World Geostrategic Insights interview with Marialaura De Angelis on what’s behind the North Korean leader’s announcement of a constitutional amendment identifying South Korea as “hostile state number one”, and no longer as a “partner for reconciliation and reunification,” the possibility that North Korea is preparing for war in 2024, and on the current U.S. policy on the Korean Peninsula.
Marialaura DE ANGELIS is a Northeast Asia geopolitical analyst with extensive experience on EU external affairs, mediation-support and dialogue facilitation. A passionate advocate for peaceful conflict resolution, she has been involved in mediation efforts on the Korean peninsula since 2008. In 2014, she co-founded Track2Asia, an NGO focused on Track 2 and Track 1.5 diplomacy between Europe and East Asia. In 2023 she co-founded Asia Guild, the first Think-and-Do Tank in Brussels dedicated to Northeast Asia.
Q1 – In his speech “On the Immediate Tasks for the Prosperity and Development of Our Republic and the Promotion of the Welfare of Our People,” delivered Jan. 15 before the North Korean Parliament, Kim Jong Un said that unification with South Korea is no longer possible and called for a constitutional amendment to change South Korea’s status to a separate “hostile country”, and the closure of three organizations concerned with inter-Korean reconciliation: the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Country, the National Economic Cooperation Office and the International Tourism Administration (Mount Kumgang), as reported by the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). Some analysts consider it very unusual, and unprecedented, for a North Korean leader to deviate from the unification policy, even in cases of severe deterioration of Inter-Korean relations. What is your opinion? What is behind Kim’s move?
A1 – Indeed this has to be seen, in Kim Jong Un’s intentions, as a historical change. However, this is part of a bigger strategic shift that started a few years ago as a consequence of the Hanoi fallout.
Ever since the Soviet Union collapsed, leaving the DPRK isolated, the Kim regime has been trying to avoid becoming a vassal state to China by achieving political independence and economic self-reliance. While its nuclear program has been a crucial element of that struggle, efforts to establish a normal relationship with the US — the only big power capable of balancing overwhelming Chinese influence — has been just as important. This policy has started under the rule of Kim Il Sung and has been kept under his son, Kim Jong Il, and his grandson, Kim Jong Un – until the Hanoi Summit.
The normalization of relations with the US was a necessary first step to achieve a level of economic and technological growth for which the DPRK could have envisioned, in the long term, reunification with the RoK on the basis of the principles established by Kim Il Sung – that is, as two equal powers rather than reunification by absorption of a collapsed DPRK, as it happened in Germany. The market reforms Kim Jong Un set in motion in the 2010s were most likely part of this plan – preparing the country for the fourth industrial revolution enabled by the diplomatic normalization of relations with the US, and a peace treaty with the RoK.
At Hanoi, Kim Jong Un realized that even within the most favorable conditions for dialogue, the goal of the US was still incompatible with that of the DPRK – as the US still focused on a Libya-like solution of denuclearization and disarmament in exchange for sanctions, which is unacceptable for the DPRK especially as calls for regime change have been a constant in US public rhetoric on North Korea.
As a matter of fact, Kim mentioned in his speech that a major factor weighing on this change of policy vis-a-vis the RoK was the fact that regime change in the DPRK has been and keeps being the main goal of his Korean counterparts. Assuming that the main objective of the Kim family is regime survival, and especially the Kim family survival, that means that as long as his interlocutors keep advocating for regime change there can be no real dialogue on either disarmament (US) or peace (RoK) – as in both cases it would mean, in the medium to long term, the end for the Kim regime.
As he had invested considerable political capital in the negotiations process with President Moon and President Trump, the political blow Chairman Kim suffered internally might have been quite more significant than what expected by US analysts and negotiators. In fact, after Hanoi Kim Jong Un seems to have decided to permanently abandon the long-term goal of normalization of relations with the US set by Kim Il Sung. As a consequence, a peace treaty as well as the long-term goal of reunification with the RoK – as envisioned by Kim Il Sung – had to be abandoned as well, as both depended on completion of that first step.
In his speeches before the 9th Korean Workers’ Party Congress in December as well as the Supreme People’s Assembly in January, Kim also mentioned several times the new five-year economic plan set in motion at the 8th Party Congress in 2021. The plan, in direct contradiction with the earlier economic reforms, announced the renewed dominance of ideology and politics over the economy as well as the centrality of Juche in economic policies. Similarly to how the market reforms Kim Jong Un put in place in the 2010s seemed to prepare the country to walk a path opened by peace with the RoK and the US, we can see instead this return now to juche and socialist principles in North Korean economy as preparation to survive – or thrive – on a path turning away from peace.
The DPRK has changed a lot since Kim Il Sung’s era, and so has the international environment surrounding it. As Kim Jong Un walks away from the path set by his grandfather, he will have to create a new legacy for his regime, and open a new path forward for the country. It is still unclear what direction Kim has decided to take but whatever it is, it has been in motion for a few years already.
