World Geostrategic Insights interview with Irina Tsukerman on the importance do the Gulf countries have for the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) government now ruling Syria, what role does Saudi Gulf Arabia intend to play in Syria and the Middle East in general after the fall of Assad, the likely policy of the new Trump administration in Syria, and how the relations between the United States and the Gulf country will develop under the second Trump Presidency.
Irina Tsukerman is a national security & human rights lawyer, Fellow at Arabian Peninsula Institute, Fellow at Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Board Member at The Washington Outsider Center for Information Warfare. She is President of Scarab Rising, Inc, an advisory company specializing in media, communications, reputational management, & security strategy.
Q1 – The first official foreign visits of Asaad al-Shibani, Syria’s foreign minister in the new Syrian interim government, were made to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries: to Saudi Arabia on Jan. 1, 2025; to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on Jan. 4; and to Qatar on Jan. 5. What importance do the Gulf countries have for the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) government now ruling Syria?
A1 – The GCC is a double-edged sort of the transitional HTS government. On the one hand, there is an active courting of the entire Council, as well as an outreach to individual organizations. On the other hand, each country has its independence policies, priorities, and concerns, and some of those policies reflect internal struggles and competition for resources, position and influence in the region and globally, as well as divergent ideological models. In theory, the HTS government – which has never formally relinquished its Muslim Brotherhood roots, is at odds with at least some of the GCC countries, yet needs their approval for legitimacy, and their trade and investments for reconstruction and economic survival. In practice, the situation is far more complicated. UAE is particularly an uphill battle, because UAE was the promoter of the normalization of the Assad regime, the first GCC (or any Arab state) to restore relations with Assad after the civil war, and the country that rallied the most to return Assad to the Arab League, despite widespread criticism of that move.
was particularly heavily invested into Assad’s Syria, was therefore seen to have the most to gain and at stake from Assad being in control, sought to maximize economic benefit from backing him early and at the same time had the most to lose from his downfall. Yet this strategic visit by Al-Shibani indicates that HTS is willing to bury the hatchet and show goodwill towards a diplomatic rapprochement. UAE is wise to be cautious; having earlier and very openly positioned to be adamantly anti-Muslim Brotherhood, an embrace of an Al Qaeda affiliated, which has never renounced its past, complicates UAE’s agenda, already besmirched by its very open embrace of Russia and China, at least in the eyes of the West, not to mention its diplomatic flirtation with Hizbullah, and the return of some Muslim Brotherhood voices into its official channels.
UAE has worked hard to present an image of a modern country with traditional values, opposed to extremism of any sort, and promoter of a humanitarian vision and various human rights reforms, particularly pertaining to the role of women in the region and other issues, where it has previously faced a lot of criticism. While HTS likewise pushes itself to promote the image of being willing to put women in leadership positions and to be accommodating to pluralistic values, ideological questions have never been broached with Al-Sharaa by the media, and no one knows where he really stands on anything of importance. However, one can presume that while he wants to appear pragmatic, there has not been a break with his Islamist past, if only for the obvious reasons of self-preservation. HTS is counting on UAE’s “trade mentality” and competition with Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
UAE will not wish to cede strategic territory and prospective contracts to its regional rivals, or to lose influence as a result of excessive rigidity. HTS therefore is implicitly playing off the rivalry between the three countries, seeing to exploit these competitive undertones to its own advantage. Moreover, if HTS is indeed dedicated to a path of fundamentalism couched in reformist rhetoric and optics, there is no better way to be a corrupting influence on the GCC countries than to bring them into a common fold, where by association they could be enticed into normalizing some of HTS’s dogmas, and to open doors to revivalist influences at least on a popular level/unofficially.
Establishing a channel with Saudi Arabia is a big win for HTS, first because KSA is still considered a leader in the Arab world on many issues geopolitically, second and probably more importantly, because it is a Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and plays an unparalleled role in the Muslim world, which means that by gaining official approval from the authority, HTS may be gaining a religious green light implicitly which can be used in furtherance not only of its political and economic ambitions but as a tool of ideological warfare and combating more liberal tendencies in the battle for the soul of Islam, and third, because Saudi Arabia is one of the bridges with both the East and the West, and HTS can capitalize on this link to gain approval from the US as well as from Russia and China, positioning itself to enter the international community with relative ease.
