By Neeraj Singh Manhas
For some years now, the idea of a rising strategic divide between New Delhi and Moscow has been common. Even within Russia’s and India’s strategic communities, there is ongoing discussion about the significance of this bilateral involvement. Ahead of the next India-Russia summit, this article examines what is working and what needs to be improved in the two countries’ relationship.
It is reasonable to assert that the essential glue that holds the two together is strategic legacy. It is reinforced with a modern thread of political convergence in a world in which the South Block and the Kremlin are both players and subjects.
India’s key goal in the future decades is to prevent China from achieving hegemony in Asia. It is interested in a multipolar globe and a multipolar Asia. Russia will vehemently support this and, for a variety of reasons, will want it. It would put the US as the primary adversary to thwart in its calculus. The Russians are unlikely to want to restrict China if doing so results in increased US dominance. If a result, there is broad agreement on a multipolar international order, even as India and Russia disagree on the respective roles of the poles in defining it.
By 2020, Russian military systems and equipment would make for almost 60% of the Indian armed forces’ arsenal.
This might change radically if Russia decides that it is content to sit in the Emperor’s court in Beijing as a junior partner. India believes this is improbable. It aspires to a more self-sufficient Russian worldview that is not afraid to stand up to others, notably China, to defend its own interests. As a result, New Delhi is continuing to spend significantly on this relationship in a variety of areas.
The first and most important is defence. By 2020, Russian military systems and equipment would make for almost 60% of the Indian armed forces’ arsenal. While India is making a concerted effort to diversify its military gear sources, Russia remains a key historic player. A large portion of this is due to spares and component upgrades. However, important new enterprises have occurred. These include the S-400 missile contract (with initial deliveries scheduled for this year); the manufacture and co-production of four Project 1135.6 Frigates; the manufacture of the world’s most advanced assault rifle – the AK-203 – as part of the ‘Make in India’ initiative; and additional T-90s, Sukhoi-30 MKI, MiG-29, MANGO ammunition, and VSHORAD systems. Russia is more involved than any other country in the ‘Make in India’ project for defence equipment.
Simultaneously, the number and intricacy of workouts has increased. As he bid farewell to his post as Indian Ambassador to Russia, DB Venkatesh Varma noted that the two countries were experimenting with new formats – including force mobilisation and transportation over long distances, the impact of drone technology on modern warfare, and the impact of cyber on the future of conflict. The terrain of doctrinal coordination and comprehension is always evolving.
India plans to expand its oil imports from Russia, which currently account for 1% of total imports, to 4% or 5% in the next five years.
Energy is the second area of convergence. This does not just apply to hydrocarbons (oil and gas), but also to nuclear energy. While India imports gas from Russia, a significant rise is expected. If the Vostok negotiations are successful, India will become a partner in one of the world’s largest energy projects. India plans to expand its oil imports from Russia, which currently account for 1% of total imports, to 4% or 5% in the next five years. Another potential area of investment is petrochemicals, where a Russian investment in the Paradip cracker plant and an Indian investment in Arctic LNG-2 are being considered.
With India adopting a net-zero energy target, the need to switch to more environmentally friendly energy sources has become critical. Russia will be a major partner in a new Gas Task Force, including in the field of hydrogen.
Thirdly, there is a shared interest in advanced technology. A proposal is being considered to establish a Joint Commission on Science and Technology Cooperation. It would cover high-tech fields such as quantum, nanotechnology, cyber, artificial intelligence, robotics, space, and biotechnology. Pharmaceuticals, digital finance, chemicals, and ceramics all have the potential to drive the relationship’s economic growth. Each of these factors is critical to the fourth industrial revolution’s success.
The fourth critical aspect is food security. The thought of India leasing land in Russia’s Far East and cultivating it with Indian labour is alluring. Russia is undergoing a population crisis and suffers from significant human resource shortages. China has leased tens of thousands of hectares in Russia’s Far East. This is farmed by Chinese farmers, whose harvest is marketed in Russia and exported to China.
A proposal is being considered to establish a Joint Commission on Science and Technology Cooperation. It would cover high-tech fields such as quantum, nanotechnology, cyber, artificial intelligence, robotics, space, and biotechnology.
India might use a similar tactic. The government might reach an enabling agreement with Russia but leave implementation to the private sector. The Chennai-Vladivostok marine communication corridor expands the window of opportunity for such collaboration.
This method would be a true win-win situation. India might contribute to its food security by decreasing the burden on its natural resources (land, water, and electricity) and repurposing its surplus farm labour. Russia’s reliance on China would diminish, providing Moscow with the strategic leverage it requires and desires.
And this is where India must address a strategic issue. Is it prepared to invest in Russia’s tale at the same time as we celebrate Russia’s participation with “Make in India”? India must inject itself into the Far East and other regions of Russia’s development narrative through investments and skills. There could not possibly be a more solid foundation for the partnership.
Additionally, there is a pressing need to overcome some recent angularities. Afghanistan is the first. Until at least 15 August 2021, India and Russia were at odds, with Moscow openly flirting with the Taliban. While both countries seek peace in Afghanistan and restrictions on the export of terrorism and drugs, New Delhi believes Moscow’s negotiators with the Taliban become Taliban negotiators. That presents Russia with a credibility dilemma.
India must inject itself into the Far East and other regions of Russia’s development narrative through investments and skills.
On the Indo-Pacific, the second divergence occurs. It comes down to a deficiency of trust. Russia has mistrust for India in relation to the US, and India perceives Russia as reading from China’s script. This is a problem that must be addressed. Either country serves as the other’s flexibility mechanism, a long-standing agreement. Russia’s ‘Greater Eurasia’ initiative and the Indo-Pacific both describe the same process of emergence: Of a new political moment and a political geography that will seek to connect interests and actors in novel ways. While India and Russia continue to forge new partnerships, their enduring partnership serves as a financial safety net for both.
President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India is his second overseas tour since the outbreak began. The first was earlier this summer, when he travelled to Geneva for a summit with Vice President Joe Biden. Meeting Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New Delhi is highly symbolic and significant. It demonstrates that the President is aware that India enables him to have a more equitable partnership with China, while Russia allows India to pursue its own interests.
Author: Neeraj Singh Manhas (Director, Indo-Pacific Raisina House, New Delhi, India)
(The views expressed in this article belong only to the author and do not necessarily reflect the views ofWorld Geostrategic Insights)
Image Source: The Hindu