Q2 – Kim labeled South Korea a “main enemy” and called reunification efforts a “mistake we should no longer make,” … “We don’t want war, but we have no intention of avoiding it,” Kim further stated. In their constitutions, both North and South Korea claim sovereignty over the entire peninsula, and Kim Jong Un’s bellicose rhetoric against South Korea and the United States has been recurrent in recent years. This time, however, the threats seem more perilous, considering also that North Korea has launched a record number of missiles in 2023, including a nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that could potentially reach anywhere in the United States. What is your opinion? Is North Korea preparing for war during 2024?
A1 – Kim seems to be preparing for war, yes – that does not necessarily mean he has decided to start a war, although it is a possibility that cannot be completely excluded either.
There are indeed similarities between the current situation and what happened just before the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, when the North initiated limited military clashes along the border to provide the pretext for its surprise invasion of the South. The recent artillery provocations from North Korea can be seen as mirroring those particular tactical maneuvers.
However, it is important to point out that, as the DPRK has been completely closed for the past few years, all analysts can do is speculate. Therefore the current situation should not be either exaggerated nor undermined. Kim Jong Un’s intentions will become clearer in the next few months, as clashes happen with the RoK over the Northern Limit Line and Yongpyong Island, now officially reclaimed by the DPRK as its territory. However, a lot will also depend on the US and RoK’s next moves and their capacity – and political will – to de-escalate tensions on the Peninsula, at least until the intentions of the DPRK become clearer.
That said, the decision to consider the RoK as a foreign and hostile state, and the South Koreans as strangers and not ‘uri minjok’ or ‘our people’, seems to indicate that war in the short to medium term has become a real prospect for Kim Jong Un – be it offensive or defensive. The new policy is necessary to dehumanize the South Koreans in the eyes of the North Korean people so as to allow war against them from a moral perspective, especially if the use of nuclear weapons becomes necessary – given the insurmountable superiority of conventional military capability of the RoK and its allies. At the same time, legally claiming the sovereignty of the North as a country independent from the South could be meant to prevent the rightful absorption of the DPRK as part of the RoK unification policy, making an invasion by the RoK that of a sovereign country, thus illegal in the eyes of the international community.
Accidental war remains the highest risk on the Korean peninsula, as tensions can spiral up dangerously. Assuming there was no strategic plan for war by the DPRK, then the current escalations are to be seen simply as tactics used to pursue geopolitical and political goals of the regime. Yet North Korea needs to be aware of the risk associated with such tactics, as sometimes the perception of an imminent danger is all it takes to start a war.
Nuclear tests and missile launches by the DPRK are considered provocations that escalate tensions in the frame of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the notion that the DPRK has no right to a nuclear program. The DPRK does not share that premise, and as they develop their nuclear program they perform tests which are not necessarily meant to escalate tensions.
As the DPRK prepares to thrive in a conflictual environment its nuclear program is going to be more important than ever before – which means that both nuclear and missile tests are not going to stop but perhaps increase in number and frequency. However, as relations with its adversaries become more hostile and tensions rise, the very fact that the DPRK’s nuclear program reaches certain milestones is perceived as a threat.
The development of a nuclear arsenal capable of reaching US territory, by instance, is the ultimate goal of the DPRK’s nuclear program: obtaining a deterrent against the US would bring a significant shift in the regional balance of power in favor of the DPRK. However, this could be a miscalculation on the part of North Korea policy makers,
Until now, the US has refrained from military solutions to the DPRK threat because war on the Korean Peninsula would take place in densely populated areas, and the number of casualties would not be acceptable. However, a direct threat to American territory is unacceptable to any US administration and could trigger a preemptive attack from the US, even if it ended up costing millions of Korean and Japanese lives.
In other words, the strategy the DPRK has set up to deter an attack from the US could actually backfire and trigger the attack it was meant to prevent.
If Kim Jong Un should pay attention to the risk of perceived danger on the other side, so should the US and the RoK. In spite of publicly labeling North Koreans as irrational, it is clear that both the US and RoK consider the Kim regime a rational one – as they do not hesitate to escalate tensions, responding to its provocations with the same level of threat. That means they clearly trust Kim Jong Un with having the amount of rationality necessary to decide to not start a war that would mean his own annihilation.
The policy of maximum pressure is also based on an assumption of rationality by the Kims – meaning the assumption is that if they bring the regime to the verge of collapse, it will have no other choice than to come to the negotiating table. That is, no other rational choice. In fact, these policies might be based on a dangerous misread of the Kim regime – or any authoritarian regime there is. Because from the perspective of an autocratic regime, there is no survival of the country outside the survival of the regime itself.
Assuming the Kim regime’s goal is the Kim regime’s survival, if the US, the RoK and their allies’ economic, diplomatic and military pressure actually brought the regime to its knees and the country close to collapse, that could trigger a nuclear war. For Kim Jong Un, falling on his knees and crawling to the negotiation table as a surrendering party would be equal to death, either by the hands of his American and Korean adversaries calling for regime change, or by the hands of his own people. If he is left with no other choice, rather than meeting the same end as Ghaddafi in Libya, he will opt for war. Because war would give him a chance of survival, although a small one.
In other words, the strategy the US and the RoK have set up to prevent a nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula could actually backfire and become the main cause of a nuclear conflict.