Finally, its relationship with Qatar is in many ways unique, and therefore the visit was more of a friendly courtesy visit than anything particularly groundbreaking, and that is clear from the fact that the head of Qatari intelligence was the first Arab official to visit and appeared jointly with his Turkish counterpart. All of that indicates that Qatar is likely the founder of Turkish intelligence operations that brought about the downfall of Assad and the ascent of HTS to begin with, and given that Al-Sharaa was driving both of his spooky visitors around, that indicates that those relationships are more of vassal-lord relationship than that of a new leader embracing brethren equal in stature.
Qatar is likely to play an outsized role in Syria; it will likely be one of the leading donors and will consider Syria to be its major sphere of influence. Also most analysts are fundamentally misleading the balance of power issue between Iran, Turkey, and Qatar with regards to Syria. Iran and Qatar share a gas field, are part of a gas cartel with Russia, and in many ways are joint at the hip. IRGC is reportedly providing the Al Thani royal family with security, in addition to the US and Turkish military bases located inside the country.
Qatar is the lead cut out for Iranian money laundering and ideological and intelligence operations in the United States and many other Western countries. Moreover, it was Qatar that enabled and facilitated Iran’s entrenchment in Syria. Reportedly, this was done under a guise of a ransom operation, where Qatari royals were allegedly taken hostage by the Iraqi Shia militias and were released in exchanged for nearly a billion US dollars, at least a portion of which went to Qassem Soleimani, and the remainder went towards various terrorist operations and the military set-up in Syria. Additionally, Qatar advanced Iran’s population transfer, which involved ethnic cleansing of Sunnis from two strategic cities in Syria and populating them with Shia operatives.
De facto acting as Iran’s henchman, Qatar was the leading contributor to Iran’s successes in Syria. And only shortly before Assad’s downfall, Iran publicly announced the upgrade to its relationship with Qatar. Considering that Iran was alleged to be taken by surprise of Assad’s downfall, one would expect the Islamic Republic to consider Doha as a two-faced turncoat, which aided Turkish operations trading Erdogan off for the ayatollahs. Yet, there was not one word of reproach or downgrade in relations following the operation. Let’s consider the similarities between the clandestine exchanges in the first scenario and the current shift in power in Syria.
Although Iran withdrew its military from Syria, Qatar’s role may very well have been less of a self-serving traitor and more of an official liaison between Iran and Turkey. Assad was losing territory, and never quite regained control over the provinces where Turkey-backed opposition was centered. He was the weakest link of the Axis of Resistance; his military was being challenged by Ukraine, and Syria became an attack ground for Israel, which was with increasing frequency disrupting operations. And once Israel stopped worrying about its symbolic arrangements with Russia, Assad’s position became particularly precarious, and the transfer of weapons to Lebanon was being jeopardized. For that reason, it did not make much sense for Iran to fight for the Assad regime’s survival too hard while also contending with heavy losses on other fronts. Rather, Qatar’s closeness to Turkey, which is heavily dependent on Qatar for investments, guaranteed that at the very least, Iran would have important leverage to negotiate concessions and division of territory while cutting its losses in the short term.
Qatar’s role is not only to ensure its own interests in backing a fundamentalist Islamist faction so ideologically close to similar factions supported by the pro-Muslim Brotherhood branch of the Al Thani family at the helm in Doha, but also to ensure Iran’s interests in Syria. So when we are seeing the Qatari and Turkish intelligence chief visit with Al Jolani, clandestinely, the invisible third party along for the ride is Iran. To the public view, this appears to be a hostile takeover of Syria by Turkey but in reality this process is far closer to an amicable redistribution of power and territory and renegotiation of the terms. This means also that Iran will continue to benefit directly and indirectly from the foregoing scenario of Turkey’s increased influence in Syria, which may include an unimpeded flow of trade, a speedy lifting of sanctions by EU and the US (some of it has already happened, reportedly including some sanctions lifted by the US which astonishingly permit some transactions with Russia and Iran!), and a Qatar-Turkey gas pipeline, long under negotiations, that would not be possible without Iran’s role in the background since Iran and Qatar share a gas field.
