China and the United States are engaged in a profound rivalry, a true Cold War. Endowed with a profound sense of entitlement, the Middle Kingdom and the exceptional nation seem particularly ill prepared to accept a number two ranking position within their power struggle for world supremacy.
The outcome of the multilayered, serious, and far-reaching impasse that confronts the two of them, might evolve in several directions.
Containment
The first of these directions would be a long-term containment policy of China by the United States. This follows the main lines of the one that the United States sustained between 1947 and 1989, in relation to the Soviet Union. When conceptualizing such policy in his famous “Long Telegram” of 1946, George Kennan wrote that the Soviet Union was “to be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of shifting geographical and political points” (Nash, 2008, p. 825). Provided the final success of this policy in relation to the Soviets, it has become Washington’s preferred option in relation to China as well. Since Obama’s “pivot to Asia”, and with shifting priorities, this has been the policy followed through three successive presidential administrations.
A fundamental difference comes to mind, though, when comparing the case of China to that of the USSR. As Stalin understood early on in post WWII that no new gains were possible in Europe beyond the “Iron Curtain”, Soviet expansionist intents move away from this sphere and over the so called “Third World”. Conversely, the U.S. did not respond to events within the Soviet bloc. That was the case when East Germany’s protest were violently suppressed by the Soviets in 1953 or when Hungary was invaded by the Warsaw Pact forces in 1956 or, for the matter, when the Berlin Wall was built in 1961 or Czechoslovakia was invaded by the Warsaw Pact in 1968. During the first Cold War, hence, neither the Soviets nor the Americans challenged each other’s main spheres of influence. With the single exception of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, which almost lead to WWIII, their confrontation was limited to client states in peripheral zones.
The contrast with the current case is thus notorious. America’s containment of China not only includes Taiwan, which China considers to be an integral part of its territory, but takes place in an area that for millennia was a tributary dependent region of Beijing. It is difficult to assume that China might be restrained in relation to its aspirations to incorporate Taiwan into the People’s Republic, or that it may be willing to relinquish its aspirations of hegemony in its own backyard. What is herein involved is not only China’s “Great Unification” of its territory, but the restoration of its glorious past, the “China Dream of National Rejuvenation”.
On the other hand, though, the United States might not easily yield presence from an area where it has been a major power since 1854. An area, which after its own hemisphere, became its first focus of international attention, where it has fought four major wars and, where it has five formal treaty allies. Moreover, a region where the United States currently deployed 60 percent of its fleet, 350,000 troops of its Indo-Pacific Command based in Hawaii, around 50,000 troops in Japan and more than 24,000 in South Korea (Medeiros, 2019). For both China and the United States, the stakes are exceedingly high. Containment is not an easy proposition, but neither is relinquishing presence. If the Chinese Communist Party yields, it will be devoured by the tiger of domestic nationalism. If the U.S. yields, it will lose its superpower status.
Power Sharing
The second possible direction that might result from the serious impasse between China and the United States would be some kind of power sharing agreement. Among mainstream U.S. foreign policy thinkers there is currently a debate about whether the country should continue to pursue primacy in Asia, or switch to a strategic balance amidst major powers (Medeiros, 2019). Henry Kissinger and Fareed Zakaria have been among those advocating for a compromise between China and the United States.
According to Kissinger, conflict between both superpowers is a choice not a necessity. They can choose whether to move toward a genuine effort of cooperation, creating a new order in Asia, or fall into a dangerous rivalry. As he admits, cooperation is not an easy task as the U.S. has few precedents in relating to a country of comparable size, self-confidence, economic achievement, and international scope. At the same time, China had never had to relate to a fellow great power with a permanent presence in Asia, a vision of universal ideas alien to the Chinese conceptions, and alliances with several of its neighbors.
However, the danger of an overt rivalry is overwhelming as a major war between these two developed nuclear countries could bring casualties and upheavals impossible to relate to calculable objectives (Kissinger, 2012). Not surprisingly, while arguing that much complementarity still exists between these two countries, Fareed Zakaria concludes that Washington’s greatest challenge is embracing and managing the complexity of this relation itself (Zakaria, 2021).
