By Eslam Abdelmagid Eid
In the Middle East there is no stronger voice than the crises. It stands out for its peculiar strategic position, which constitutes a heavy burden for the decision-makers of the countries of the region, especially as regards the safeguarding of national security against the continuous external interference in internal policies.
Egypt has always played a leading role in Middle Eastern policy making for many periods, but this role has begun to decline at an accelerating pace. Cairo was a major player in the African integration project and in the Arab unitary ambitions in the 1950s and 1960s. He pioneered the principle of non-alignment at a time when bilateral polarization policies were dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union. Egyptian influence began to wane after the defeat of June 1967, and the subsequent placement of Egypt, under Sadat’s presidency, in the Western camp, led by Washington, in addition to the normalization of relations with Israel. With the exit from the Arab-Israeli conflict, Egypt loses one of its most important diplomatic cards and one of the main pillars on which the Egyptian regional influence strategy has been based for thirty years, that is the Palestinian question.
Egypt during President Mubarak’s rule was also limited by Washington’s policies in the region, which was evident in Cairo’s handling of the 1990 Gulf War crisis, through the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In the aftermath of the fall of Mubarak, the government of the country by the Muslim brotherhood, was a fact that had no equal in the era of the US democratic administration of President Obama, and which on the other hand represented an existential threat to Egypt and to the its military system, which for decades had held the reins of the country’s affairs.
On July 3, 2013, the leadership of the armed forces, led by Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi, overthrew former president Mohamed Morsi, following mass demonstrations in Egyptian squares calling for a change of government.
From this moment, with the assumption of power by President Sisi, the characters of a new foreign policy for the country begin to take shape, especially due to the fact that the region is experiencing one of the most difficult periods in its history, which is a great challenge for Egypt decision makers.
Foundations on which Egyptian foreign policy is currently based
The three main dimensions of Egyptian foreign policy
1- Cairo wants to limit the influence of Islamists and terrorist groups in the region, against the backdrop of the political struggle between the state and the Muslim Brotherhood, supported by Qatar and Turkey. This is the reason for Egypt’s moves in the international area, especially regarding the Libyan crisis to a large extent and the Syrian crisis to a lesser extent. Relatively speaking, also depend on this, the regional alliances of the Egypto with the Gulf States, led by the Emirates and Saudi Arabia, which take a position similar to that of Cairo regarding the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies.
2- The Egyptian leadership operates within the framework of the balance between protecting the country’s national interests, defending the sovereignty of the state and increasing the quality of life of citizens. This was evident in the Ethiopian Renaissance dam issue and in the tireless political efforts of diplomatic cadres in the country to preserve water rights. The structure of the current system is based on an elitist character, which is represented in the form of interconnected networks in all political and economic sectors of the state.
3 – Egypt adopts a model of “strategic anticipation”, which is based on not making impulsive decisions regarding the crises in the Middle East region. Cairo currently lacks the economic and diplomatic capabilities to occupy a leadership position in the region. Crumbling infrastructure, especially with the crises plaguing the region following the events of the Arab Spring, make a tangible regional role difficult for Egypt. The major ambition of Egyptian diplomacy continues to be to achieve a situation in which the powers of the region are balanced, especially with the growing influence of some regional powers such as Turkey and Iran, and the presence of international actors in the region, led from the United States and Russia.
Theory of the balance of power
This theory is based on the realistic model. The basis of the balance of power theory is the existence of an international system in which states strive to achieve their own interests. Among the pioneers of this theory was Hans Morgenthau in his famous book “Politics between Nations”, in which he mentioned that states will seek an alliance with each other, so that it can be protected by another country or alliance. Morgenthau points out in his theory that the determinants of the alliance come mainly from the current and potential external threats in the international system. Perhaps Egypt’s accession to the Saudi-Emirati alliance is the clearest example of this. Egypt’s main goal was to try to maintain a balance with its opponents Turkey and Qatar, who support the regime’s most prominent opponent at home, the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as a large number of extremist jihadist organizations in most of the countries of the Region and Sinai Peninsula.
But Morgenthau’s theory ignored one important factor, namely insider threats, which is what Stephen David highlighted in his theory known as omnibalancing theory. Furthermore, his theory takes into account the leaders of authoritarian countries, particularly in developing countries, and the ruler here is instead the basic unit of the analysis. From the state itself because these leaders are interested in staying in power, in facing internal challenges. Thus, the Egyptian leadership’s foreign policy decisions revolve around the orbit of reconciling what might keep it in power alongside assessing internal and external threats.
Egyptian foreign policy in the Middle East
The Palestinian issue
The current Egyptian leadership has inherited the repercussions of the situation in the Gaza Strip in its foreign policy. Egypt faces the problem of smuggling and protection of the borders adjacent to the Gaza Strip, in particular with the influx of terrorists through the tunnels between Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula, with particular reference to Hamas militants, who carry more or minus the same Islamist ideology as the Muslim Brotherhood. Egypt also needs to protect its national interests, especially as regards its relations with the United States and its ally Israel.