There is another dimension to this situation, which is the fact that the entire concept of GCC is more a useful legal fiction than a true security alliance in the traditional sense. After all, the Council was created in the 1980s specifically as a bulwark against the newly formed Islamic Republic, considered to be an ideological and military threat to the Sunni majority Arab countries. Yet from the outset, GCC was heavily divided with Qatar and Oman especially being much closer to Iran than they had any reason to be in this framework, and consistently acting against the alleged collective interests of GCC and favoring Iran. The re-normalization with Iran by most of the GCC and Arab states brought us one step closer to throwing off the mask.
The Qatar-Turkey pipeline would benefit Saudi Arabia just as much as Iran, and really the entire operation in the end advances economic interests between Tehran, GCC, and Ankara. Given the fact that the volume of trade between Iran and some of the GCC members has been steadily expanding, and give the fact that a senior Saudi military official visited Iran in the immediate aftermath of the US election, it seems that Qatar’s role in this scenario is to facilitate relations between Iran and the others, particularly Saudi Arabia, and Syria, then should be seen in an entirely different light; it is more than a new Vienna with quarters dedicated to the different powers vying for influence in the wilderness of mirrors; rather, it is more of a vestibule for powers to occupy the space while regrouping or preparing for operations elsewhere. This also means, then, that once again, the West is being pushed out of the decision making process in the Middle East – Iran, GCC, and Turkey are deciding the future of the region among themselves using their own intermediaries, their own diplomatic processes, and their own cover stories that the rest of us, outsider to the region, are expected to believe.
Q2 – Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister, called Sunday, Jan. 12, for the lifting of sanctions on Syria during a meeting in Riyadh with diplomatic officials from the Middle East, Turkey, France, the European Union and the United Nations. What role does Saudi Gulf Arabia intend to play in Syria and the Middle East in general after the fall of Assad?
A2 – I don’t think it would be too much of a stretch to say that from a practical standpoint, calling for the lifting of the sanctions on Syria is premature. Just because the Assad regime is gone does not mean that the new transitional government, which only will consider elections in four years from now, should be given a free pass and the benefit of the doubt on trade. HTS has not renounced Al Qaeda ideology or past actions, and Al-Sharaa has never explained whether a shift in his own paradigm has actually taken place – or whether he is forced to moderate governance in the short term for PR purposes, to gain credibility and support, and to be able to trade freely.
However, Riyadh’s call of the lifting of the sanctions has nothing to do with concerns about HTS legitimacy and everything to do with a growing competition among the Arab states and the fixation on not losing ground to Turkey. The more countries lift their sanctions on Syria, the easier it will be to trade unimpeded, to make investments, and to benefit economically. Yet many questions remain. After all, only a few years ago, Saudi Arabia was at the forefront of the ideological warfare against ALL forms of extremism, including but not limited to Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated organizations, and especially known jihadist groups. Why is Saudi Arabia suddenly placing economic concerns well above political and religious moderation at the top of its priorities? Several factors elucidate the situation.
First, a power shift inside Saudi Arabia, resulting from the political influence campaigns to delegitimize the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, significantly weakened him towards the end of Donald Trump’s first term in office, just as Trump and Kushner pushed for the Al Ula agreement which would restore diplomatic relations between the Anti-Terrorist Quartet and Qatar. In fact, however, far from fixing the underlying problems between moderate and reformist Arab states, such as KSA, UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain, it opened the Pandora’s Box releasing unhindered Qatar’s foreign malign influence in those countries, lifted the taboo on extremism, and created and contributed to dangerous splits about the formerly unified quartet.
