By Alfredo Toro Hardy
Idealism and realism have alternated in America’s foreign policy, with the former overtly prevailing. The idealist tradition goes back to the foundation of the country, and has its roots in colonial times. Americans, indeed, have always believed to be unique. As if entrusted by providence to bring about a special purpose on Earth.
U.S.’ 19th Century philosopher Ralph Waldo Emerson, wrote that being an American represented a sort of religious experience. In the same manner, Herman Melville, also in that century, referred to his fellow citizens as the chosen people, as the Israel of their time, entrusted with the Arch of Liberty of the world. This line of thought was initially exposed by Alexis de Tocqueville in his 1835 book Democracy in America. There, he referred that America’s democracy represented a particular form of Christianity, a sort of republican religion, whereby politics and religion merged in an indissoluble alliance. Hence, the United was an exceptional nation. This gave rise to the notion of its exceptionalism. (Toro Hardy, 2007, p. 165; Ferguson, 2004, p. 60; Harrison, 2013, p. 127).
A city upon a hill
Two facts can shed light as to why Americans have always believed to be a force good for humankind. The first of them, because the cradle of American society was formed by dissident protestants who felt to be in intimate contact with God. The notion of a covenant between them and God was a central theme in their religious, social and political organisation. Theirs, indeed, was a theocracy that attempted to build utopia from scratch. Differently from the Spanish Crown, which forbade their religious heterodox to go to the colonies, fearing that they may contaminate them, the English Crown thought that the heterodox was the perfect exportation product. (Manseau, 2016, pp. 60-61; Maurois, 1972, p. 33).
In the second place, because as argued by Samuel Huntington the United States never stopped being what its puritan colonists wanted it to become. The essential culture of the United States was, and remains being, that of the colonists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, who gave birth to the American society. In this sense, U.S.’s colonial legacy profoundly impregnated the nation’s way of thinking. (Huntington, 2004, p. 65).
America’s national mythology, thus, makes their citizens see themselves as a society with a particular sense of purpose. As the bearers of a sort of secular religion. As pointed out by Colonist James Winthrop, in his famous seventeenth Century “City upon a Hill” sermon: “For we must consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill, the eyes of all people are upon us…we shall be made a story and a byword through the world”. This secular religion is, thus, assumed with the same kind of intensity than their militant Christianity (Manseau, 2016, p. 61).
A crusading ideology
By natural extension America’s foreign policy was called, since its inception, to spread its model of society around the world. Thomas Jefferson made this sufficiently clear when expressing that the country’s foreign policy was to rest on the moral values rooted in their civil religion: Democracy. A model called to serve as an example for humankind.
With the notorious exception of Theodore Roosevelt, a political realist for whom American foreign policy was to be based in notions such as national interest, the search of power, and balance of power, a majority of U.S.’ leaders have always insisted that their nation is called to serve as an example for humankind. As a result, it would not be Roosevelt but Woodrow Wilson, who a few years later, and in tune Thomas Jefferson’s vision, provided the fundamental guidelines for America’s twentieth century’s foreign policy. Believing in his country’s exceptionalism, Wilson put that tradition at the service of a crusading ideology. According to it, the U.S.’ special mission was to become a beacon of liberty for the rest of the world and to promote democracy as the cornerstone of its foreign policy. He even maintained the need for America’s international policy to reflect the same moral standards as personal ethics, insisting that the State had no right to claim a separate morality for itself (Kissinger, 1994, pp. 39, 44, 45, 46).
What about isolationism?
But where to place the country’s isolationist tradition within this context? Also, an important tradition throughout its history, and the prevailing trend between the end of World War I and the beginning of World War II. Did its premises contradict the idealist tradition?
No, isolationism presents itself as a close relative to idealism. Indeed, the United States’ foreign policy has shown to possess its very curious yin and yang qualities – seemingly opposing forces that actually belong to the same Oneness. The Oneness being America’s self-perceived moral superiority, and the yin and yang representing the shifting periods of international missionary impulses and the imposition of barriers towards foreign influences. As such, the high moral ground that Americans have always reclaimed for themselves can relate to both. Whereas, by proselytising abroad its superior beliefs, or by curtailing the penetration of alien models or foreign events susceptible of contaminating them. As such, isolationism contradicts Wilsonianism, but not Tocqueville’s assertion of America’s democracy being perceived as a particular form of Christianity, as a sort of republican religion.
The Cold War
The period that came after WWII, was characterised by the missionary impulses represented by the so-called liberal internationalism. In other words, Wilsonian idealism. This meant confronting the Soviets’ totalitarian impulses by promoting America’s freedom – freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly, economic freedom, and the right to petition the government. This belief served the United States exceedingly well in its contest with the URSS. Firstly, because strong ideological convictions were needed in order to confront the Soviet’s Marxist-Leninist ideological juggernaut. Secondly, because only through strongly held beliefs could the U.S. have guaranteed itself the sense of purpose needed to follow the same grand strategy for decades.
Things, however, were far from being clear cut. On the one hand, the eight years of the Nixon and Ford administrations, where Henry Kissinger influence was notorious, were clearly realist in nature. In line with Theodore Roosevelt’s guidelines, American foreign policy openly followed, during those years, notions such as national interest or balance of power. On the other hand, and more significantly, beneath the missionary purpose of America’s Cold War foreign policy, laid an overtly realist foundation. Indeed, containment and its geopolitical implications (such as East Asia’s domino theory) were manifestly realist in nature. As also was the notion that any enemy of my enemy was my friend, independently of its moral standing. One way or the other, America’s support and promotion of Third World’s authoritarian regimes overtly contradicted its notion of a “free world”. As a result, an authentic collection of thugs, distributed around Asia, Latin America and Africa, became the visible faces of “freedom” in the fight against Communism.