Such compromise would lead to the U.S. remaining as a major power in Asia under a power sharing structure with China. In Hugh White words, that would imply for America “to try to find a way to share power with China in Asia. That would mean negotiating a new distribution of political authority and influence to more closely match the new distribution of power (…) To have any chance of success, the United States would have to be prepared to treat China as an equal” (White, 2012, pp. 103, 104).
However, you need two for tango and even if the U.S. were to reach the conclusion that a new distribution of power in Asia was admissible, Beijing might disagree. Would China be willing to accept a power sharing structure in its historical sphere of influence? Especially so as its objective is to expand its area of control beyond the Second Island Chain. China’s vision of power sharing, indeed, seems to be none other than the United States controlling the Western Pacific, while they control the Eastern Pacific.
Moreover, two additional considerations should be added to China’s possible rejections to a regional power sharing agreement. First, China seems no longer interested in restricting itself to the regional order, aiming at shaping the twenty-first century much as the United States shaped the twentieth (Doshi, 2021). Second, China believes it to be on the crest of the wave, precisely at the time of a big power pushover (at least that was the case until the emergence of its current economic crisis). Since 2017, Xi Jinping has been declaring that the world is amidst great changes not seen in a century and that time and momentum are on China’s side. Why would Beijing, then, seek a power sharing agreement when it believes to have a winning hand?
War
The third possible direction that might result is war. Incapable of managing tensions or reconciling differences, an armed conflict might ensue between the two. The usual suspects for its eruption would be China’s invasion of Taiwan, an accidental clash between American and Chinese forces in the maritime or air spaces of the South China Sea or the East China Sea, and the U.S. going in defense of one of its treaty allies in the region. However, beyond these most obvious reasons, either part could decide that going to war makes sense out of cold calculations. Two options could be plausible. A Thucydides’ Trap situation or a Power Transition Theory’s type of conflict.
In accordance with the first of them, the leading power triggers war before the emerging one becomes too powerful: “Thucydides repeats, ‘the growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made war inevitable’ (…) The distinction clarifies what Thucydides keeps trying to tell us: that fear inspired by the growth of Athenian power caused the Peloponnesian War” (Gaddis, 2019, pp. 59, 66). Under this perspective, it would be the U.S. the one precipitating a war before it’s too late to waging it with good chances.
The so-called Power Transition Theory, goes in the opposite direction. According to it, in the last 500 years it has been the weaker power, rather than the stronger, the one that has most likely initiated a war. Dissatisfied emergent powers, trying to break the ceiling that constrains its ascendancy, have been more prone to unleash hostilities (Organsky, 1968; Lemke, 2002). Under this perspective, China would be the most probable candidate to begin a war. It must be added that this coincides with China’s military doctrine, which believes in the advantages of a surprise attack when the right configuration of factors materializes.
Whichever the way in which belligerent actions are triggered, what really would matter is the way in which they develop. Meaning, its wide and length: How many participants might be involved in it, and how long would the conflict take? The best-case scenario for such a war would be one limited to just two participants: China and the United States. Alliances tend indeed to complicate things, introducing additional agendas and grievances. The worst-case scenario would be an alliance between China and Russia. Firstly, because of Moscow’s boiling grievances against the U.S. and the West. Secondly, because Russia’s nuclear superpower status might increase the risk of escalation into that threshold. Thirdly, because Russia’s involvement in the conflict could trigger NATO’s participation. A Beijing-Moscow axis would immensely complicate things.
The length of a war could also vary. The best-case scenario would be a short one, followed by a peace treaty that clearly defines mutually accepted conditions. The worst-case would be a prolonged state of war, or a long belligerence that triggers periodical armed conflicts. The Power Transition Theory postulates that hegemonic periods last approximately 60 to 90 years, while conflicts leading to new power correlations last approximately 20 years (Wittkopf, 1997). The two chapters of the long war that took place between 1914 and 1945, during which Germany unsuccessfully aimed at attaining European supremacy, exemplify this kind of conflict. This scenario would entail a long and not resolved belligerence between China and the United States.