Qatar was able to play to the inherent internal weaknesses and disputes to drive the wedge between and among the other three countries and utilized the ensuing tensions to insinuate itself in each case and to undercut resistance to extremism and corruption. These dynamics only became more entrenched with the Biden administration’s openly antagonistic initial attitude towards Mohammed bin Salman and varying degrees of hostility to everyone else except Qatar. Normalization with Iran and rapprochement with Turkey further breached the ideological commitments to fighting extremist and hardline authoritarian regimes and movements.
The greatest beneficiaries of Mohammed bin Salman’s political isolation were the Old Guard and the “New Guard” inside the country: former pro-Muslim Brotherhood, Salafist, and corrupt nepotistic officials on the one hand, and opportunistic mercurial mercenary-minded technocrats on the other, who initially benefited from MBS’s reforms and rose to power on his coattails, but once his star started to fade under the weight of internal and external attacks, they quickly gravitated to the “stronger horse” or reverted to their prior allegiances. Between the ideologues who embraced their counterparts in Turkey and the Levant, and the technocrats who prioritized short-term economic and political opportunities over longer-term vision for the country, the old grudges crumbled very quickly. Normalization with Iran only hastened that process.
Second, the reversion to nepotism and the loss of Mohammed bin Salman’s oversight, as some of his signature Vision2030 projects, such as Neom, shifted to other players and attracted the interest of regional players such as China not particularly concerned about transparency or accountability, eventually had its toll. Saudi Arabia, in four years since the conclusion of the Al Ula agreement, went from a surplus to a rising date and an internal economic crisis with a pre-MBS high youth unemployment and massive loss of economic resources. In other words, Saudi Arabia, to satisfy the appetites of its power elites, must now quickly find supplementary source of income given that its many increasingly risky projects are failing, the investors are increasingly reluctant to support dubious economic adventures, and those who have replaced MBS at the helm of managing massive projects are either not concerned with the costs or do not have the acumen to address overruns. Syria in this light is like a lifeline for a drowning man.
Third, some of the Islamists in charge in KSA are sympathetic to both Erdogan’s role in the region (despite old grudges between Arabs and the Ottomans) and to HTS. In fact, some members of the royal family continue to fund Muslim Brotherhood and even jihadist networks. An HTS-controlled Syria is still preferable than an Assad controlled Syria and appeals to their ideological paradigms. And as a Custodian of Two Holy Mosques, Saudi Arabia can play an outsized ideological role even if Turkey is willing to commit the troops and other resources to keep the show running.
Fourth, Saudi Arabia is looking to take advantage of the Trump administration’s overall disinterest in Syria or in expansion of the US military role in the Middle East, to reassert its own leadership among Arab states and in the region overall. Being seen as a leading advocate for the lifting of the sanctions could help Riyadh score cheap political points on the street and move the region out of the crisis mode and into the “business as usual” mode.
Fifth, just as the Iran-Qatar-Turkey love-hate triangle played out its charade in public, it’s worth noting that the Saudi Islamists and others likely were in on the operation from the start. They jumped on board very quickly; Al-Sharaa was giving interviews to the Saudi press calling for normalization and cooperation within days of getting into Damascus, which indicates that the ground was likely prepared for such a scenario and some of these diplomatic arrangements were already made in the background, while the push for dialogue was largely being played out for the public benefit and to prepare the skeptics towards an official shift.
In other words, Saudi Arabia is likely to be one of the leading powers involved in Syria, and will likely balance its historic differences with Turkey, with the common interests uncovered through the above-mentioned confluence of factors.
Q3 – Trump praised Turkey’s regional role as a great power and its personal ties with Erdoğan, saying Ankara will play a key role in Syria’s future after the ouster of the Assad regime. Trump also stated that Syria is not a central interest of the United States. However, the fall of the Assad regime in Syria could bring a number of new challenges for the incoming Trump administration. What is your opinion? Do you think Trump’s promise to disengage completely from Syria may still be a viable option? How do you foresee President Trump acting?
