World Geostrategic Insights interview with Ardian Shajkovci on the future of al-Qaeda after Zawahiri’s death, the Taliban government’s willingness and ability to counter terrorism, the spread of terrorist groups in Central Asian countries, and the potential menace arising from the presence of Islamic fighters in Ukraine.
Ardian Shajkovci, Ph.D, is the Director at American Counterterrorism Targeting and Resilience Institute (ACTRI). He is a counter-terrorism researcher, lecturer, and security analyst.
Q1 – On August 1, U.S. President Joe Biden announced that al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri was killed in a drone strike in Afghanistan’s capital, Kabul. Zawahiri had succeeded Osama bin Laden, after U.S. Navy SEALs killed him in 2011, and had been successful in holding the organization together. Are the “counterterrorist” approach of leadership decapitation, and other kinetic operations conducted as part of the “War on Terror”, effective in eradicating the threat of terrorist violence? What will be the future of al-Qaeda after Zawahiri’s death? Will al-Qaeda remain relevant in terms of international security?
A1 – The decapitation of AQ’s Zawahiri marks an important counterterrorism success and milestone in the fight against AQ. The decapitation of high value terrorist leaders, while important, needs to be assessed in conjunction with other efforts aimed at both targeting terrorist leadership and wider terrorist groups and movements simultaneously. Literature underlining circumstances under which terrorist leadership decapitation may be deemed effective in destabilizing a terrorist organization remains conflicting. A binary view on its overall utility may be misleading and therefore must be avoided, especially in the context of jihadist and larger separatist groups and movements.
While one should naturally expect a reduction in insurgent capability as a result of Zawahiri’s killing, AQ will likely continue to adapt to ensure sustained resiliency. Perhaps one measure of success could be attributed to the fact that the killing led to the removal of a terrorist leader instrumental in founding and leading the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and al-Qaeda. That said, AQ is a profoundly bureaucratic organization, designed to ensure swift leadership succession and transitions to avoid any uncertainty as to its future. More importantly, its hybrid composition, its decentralized lower-level operational activities that currently expand beyond Afghanistan and into other geographic areas, are likely to ensure the group’s resiliency following Zawahiri’s decapitation.
Sentiments over Zawahiri’s killing remain vast and varied, depending on the interlocutors on the said discourse. Social media posts we often monitor at our center among AQ supporters and sympathizer bases stress Zawahiri’s strength in providing ideological appeal to its affiliates in Central Asia, India, North Africa, and Arabian Peninsula, among others. There are also those who point out his ability to master and retain loyalty among its affiliates and offshoots, including keep AQ pertinent, despite the pronounced ISIS-dominated era in Syria, Iraq and beyond in recent years. Conversely, others find him responsible for AQ-Jabhat al Nusra split in Syria, for allowing ISIS to become a face for jihad, and for his media inaptitude and inability to connect with the younger pool of AQ followers and potential followers more generally.
AQ may be facing an identity crisis, largely spurred with the emergence of ISIS on the militant jihadi theater. Its affiliate networks remain an advantage for the group, however, though the group’s survival also rests on its ability to continue to garner and nurture the loyalty of the same. Despite the list of potential AQ leader contenders circulating recently, the fact that the group remains without a [publicly] announced leader may suggest both an internal dispute within the group or a mere strategy to avoid security repercussions given the recent killing of Zawahiri. High profile attacks in the west could serve to restore some of its reputation and bravado, which the US and its allies need to remain apprehensive about.
Q2 – Zawahri was killed in a comfortable neighborhood in Kabul, where he lived, favored by high-ranking Taliban members. This could raise concerns about an enduring affinity between al-Qaeda and the Taliban. After all, the departure of U.S. troops from Afghanistan was expected to provide various terrorist groups with some safe shelter in the country. In your opinion, would the Taliban leadership, or part of it, be willing to tolerate a terrorist attack abroad from inside Afghanistan? The Taliban government has repeatedly promised that it would not allow such attacks. But would the Taliban be able to prevent them? Terrorism is a problem that the Taliban seem unable to handle quickly and efficiently. Could al-Qaeda in Afghanistan therefore conduct terrorist attacks abroad without the Taliban’s knowledge?
A2 – The killing of Zawahiri in Kabul indeed raises a number of pressing questions. One being the extent to which the Taliban may have provided a safe haven to Zawahiri and AQ more generally. The second, whether the US withdrawal from Afghanistan may have provided operational freedom for AQ and its affiliated groups. Answers to such questions remain puzzling—and incomplete based on available data to date.
AQ is likely to continue to seek ways to target US and its ally interests in the region and beyond. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan, however, does not necessarily translate to US or ally reduced military capabilities on the ground when it comes to targeting high value terrorists at least, as demonstrated by Zawahiri’s recent killing.
The fact that Zawahiri was killed in a Haqqani-linked safehouse in Kabul, based on preliminary reports—and in light of the ongoing Taliban- Haqqani leadership dispute—does provide a glimmer of hope vis-a-vis Taliban’s absent legitimacy and efforts to curb terrorism on its soil. The surge of ISIS-K attacks in particular since the Taliban takeover remains a security concern, and whether the Taliban will keep extremist groups in check from operating both domestically and internationally, AQ included, as also envisioned by the 2020 US-Taliban peace deal, remains to be seen. The current supposed severing of ties between AQ and the Taliban remains cosmetic; AQ and the Taliban are likely to remain friendly for a foreseeable future, with no clear commitment to curb AQ activities on Afghan territory. The power exertion of Pakistan on both AQ and the Taliban will also likely continue to dictate the nature of future AQ-Taliban collaboration.