The U.S.’ Cold War liberal internationalism was, thus, hybrid in nature. A mixture of Wilsonian missionary idealism and unprincipled realism. Needless to say, of course, that for a majority of Americans it was the high ground of its ideals, the one that toppled the Iron Curtain. As so many times throughout American history, indeed, ideals were not required to walk the talk. Meanwhile, realism has always been rather shy in overtly talking the walk. Only exceptionally, as in the cases of Theodore Roosevelt and Richard Nixon, has realism been proclaimed as the aim to be followed.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, liberal internationalism led the way. Idealism was once again at the forefront. This time, though, realists were not adjuvants but objectors of the route followed. However, before getting into this subject, it should be ascertained what was the nature of the aggressive unilateralism followed by George W. Bush and Donald Trump. Could their raw pursuit of America’s national interest be considered as realist in purpose?
Bush and Trump
Bush’s foreign policy objectives could be synthesised as diplomacy if possible, force if necessary; U.N. if possible, ad hoc coalitions, unilateral action, and preemptive strikes if necessary. According to these premises, America shouldn’t be constrained by prevailing rules, multilateral institutions, or international law. At the same time, the U.S.’ postulates of freedom and democracy, expressions of its exceptionalism, entailed the right to propitiate regime change whenever necessary.
Although downplaying the role of allies, international institutions and even international law, Bush’s foreign policy retained the belief in America’s exceptionalism and in the missionary impulse to project its values. Francis Fukuyama defined this policy as Wilsonianism minus international institutions, whereas John Mearsheimer labelled it as Wilsonianism with teeth. Although taking Wilsonian notions to the extreme, Bush’s foreign policy remained in track with the idealist tradition. (Steltzer, 2004, pp. 3-28; Fukuyama, 2006, p. 41).
Trump’s foreign policy, on the contrary, seemed to have been on a totally different dimension. According to Fareed Zakaria, Trump’s foreign policy was based on a basic premise: “The world is largely an uninteresting place, except for the fact that most countries just want to screw the United States”. Trump believed, indeed, that by stripping the global system of its ordering arrangements, a “dog eat dog” environment would emerge. One, in which his country, being the top dog, would reap up the benefits. This was not realism, but a simple reflection of ignorance, gut feelings and prejudices. (Zakaria, 2019).
The idealists versus realists’ debate
With the exception of Trump, hence, the idealist tradition prevailed after the Soviet collapse. However, as mentioned before, an open debate between liberal internationalists and realists took place. The simple fact that realists outspokenly defended their line of thought made it particularly interesting. The debate was centered around NATO’s role once the URSS had collapsed.
It all began in 1993, when presidents Walesa of Poland, Havel of Czechoslovakia and Goncz of Hungary met with President Clinton, and asked for their countries to join NATO. The Clinton administration gladly agreed. This responded to its belief on the freedom of choice of the countries involved in joining in. Moreover, this allowed for the simultaneous expansion of America’s values and influence. In successive phases, not only under Clinton but also under Bush and Obama, this process took place. Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latonia, Lithuania, Rumania, Croatia, Albania, Montenegro and Northern Macedonia, were all incorporated into NATO.
Realists, represented by towering foreign policy and academic figures such as George Kennan, Henry Kissinger, John Mearsheimer, Kenneth Waltz or Stephen Walt, strongly objected to this expansion. Kennan, the architect of America’s Cold War containment policy, wanted to find ways to incorporate Russia into a European world, and did not understand the rationality of NATO’s expansion as no one in Europe was threatening anybody else. Mearsheimer and Walt believed that NATO’s expansion was recklessly interfering with the Russian traditional sphere of influence, which at some point would push Moscow to react. Kissinger was particularly worried about NATO’s approach to Ukraine, a flat land extension that had been crossed by Napoleonic France, Imperial Germany and Nazi Germany to invade Russia. As a result, he criticised America’s lack of understanding on the special meaning that Ukraine held for Russia. Waltz argued that while the U.S. believed that it was acting for the sake of peace, justice and well-being in the world, overwhelming power (like the one manifested through NATO’s expansion), repelled and led others to balance it. (Stent, 2014, pp. 69-75; Mearsheimer, 2014; Haroche, 2023; Kissinger, 2014; Waltz, 2000).
It could be argued, in relation to the U.S.’ support to the expansion of NATO, that while idealists clearly misjudged Russia´s geopolitical sensibilities, realists underestimated the imperialist vocation ingrained in that country’s history. Both parties failed in this regard, with the latter misreading Russia’s traditional expansionism, precisely the one that they had contained so thoroughly in Soviet times.
Beyond who got it right or wrong
It should be added, in this regard, that Stephen Waltz, one of the most preeminent realists, made a distinction between defensive and offensive realism. The first of them represents states that respect the status quo and aim at maintaining the balance of power. The second, being the expression of revisionists states that aim at projecting its hegemony over its neighbourhood. If something can be criticised to realists is that they foresaw Putin’s Russia under the lenses of defensive realism, without having anticipated its intrinsically revisionist nature.
However, leaving aside who got it right or wrong in relation to the actions that culminated in Russia´s invasion of Ukraine, it is worth insisting on the singular importance represented by this debate between idealists and realists. The same has been a rare opportunity in which both sides confronted their points of view.
Alfredo Toro Hardy, PhD, is a retired Venezuelan career diplomat, scholar and author. Former Ambassador to the U.S., U.K., Spain, Brazil, Ireland, Chile and Singapore. Author or co-author of thirty-six books on international affairs. Former Fulbright Scholar and Visiting Professor at Princeton and Brasilia universities. He is an Honorary Fellow of the Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations and a member of the Review Panel of the Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Center.