A3 – Trump’s comments about Turkey are troubling given the fact that Turkey is actually a middle power besieged by a host of internal economic and political challenges and therefore Trump is giving it undue credibility, particularly in the view of the Turkish and Islamist street. Moreover, Trump fails to address the concerning impact of Turkish involvement, including erasure of security and democratic and human rights norms, the spread of corruption, the blackmail of the EU with the Syrian refugee issue, the dissemination of extremist ideology, the tensions and threats to Greece, Cyprus, Libya, Syria, Iraq, and even Egypt, the potential for border tensions or conflicts with Israel, the spread of antisemitism, the support for terrorist organizations such as Hamas, marginalization and demonization of the Kurds, the purchase of Russian weapons systems and the financial transactions which enabled Russia, and Iran, the joining of anti-Western blocs such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the aggressive and corrupting role of lobbies and intelligence agencies, and other issues.
Moreover, far from using the personal connections with Erdogan to resolve any of these fundamental concerns, Trump has ignored the long-term trends and essentially greenlighted some of Erdogan’s troubling actions. It was an imposition of sanctions on Turkish officials, rather than a personal relationship with Trump, that finally got a wrongfully detained American pastor released. Such comments and rejection of accountability are demoralizing to US allies, undercut US credibility in various parts of the Middle East, and erode deterrence value of the existing and very limited US presence in Syria.
Moreover, Trump’s comments indicate that he is willing to give over Syria to Turkey without any resistance or discretionary comments that would indicate that the US is keeping an eye on the situation and that there are hard red lines Turkey cannot cross without repercussions, be they sanctions or the increase in the presence of the US troops. Still, so far Trump has not indicated the prospects for a complete withdrawal which indicates that he may also not prioritize the withdrawal of the current US contingency in Syria for pragmatic reasons. Withdrawal now is far riskier for Trump than maintaining the status quo without an increase in troops or an active policy. That’s precisely because the US is facing challenges in Syria that can only become exponentially worse if the US makes an announcement that could encourage an escalation. Some of these challenges include:
– HTS thus far has not been able to unite all the warring factions under one defense ministry umbrella. Clashes are ongoing between SNA and the Alevites, as well as between SNA and other armed groups and the Kurds in Northeastern Syria. An unknown number of terrorist organizations and armed groups is scattered all over Syria and there is no accounting for them or their intentions.
– Although Israel has destroyed much of Syria’s advanced equipment, a Syrian tank filled with weapons was recently found close to the border, indicating possible hostile intent from an unknown party. Moreover, although al-Sharaa indicated he will not be attacking Israel soon, his recent comments point to a long-term plan for aggression that could lead to a dangerous escalation on Israel’s borders.
– A takeover of Syria by Turkey would most likely lead to massacres and ethnic cleansing of Kurds, and a blow to US credibility and influence in the region, so in the event the US decides to re-engage in Syria, it will not have the same resources as in the past.
– Increased mayhem in Syria or an authoritarian takeover by Syria would likely open the doors to all sorts of jihadists groups to flock to Syria and to establish it as base of operations, proliferating to Iraq and attacking Israel, which could lead to a forced US return for counterterrorism operations and would be far costlier than never letting them in in the first place and maintaining a low-level deterrence in the face of a minor US troops contingent. Full withdrawal from Syria could lead to the same long-term security deterioration in the entire region as what the US withdrawal from Afghanistan did for Southeast Asia. The impact included the global rise of ISIS-K, a major uprising in Bangladesh and the flocking of Islamists, jihadists, and increased influence by China in Bangladesh at the cost to India’s security.
– If the oil reserves in Syria fall into the wrong hands, only anti-America actors benefit from this scenario.
– Syria is of strategic geopolitical importance. Iran had used it to transport weapons to Lebanon and may carve out a deal with the HTS to do so again. Russia has not yet fully abandoned its bases in Tartus and could likewise negotiate a return. China is eyeing potential deals and even a new naval base in Syria once the situation is stabilized, regardless of who ends up in power, which would endanger US operations in the region and contribute to China’s rise in the Middle East. Moreover, Turkey may take over the transport of weapons to Hamas for Iran, in a bid to displace Iran as a leading backer of Hamas and the “Palestinian resistance”.