America’s withdrawal
The fourth possible direction that could emerge from the China-U.S. rivalry would be America’s withdrawal. Meaning, a return of isolationism to the United States. Several important authors believe that an isolationist process was already put in motion during Donald Trump’s presidency (Hass, 2017; Mills and Rosefielde, 2016; Kagan, 2018; Bulmer-Thomas, 2018). However, it’s not easy to reconcile this line of thought with the pugnacity shown by Trump in almost every international front.
By definition, isolationists are prone to a low international profile. An alternative explanation, thus, might be that Trump believed that by stripping the global system of its ordering arrangements, a “dog eat dog” environment would emerge. One, in which the United States would come up as the top dog. Under that light, Trump’s foreign policy would have been much closer to George W. Bush’s blatant unilateralism than to isolationism. That, of course, without the intellectual drive of Bush’s neoconservatives.
But whichever the true nature of Trump’s actions, this does not preclude that Republicans, and in particular MAGA Republicans, have become increasingly uninterested in international affairs and even in security matters. Key figures in the U.S. military and top diplomats, including the nominee for Ambassador to Israel, are being held up in political holds. Support for Ukraine is grossly unpopular among them. A U.S. government shutdown that would damage the country’s ability to respond to a looming international scenario hangs continuously in the air. And so on.
The countless American jobs lost to globalization and the “forever wars” in the Middle East, have indeed become fertile grounds for isolationism. A phenomenon where Republicans undoubtedly play an outsize role: “The world is facing the most serious threat of nuclear confrontation since the Cuban missile crisis 60 years ago. At the same time, we’re seeing a growing isolationist movement in the U.S. (…) The GOP is becoming an isolationist party. It is no longer the party that embraces the bold foreign policy of Ronald Reagan or the Bushes. By more than two to one, Republicans endorse the view that ‘We should pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate on problems here at home’. Only 30 percent of Republicans believe ‘It is best for the future of our country to be active in world affairs’. Whenever a policy becomes difficult or costly, isolationism emerge” (Schneider, 2022).
It should be remembered, in that respect, that the United States’ foreign policy has shown to possess its very curious yin and yang qualities – seemingly opposing forces that actually belong to the same Oneness. The Oneness being America’s self perceived moral superiority, and the yin and yang representing the shifting periods of international missionary impulses and isolationism. As such, the high moral ground that Americans always have reclaimed for themselves can relate to both: whereas by putting barriers to alien models or foreign events, or by proselytizing abroad its superior beliefs. The period between the first and the second world wars was clearly isolationist, as Americans didn’t want to be contaminated by European events. The succeeding one, after the end of WWII, was marked by the missionary impulse represented by the liberal internationalist foreign policy consensus. A shift between the two sides of the same coin is always, thus, an open possibility.
On the other hand, China is trying to alter the regional status quo by entrenching itself on the ground. The aim is none other than increasing the U.S.’ costs in defying its actions and, by extension, inducing America’s retreat. This follows the presumption that a society weary of foreign military entanglements, becomes prone to yield presence when sufficient deterrence is applied. Some Chinese military analysts have even suggested that a show of force, like the sinking of an American aircraft carrier, would increase the perception of China’s indeclinable determination. This, in turn, would foster the notion that withdrawal is preferable to a highly costly confrontation with uncertain outcomes. However, this is a highly risky line of thought that would generate exactly the opposite result: From Pearl Harbor to 9/11, the United States has always reacted in might when provoked.
The collapse of the CCP
The fifth possible direction that might emerge would be the collapse of the Chinese Communist Party regime. As a matter of fact, several articles predicting the demise of the party were published on occasion of the 70th Anniversary of the People’s Republic. Two of those articles gave overwhelming relevance to the longevity factor. The first of them referred that the CCP was approaching the longevity frontier for one-party regimes: “Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party retained power for 71 years (1929-2000); the Communist Party of the Soviet Union ruled for 74 years (1917-1991); and Taiwan’s Kuomintang held on for 73 years (from 1927 to 1949 on the mainland and from 1949 to 2000 in Taiwan). The North Korean regime, a Stalinist family dynasty that ruled for 71 years, is China’s only contemporary competition” (Pei, 2019).