Egypt has received US aid worth approximately $ 1.3 billion annually since 1987, to ensure the continuity of the Egyptian government regarding the Israeli peace treaty, and to facilitate the passage of the Navy of the United States at the Suez Canal. President Al-Sisi had to take these priorities into account, as well as the general national sympathy for the Palestinian cause, which is still of great importance to the Egyptian people.
Egyptian diplomacy was based on two points in addressing the Palestinian question:
1- Maintain the official state of sympathy for the Palestinian cause.
Egypt continues to play a role of mediation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, especially taking into account the great value that the Palestinian cause brings to the Arabs in general. The Egyptian leadership is thus trying to gain some kind of popular sympathy at home for the Egypt’s emergence as a peacemaker. In this way the regime can be relatively protected from popular anger, in addition to the fact that President Al-Sisi does not want to leave the Palestinian arena in order not to give way to other regional actors, with a strong link with Hamas, namely Turkey and Qatar, and averting the attempts of Doha and Ankara to limit Egyptian influence in the region.
2- Create a state of balance in the relationship with Hamas.
Initially, Egypt’s foreign policy in the Gaza Strip was aimed at paralyzing the economy of Hamas and its resources by identifying and destroying the smuggling tunnels that allow large numbers of extremist groups to enter the Sinai. Egypt also demolished a large number of Palestinian homes on the Egyptian side of the Rafah border, with the aim of creating a buffer zone between the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. Hence, the relationship between the Egyptian leadership and Hamas witnessed a new turning point, especially with the Egyptian sponsorship of the dialogue between the Palestinian parties, namely the Fatah and Hamas movements, which took place in Cairo, and subsequent visits of Egyptian intelligence leaders in the Gaza Strip, which led to the opening of the Rafah crossing after it was almost closed for several years, avoiding a humanitarian crisis in Gaza by allowing the flow of aid to the Strip. But Cairo is well aware of the need to contain Hamas, to guarantee Egypt’s historical role in the Palestinian cause, especially since Hamas has become one of the arms of the Islamist in the region, compatible with the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood organization that receives support from Qatar and Turkey.
The Syrian Crisis
The Syrian crisis has had a significant impact on international relations, particularly between the countries of the Middle Eastern region. The spark of the Arab Spring found its way into Syria, causing a brutal civil war. An important factor was the external financing of anti-regime armed groups by US allied regimes, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey and, at the same time, the support of extremist Salafist organizations, the attachment to the power of the President al-Assad and its request for assistance from outside parties, such as Russia and Iran.
Here, the cards shuffled for foreign policy makers in Egypt. Saudi Arabia, Cairo’s current ally, hoped to overthrow the Assad regime, because the fall of Assad would weaken Iranian influence and presence in the region. Furthermore, this would cut the Iranian line of action that extends from the Fertile Crescent (Syria and Iraq) to Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. But Cairo opposes the presence of extremist Islamic groups in Syria. Egypt suffers from their presence in Sinai and works to stop their growth, which is considered probable in the event of the fall of the Syrian Baath regime. Therefore, from this point of view, Cairo has maintained security relations with the current Syrian regime, and on October 8, 2016 Egypt supported a Russian draft resolution in the United Nations Security Council to resolve the crisis in Syria, in conjunction with the regime’s attack on Aleppo, and the draft text of the Appeal for a Political Solution and a Ceasefire, in order to send humanitarian aid to the country, rejected by Riyadh, which pushed for a military solution and international action to overthrow President Assad.
After Cairo accepted the Russian draft resolution, the Kingdom informed the Egyptian leadership that it would withdraw its monthly supplies to Egypt from oil shipments amounting to 700,000 tons, in order to pressure Cairo to change its position. Despite this could have dealt a severe blow to the already struggling Egyptian economy, President Sisi maintained his opposition to the Kingdom regarding the crisis in Syria by saying, “There are attempts to put pressure on Egypt, but he will not kneel before none except God “. This prompted Iranian media at the time to publish the news of Egypt’s demand from Tehran for oil supplies to offset the withdrawal of Saudi supplies. But Cairo has effectively reconciled the two solutions by signing an agreement with the Iraqi government that requires Baghdad to supply Cairo with about one million barrels. of crude oil per month from March 2017.
It is also striking that there is now no real Egyptian role in Syria. The Syrian Baath regime no longer sees in Egypt, the largest Arab country in the region, the image of an ally since Sadat signed the peace treaty with Israel in 1979. This prompted the Baath regime to turn to a new ally in the region, represented by the Islamic Republic in Iran. But despite this, Cairo still maintains its security relations with the regime in Syria and supports its war against jihadist opposition groups, which is categorically inconsistent with the views of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, its main ally in the region. And this is a clear message to Riyadh that Egypt’s position towards the crisis in Syria is stable and immutable, regardless of all threats and temptations, given that the presence of terrorists in Syria is an existential threat to Egypt, which is what the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has begun to understand relatively in the current period.
