2020 ceasefire agreement effectively ended the 2nd Karabakh war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Russian military presence in Nagorno-Karabakh did not help the Kremlin strengthen its positions in the South Caucasus.
Russian troops had a peacekeeping mandate until at least the end of 2025. But since Azerbaijan resolved the Karabakh issue in its favor in the fall of 2023, and the entire Armenian population fled the region, the very presence of the Russian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh became pointless.
According to the ceasefire agreement, Russian peacekeepers’ major role was to protect the Lachin corridor – the only route that was connecting Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh. But even before Azerbaijan established full control over the road in April 2023, local Armenians started blaming Russian troops for their passive approach regarding the Lachin corridor crisis.
Indeed, Russian peacekeepers proved unable (or unwilling) to preserve the status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh. As a result, following brief clashes between the local Armenian forces and Azerbaijani military in September 2023, Baku recaptured the region that was under Armenian control for more than two decades.
Thus, since there are no more Armenians in Karabakh, and the conflict has been resolved, there was no need for the Kremlin to keep its troops in the region until 2025. They can be deployed to Ukraine, instead. However, Russia’s actions in Nagorno-Karabakh had a serious impact on relations between Moscow and Yerevan – the Kremlin’s nominal ally in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
Given that Nagorno-Karabakh has been internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, Moscow can justify its lack of support to the Armenians by claiming that backing their separatist forces would represent a clear violation of international law. What the Kremlin cannot justify, though, is its ambivalence regarding the territorial integrity of Armenia itself.
In May 2021, Yerevan accused Azerbaijani troops of entering Armenian territory aiming to “lay siege” to Lake Sev Lich (Black Lake), which both countries border. Although Armenian authorities officially applied to both Russia and CSTO for help, the Kremlin and the Russian-led military bloc remained silent. It is, therefore, not surprising that Yerevan began distancing itself from Moscow, and started developing close relations with the West.
Quite aware that it cannot count on its nominal ally’s assistance, Armenian leadership seems willing to even cede four strategically important villages in northeastern Armenia to Azerbaijan, just to avoid another war with its powerful archenemy. It is entirely possible that Yerevan will, sooner or later, allow Baku to have a de facto control over the Nakhchivan corridor (also known as the Zangezur corridor) passing through Armenian southern province of Syunik along the country’s border with Iran.
Defeated by Azerbaijan and abandoned by Moscow, Armenia does not seem to have much choice but continue making concessions to Baku. At the same time, Yerevan will undoubtedly seek to establish close military and political ties with the West, hoping that it will allow the landlocked nation to gradually improve its positions vis-à-vis Azerbaijan. Such a policy, however, will have a negative impact on Russia’s interests in the South Caucasus.
In the foreseeable future, Yerevan will likely start demanding Russia to close its military bases in Armenia. The former Soviet republic has already sent an official request to Moscow asking it to remove Russian border troops from the Zvartnots international airport in Yerevan. From the Armenian perspective, Russian border guards have “proven several times they do not protect the Armenian national border”. Yerevan now relies on the European Union mission in Armenia, despite still formally being in the CSTO.
It is no secret that the Armenian leadership seeks to leave the Russian-led military bloc. That move is expected to be on Yerevan’s agenda soon. Russian withdrawal from Nagorno-Karabakh could speed up the process of decoupling between Armenia and Russia.
Meanwhile, relations between Yerevan and Moscow will almost certainly continue to go from bad to worse. In the mid-term, Russia might preserve economic presence not only in Armenia, but also in Azerbaijan and Georgia, although its political and military role in the region will continue to fade.
Finally, it is fair to say that ever since Putin came to power, Russia effectively lost most of its influence in both the Balkans and the South Caucasus. And that’s the result of his “geopolitical victories.”
Author: Nikola Mikovic – Journalist, researcher and analyst based in Serbia.
(The views expressed in this article belong only to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy or views of World Geostrategic Insights).
Image Credit: AP