Q3 – Tajikistan has always expressed concern about the situation on the Tajik-Afghan borders, and Taliban rule in Afghanistan, which Dushanbe has interpreted as a threat to its national security and stability. And not only in Tajikistan, fears have arisen throughout Central Asia that Afghan territory could become a springboard for various terrorist groups interested in operating in the region. How do you assess the extremist and terrorist threat in Central Asian countries? How can it be countered?
A3 – The recent takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban has indeed come to represent a challenging and perplexing security dilemma for the Central Asian states. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan has, too, created a security vacuum for the Central Asian states: the inability of the Taliban to prevent ISIS-K and other terrorist organizations from launching cross-border attacks, as demonstrated in a series of recent purported attacks carried out by ISIS-K on Uzbekistan’s territory, among others.
It is in the utmost interest of the Taliban to reign in not only ISIS-K operating in its territory but also other extremist and terrorist organization that it continues to harbor in northern Afghanistan and that are known for cross-border attacks in Central Asia, Jammat Ansarullah with ties to a number of terrorist attacks in Tajikistan comes to mind.
Beyond outsourcing its security concerns to the Taliban, Central Asian states like Tajikistan are likely to continue to strengthen their border security with Afghanistan. In fact, the Taliban must show its resolve to fight ISIS-K in particular, given the latter’s efforts and ability to not only exploit disaffected Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmen against the Taliban in northern Afghanistan, but also to recruit foreigners among the Central Asian states, Tajiks and Uzbeks in particular.
As neighboring countries with deep-rooted historical and political ties, the Central Asian states will likely continue to find ways to work with the Taliban, to curb operational capabilities of terrorist groups in northern Afghanistan that continue to pose a security threat for the Central Asian countries. Extremist and terrorist group activities coming from either across Afghanistan or taking place inside Central Asia are not necessarily unusual and it remains to be seen whether the Taliban recent takeover could further embolden groups like Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Fears over the Taliban direct sponsorship or indirect inspiration of such groups are not unfounded, however. Pan-Islamist ideology of groups like AQ and ISIS-K remains equally problematic for Central Asia. Countries like Turkey, China and Russia are likely to remain vested as security intermediaries, though many Central Asian states remain wary of some of their long-term aspirations in the region or lack of interest to invest beyond humanitarian and economic assistance.
Q4 – Islamic soldiers are fighting in Ukraine for both Russian and Ukrainian forces. Could this foster jihadist propaganda, recruitment and weapons availability, and consequently increase terrorist threat on the European continent?
A4 – Islamic soldier participation in Ukraine may be exploited and could bring propaganda value to militant jihadi groups like ISIS and AQ, given their perception of Russia as being an oppressor against Muslims in Chechnya, Northern Caucasus, and most recently in the Syrian conflict. Both AQ and IS’ disdain over Russia’s policies in such countries has been reflected in a number of propaganda videos targeting Russia, most recently captured in a 2021 AQ video featuring now killed Zawahiri. Wilayat Khorasan frequently issues propaganda material in mainly Uzbek and Tajik languages criticizing Russia’s support of the Taliban in particular.
The ongoing Russo-Ukraine war may potentially further revitalize jihadist tendencies against Russia, given a number of militant groups already operating under IS and AQ banner in North Caucasus and Central Asia, not to the mention the potential return of battled hardened Chechen, Uzbek, and Tajik fighters currently active in the Syrian conflict zone. Some Uzbek jihadist groups operating under Hayat Tahrir al Sham in Syria retain a profound digital presence, as monitored by our team, actively providing weapons training and means of financing the group.
Equally worrisome is the fact that, provided it turns out to be a prolonged war (similar to recent Syrian conflict), militant jihadist groups could rally Muslim Tatars in Crimea against Russia’s interest in Ukraine. Crimean Turkic Tatars and Chechen and Caucasus combatant groups such as Dzhokar Dudayev Battalion and Sheik Mansour Battalion have been present in the conflict zone for some time, siding with the Ukrainian side.
AQ and IS supporters and propagandists online mainly denounce Muslim participation in the Russo-Ukraine war, especially being critical of Kadyrov forces fighting alongside the Russian side, citing no religious or ideological basis to participate in the war of “Christian crusaders and disbelievers,” as often described. Postings and the rhetoric found online urging Muslims to take advantage of the easy-to-access Ukraine war theater and commonly available weapon supplies distributed to civilians as a means to carry out attacks against warring parties in the conflict, in Europe, and beyond are also encouraged, in retaliation to anti-ISIS campaigns in Syria and Iraq by Russia and the West mainly.
The involvement of foreign fighters with ties to militant jihadi, far right, and other extremist groups in general carries significant security risks to Europe and beyond, resulting in such individuals’ increased influence in the way of combat capacity, spread of propaganda, and ability to inspire others into committing acts of terrorism.
Ardian Shajkovci, Ph.D. – Director, American Counterterrorism Targeting and Resilience Institute (ACTRI). He is a counter-terrorism researcher, lecturer, and security analyst. Ardian has been conducting research on terrorism and violent extremism in Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Western Europe, the Balkans, Kenya and Central Asia, Somalia, and Ukraine. He serves as a visiting lecturer and adjunct faculty, including at Nichols College, where he is teaching CT and P/CVE courses in the MSC Counterterrorism Program. Ardian obtained his Ph.D. in Public Policy and Administration, with a focus on Homeland Security Policy, from Walden University. He obtained his M.A. in Public Policy and Administration, from Northwestern University, and a B.A. in International Relations and Diplomacy from Dominican University. Ardian has authored and co-authored numerous scientific and professional publications on the subject of violent extremism and terrorism. He has written for, and his work has been quoted by, The New York Times, The Hill, Homeland Security Today, New York Post, The Washington Times, Euronews, The Daily Beast, Le Figaro, Washington Examiner, AFP, Daily Caller, Fox News, and others.