The war in Yemen
The conflict in Yemen is also one of the most burning crises in the region. In 2011, the extension of the Arab Spring events had reached Yemen, and large protests erupted to demand an end to President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s rule, which lasted more than thirty years. However, unlike what happened in Syria, Saleh resigned early after it was agreed on his safe exit from power. But his resignation came without resolving the ongoing internal issues and conflicts within countries between the various religious and tribal sects in the country. The absence of solutions to these issues drove Yemen into a civil war that continues to this moment. The actors in this war are the Houthis with the support of Iran and the government forces of President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi with the support of the Saudi-led coalition, of which Egypt is part, but despite this the Egyptian participation is very limited, and it was limited only to sending an Egyptian naval fleet to protect its national security in Red Sea region.
Therefore, even if Egypt supports the Kingdom’s steps in Yemen, it is pursuing what is called a policy of “cautious participation” in the ongoing conflict there, which explains the apparent absence of the Egyptian military presence to support the Saudi coalition on the battlefields in Yemen due to three main factors:
1- Egypt’s preoccupation at the present time with the war on terror in the Sinai Peninsula, in addition to the country’s political leadership’s endeavor to secure Egypt’s western borders adjacent to Libya, especially with Ankara’s recent intervention to support the reconciliation government, which may harm Cairo’s interests and national security. Currently in the midst of an internal war, the Egyptian involvement in the Yemen war may cause a massive amplification of Egypt’s security problems.
2- The Egyptian leadership was afraid of repeating the scenario of the previous Nasserite experience in the Yemen war in the sixties of the last century, which overthrew the rule of Imam Muhammad al-Badr and announced the establishment of the republic headed by Abdullah al-Sallal. And it was the biggest ally of the Muslim Brotherhood in that period as well. At that time, the group saw in the Saudi regime a living example of the political and social system of the Islamic state, and the group was getting great support at the time from the House of Saud to confront the nationalist tide of Egypt, Abdel Nasser, which was a threat to the survival of the Gulf monarchs. Also, the war exhausted the Egyptian state somewhat economically and militarily, due to the terrain of Yemen and its special nature that impeded the passage of military units and equipment. The prolongation of the war in Yemen was l exploited by Israel that began its blitzkrieg war on Sinai on the fifth of June June 1967, in light of the presence of a large part of the Egyptian army in Yemen.
3- The Egyptian state’s awareness of the difficulty of returning anew to the national project pursued by Egypt during the rule of President Abdel Nasser, through which the regional influence of Egypt was embodied at the time, and it was one of the reasons for Egypt’s participation in the Yemen war in the sixties of the last century. The region was swept after the events of what is known as the Arab Spring, in addition to Egypt’s lack of adequate political and professional cadres and also to the low level of the country’s media machine, so that it cannot be relied upon at such a stage to attract soft forces to Egypt that could help to revive the national ideology again.
Conclusions
1- Cairo must go beyond its current situation as a mere “response to crises”, by not only focusing on protecting the country’s borders, but by moving towards the extreme necessity of a major foreign strategy, in which it intensifies the use of its soft power at all cultural and political levels, thus Egypt will be able to enhance the effectiveness of its views in international forums towards various regional crises, by working to harness the country’s economic, political and military resources in this context.
2- It is necessary not to adhere to the desires of the American foreign policy pursued in the Middle East, and to strive to adhere to concluding other alliances with various international powers such as Russia and China, which is what Egypt has already started to do at the present time, so that Egypt can achieve a broader state of balance in the region, and play a real effective role.
3 – Cairo must reconsider its relations with the regional powers in the region, such as Iran and Turkey, as it is not possible to ignore the effect these forces in reality have in the crises that plague the Arab depth of Egypt, in a way that Egypt is not put in a state of isolation in its regional surroundings, and in a manner that does not pose a threat to Its regional interests in general.
4- Within the framework of forming a major Egyptian strategy, focus must be placed on finding suitable cadres and competencies in leadership and diplomatic positions, who have sufficient experience and political imagination, which may contribute greatly to achieving the desired goal of the country.
5- Egypt should achieve a non-dependence with the funding of the allies in the Gulf (Saudi Arabia and the UAE), working to find a state of balance that allows Egypt to practice independent views in some crises, as the common interests of countries do not always coincide, and may conflict at times, Perhaps the Syrian case was the most prominent example of opposing the views of Saudi Arabia, which adhered to the overthrow of the Assad regime, supporting the Syrian extremist groups, in order to cut off the path of funding for Iran’s agents in the region, among them Hezbollah. On the contrary, Cairo adhered to a political solution in order to prevent the influx of terrorist groups into Sinai, and for this reason it has maintained security relations with the Assad regime in Damascus.
Author: Eslam Abdelmagid Eid (Academic, political researcher, and specialist in Middle East affairs)
(The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of World Geostrategic Insights)