– The fall of the Assad regime is a boon to the region. Assad endangered both Israel and the Arab world through his targeted and weaponized dissemination of the deadly drug Captagon (the fentanyl of the Middle East) and by giving space to Iranian proxies to operate and to threaten the region. But the transition to a more stable model is just as much of a concern. Currently, Syria is set to exchange one set of rogue actors for another, which could prove a long-term threat of equal value. For that reason, the US should have a stake and a concern about a peaceful transition to a model of governance that will not come back to haunt the US and its allies.
– For that reason, the wait-and-see approach would be wiser than announcing US intentions well in advance and giving undue comfort and encouragement to hostile factions and forces. On the contrary, it would be best if they felt watched and scrutinized or at least feared such scrutiny as a possibility.
– Much now depends on who ends up being confirmed as Trump’s advisers, and more importantly who Trump will end up valuing as his advisers. If hardcore pro-Russian and pro-Iran isolationists like Tucker Carlson, Trump’s son Don Jr., or even someone like Elon Musk end up being the primary influences over his administration, Trump could well be persuaded to withdraw forces, and even to aid Turkey, Qatar, and others in various ways. If, on the other hand, political pragmatists and national security hawks gain Trump’s trust and ear and succeed in edging out the more chaotic voices or if those voices lose influence through incompetence, infighting, or damaging results, Trump could at the very least be swayed to retain the small US contingent and perhaps to express limited concern about potential excesses in Syria. In the first 100 days in office, however, Trump will likely be focused on other matters, and we are not likely to see major changes in US policy unless the security situation escalates suddenly.
Q4 – Saudi Arabia has been at the center of Trump’s Middle East policy in his first administration. But much has changed in recent years. How do you think Saudi Arabia’s (and Gulf countries in general) relations with the United States will develop under the second Trump administration? Will the GCC still be Trump’s main Arab interlocutors in the Middle East? Can there still be a meaningful convergence between U.S. interests with those of the Gulf countries?
A4 – It does not seem that Trump or his administration are aware just how much the landscape in the Middle East has changed since four years ago – or that Trump’s own policies, including the push for the Al Ula agreement, and the very equivocal and limited backing of MBS as opposed to an immediate stop to the campaigns against him – have contributed to these changes. Several factors on the ground will make Trump’s second term significantly more challenging in terms of relations with the GCC. These include:
– The internal dynamics among and between GCC countries are quite different now. UAE-KSA rivalry has brought each country closer to Qatar than to each other. The factional battles inside KSA have resulted in more anti-American trends. MBS supporters are now far quieter, and MBS appears in public far less frequently. Iran’s influence, despite recent losses, should not be underestimated. Normalization with Iran has opened doors for operatives to infiltrate the area. The rise of Chinese surveillance technology and the control by China, via Huawei, of the Saudi telecommunications industry, has had a chilling effect on the younger generations and also has limited the role of Americans inside the country. The number of American contracts in KSA has shrunk, as these jobs were displaced by Chinese and Indian contractors. Overall, business relations with leading countries are mostly relegated to a relatively small number of big business companies. Concentrated power means fewer diverse business voices and a more limited influence for the US as a country as opposed to some key industry insiders.
– After Trump has failed to prevent or retaliate for the Iran-backed attack on ARAMCO during his first term, there is far less trust in his administration by regional leaders. The GCC countries will be less likely to cooperate on security and defense matters. Four years of failed negotiations with Biden over a defense treaty with the US left a bitter aftertaste in the entire region. Likewise, distrust increased over Biden’s mishandling of the F-35 deal with the UAE.
– The rise of Russia and China as “alternative” voices, in part in response to the perceived hostility by Biden, and in part as a result of the passive US approach to these actors overall, has now erased some of US leverage in terms of trade and other issues. Although culturally the Saudis and others are still far more attuned to the US and to the dollar, China is aggressively pursuing social and cultural rapprochement; many young Saudis are now compelled to study Chinese in schools. Still, the Saudis are cautious about fully switching sides because the US still holds significant political leverage. For instance, despite Russia’s announcement of KSA’s move to join BRICS, Riyadh never finalized its accession and after Trump’s election put the entire process on hold.