Q3 – Russia’s foreign minister said Tuesday, Jan. 16, ahead of a meeting with his North Korean counterpart Choe Song-hui in Moscow, that “the policy of the United States and its regional satellites of creating security threats to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) does not help promote peace on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia as a whole.” Indeed, the Biden administration has reinforced a coercive and pressure approach that relies on diplomatic isolation, military deterrence and economic sanctions to contain North Korea’s defiant behavior, providing also greater security assurances to South Korea and encouraging its alignment with U.S. strategic interests. What is your opinion about the current U.S. policy on the Korean Peninsula?
With the rise of China as a regional and global power, we are witnessing an earthquake shaking the very roots of the western value-based international system that was built after WWII and throughout the Cold War. As the US tries to protect this system, its policies in Northeast Asia tend to replicate the fundamental value-based confrontation that shaped the Cold War era in Europe.
Countering US policies, China’s narrative is designed to undermine the values on which the US-led international community is based and claim that the US is a power in decline, while the world is heading into a new multipolar era. The US current policy of confrontation, combined with the escalation of tensions in the region, risks echoing the Chinese narrative in US’ allies and adversaries alike: as the trust of US’ allies in the extended deterrence system decreases, so does the perception of its threat by US adversaries in the region, and the US could gradually lose its grip on the region.
Encouraged by the US, both Japan and the RoK are seeing an incredible increase in military budgets and capabilities to better contribute to the challenges posed by China and its allies in the region. While until now the US has kept the two alliances somehow separated, it has now encouraged the two countries to overcome their historical grievances and strengthen their bilateral ties to counter China’s threat.
But in both countries, the anxiety posed by the Cold War-style confrontation with China spiraled after the Russian invasion to Ukraine, which eroded trust in the US extended deterrence system. This generated a debate about nuclear armament in both Korea and Japan – and though the nuclear debate is more developed in the RoK, the fact that Japan is even considering a debate about this issue is a major historical shift. These debates could take a further turn in favor of nuclear armament should the US see a second Trump administration, which the first time around advocated for a less interventionist US foreign policy and actively encouraged its allies to attain military independence.
In the medium to long term, the inadvertent outcome of such policies could be an erosion of the very thing they are meant to protect – the US geopolitical influence in the region, the deterrence model based on US extended deterrence and, last but not least, the Non Proliferation Treaty.
This confrontational stance has also become a primary element shaping US policy on the Korean Peninsula. The new security environment created by the US’ confrontation with China plays a big role in escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and Kim Jong Un mentions it several times in his recent speeches.
The confrontational stance taken by the US and its allies in the region towards China has heavy collateral effects on the DPRK, cornering the Kim regime further in its siege mentality. As its regional adversaries increase their military capabilities and their military cooperation, the Kim regime’s reliance on its nuclear program will only increase – together with its paranoia. Encouraged by the US, RoK President Yoon is playing a dangerous game of confrontation with the Kim regime, fueling tensions where he should be de-escalating them.
In the short term, the inadvertent outcome of these confrontational policies on the Korean Peninsula could be accidental war. For Kim there are only two scenarios where initiating War would be a rational choice: the first is the scenario in which the US and the RoK will corner him to the point where his choices are surrender, collapse or fight. As mentioned earlier, Kim knows he would not survive the first two scenarios, and so war would become his only chance of survival.
The second scenario is that Kim Jong Un is basing his new long-term strategy on the distorted perception of a declining US power and an emerging new order. Having decided to permanently abandon the long-term goal of normalization of relations with the US set by Kim Il Sung, and with it that of peace and cooperation with the RoK, Kim Jong Un needs to open a new path forward for its country. However, in the current international security environment, his options seem to be limited in both number and scope.
The recent improvement of relations with Russia cannot substitute for the same improvement with the US in balancing China. Opening to the contemporary non-aligned states movement cannot bring the economic and technological development the DPRK could have known once free from the international regime of economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation imposed at UN level.
The risk of Kim Jong Un actually considering a surprise attack like back in the Korean War, which also happened at the heights of the emerging Cold War, is linked with this narrative of declined US influence in the region.
Given the isolation of this regime, especially in the past few years, its perceptions of the balance of power in the region – and his own strength – could be distorted, making it seem that, with the advantage of a surprise attack, he could actually win a war on the Korean Peninsula – and get away with it. Then he would want to try a bold move to put his regime ahead of the game – and win a leading seat in the new multipolar world. Although this second option seems much more unlikely, in the current circumstances is a possibility that cannot be completely discarded.
A conflict on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia can be avoided. Accidental war remains the most likely cause of an outbreak on the Korean Peninsula. Without stepping back, the US needs to dramatically scale down its rhetoric and its responses to provocations from adversaries in the region, especially the DPRK – and strongly encourage both Yoon and Kishida to do the same. At the same time, the US needs to immediately scale down the Cold War rhetoric and restart cooperation with China on global issues such as non proliferation and disarmament in the region, firmly showing both the RoK and the DPRK that this is not 1950.
Marialaura DE ANGELIS – Northeast Asia geopolitical analyst.
Image Credit: KCNA via Reuters