– The Abraham Accords, Trump’s signature accomplishment during his first term, have been reduced to symbolism due to the fact that they were never substantiated by clear defense, cultural, and social outline of mutual obligations and responsibilities and were disproportionately dependent on the initiative of Jared Kushner and his close associates. The framework was weakened over the course of Biden’s presidency, and eventually undercut and close to being reversed by the October 7 attacks and the wars in Gaza and Lebanon. Returning to the previous framework, restoring ties, and regaining and rebuilding trust both for the US and Israel will take tremendous effort; expanding the Accords in the GCC is not a plausible scenario at the moment. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has never moved away from its official position of the Arab Peace Initiative in place since 2002 which included normalization with Israel only upon the establishment of a Palestinian state at the 1967 border, which is an even less realistic scenario now than it was upon its first announcement. Current issues with Hamas, Hizbullah etc would first need to be resolved decisively. Many obstacles remain in place even towards those limited goals.
Leadership and political priorities have shifted within the GCC. Whereupon MBS played a pivotal catalyst role in driving reforms, messaging, and cooperation, other parties appear to be in charge. Trump’s historic relations with Saudis preceding his presidency have consistently been with the Old Guard of the Saudi political establishment; while Trump and many of his advisers may not necessarily know the difference or care, these voices will be an obstacle to the pro-peace objectives of the Trump administration. Thus the goal of expanding Abraham Accords is contradictory to the goal of continuing to do “business as usual” on a personal level between Trump, his team, and these factions.
Trump’s team is now quite different from his first term, which included far more openly pro-Israel, strongly anti-Iran, and anti-Russia voices who succeeded in leveraging their collective experience to bring at least some of the GCC members in the fault. Continuing open investments and collaboration with Qatar and its evaluation in status to the position of a major non-NATO ally despite its support for terrorism and antagonism against Israel is unlikely to be reversed by the current set of players. Moreover, the current team is far less experienced politically, has had far less exposure to GCC, lacks the cultural awareness and acumen to understand the political undertone in the region, and in some cases lacks any diplomatic or other relevant experience. The fact that the nominated Special Envoy for the Middle East, Steve Witcoff is a businessman shows that Trump sees his second term as a smooth transition and continuation from the first term and that he can get back to cutting deals with different leaders as if the last four years did not happen. But Witcoff lacks the background to deal with the complexities of the current diplomacy which has multiple layers and is far less direct and overt than what the Trump team was dealing with four years ago. It is also far less unified.
– Trump’s immediate objectives are also different. He is now focused on bringing Iran to heel and using leverage to return it to the negotiation table. He is also focused on retaining the ceasefire in Lebanon and reaching a solution in Gaza, which may not happen quickly given all the complications surrounding that conflict. Trump will likely still try to use GCC to come up with a convenient multilateral solution but most of the actors are now facing challenges and different priorities which will complicate matters. These negotiations are likely to be far more tense and less friendly than previously; moreover these countries are now facing a dilemma: Trump will want their cooperation against Iran, but most have normalized with Iran and will not wish to risk even a minimal inconvenience, much less a potential escalation, particularly given the erosion of trust in the US role in the region.
– Trump is facing growing instability in the region, the rapid rise of Turkey and China, the escalation in ideological extremism and terrorism which were on the downward trend as he was coming in, as well as the loss of US prestige, and a wave of popular outrage on the Arab street over the Gaza war, which will be difficult to contain, much less reverse. Given the other foreign policy challenges and the fact that Trump is now facing only one term, he will be lucky if he makes a dent in these troubling patterns, much less resolve them.
– However, the situation can be reversed and improved much faster, if Trump learns from previous mistakes and comes to understand that both leadership and ideology matter, and that there is no possibility of resolving regional problems working with corrupt and nefarious factions that are the catalysts of these problems. Trump could easily make moves that could restore MBS to a fully functional leadership role and from there rebuild credibility by a swift return to a credible backing of other allies. If he comes to understand who his friends and who his enemies (Islamists) are, that will be half the battle.
Irina Tsukerman – National security & human rights lawyer.
Image Credit: Saudi Press Agency