The second article also alluded to this longevity element. Making the simile with Marilyn Monroe’s “The Seven Year Itch” (which depicts the average time in which serious marital problems emerge), it stated: “There is an interesting parallel in politics; specifically, the life span of one-party regimes, though in this case we might call it the ‘70-year itch’. The U.S.S.R. is a prime example…When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the Communist Party had been in power for little more than 70 years” (Diamond, 2019).
There is no scientific base whatsoever for this length assertion, based only in a few scattered examples. Much to the contrary, as long as the CCP enjoys the modern equivalent of the so-called “Mandate of the Heavens”, it should have no problem in retaining power. Indeed, while it remains able to provide economic growth, domestic order and social stability, as well as a sense of pride to its citizens by standing tall to foreigners, there should be no reason for the communist regime to be endangered. Conversely, its hold to power might become imperiled if economic growth, domestic order and social stability grossly derails, or if the nationalist sense of pride in the achievements and greatness of the country feels betrayed. Hence, the CCP might enter a phase of existential crisis as a result of either option or by a combination of the two.
The social costs induced by the failure of China’s Zero Covid policy and the current economic crisis have undoubtedly imposed a burden upon the regime. The inflexibility showed in the application of the former, preserving it for long months against the mounting evidence of its costs, translated into a deceleration of the country’s economic growth, and in a fracture of its supply chains. The impact of this long closure upon small enterprises gives an idea of its social implications. The country had 44 million registered small enterprises, which employed 80% of its non-State labor force. As a result of the prolonged paralysation of activities, plus the lack of financial support to withstand it, that economic sector suffered a devastating blow (Pei, 2023).
Helped by the Zero Covid policy, but transcending it, China faces a serious economic crisis. Among the reasons that cause it have been the over regulation of its private sector, with particular reference to the high-tech sector where the bulk of its productivity resides; the imposition of restrictions upon foreign investors; and the huge crisis in the real state sector. Both private consumption of durable goods and private investment have fallen significantly in relation to 2015, with the latter showing a two-third contraction during that period. Nor consumers, nor private investors, trust the way in which the economy is been run and, as a result, chose to protect their money by keeping it in banks.
Moreover, exports and imports are simultaneously falling, while a worrying deflation in course brings to memory the case of Japan in the 1990’s. On top, its youngsters cannot find employment and a growing malaise is taking root among them. With a public debt estimated in 282 percent of its annual national output, Beijing cannot buy its way out of problems through public investment, as it did in the past. As a matter of fact, the economic tools at its disposal are running thin. With Xi Jinping’s emphasis on security over economics, and with the 7 members of the CCP’s Standing Committee and the 24 members of its Central Committee lacking economic experience, the CCP is not in the best of positions to overcome the crisis (Posen, 2023; Krugman, 2023; Goodman, 2023).
The CCP regime will certainly not collapse as a result of the above, even though the trust in the regime is being eroded. However, should Xi Jinping try to compensate for the shortcomings in the domestic front by overemphasizing its nationalist credentials, things could get complicated. For instance, should he try and fail an invasion of Taiwan, the accumulation of failures in different fronts could certainly be able to bring down the regime. In sum, the CCP remains strong enough to withstand multiple and difficult challenges, however, if those challenges surpass the resistance threshold that every political system has, then collapse is always an open possibility.
Maintaining economic growth, social stability, and internal order, while simultaneously ridding the tiger of nationalism, is not an easy task to accomplish, though. As yet, China has managed to do so. How much longer it will be able to keep doing it, is a different consideration. But certainly not one linked to a “70-year itch”.
Interesting times
“May you live in interesting times” is an English expression that purports to be a translation of a Chinese curse. The years ahead are definitely going to be anything but boring and uninteresting. But, with these two behemoths challenging each other at every corner, we would certainly have preferred to bore ourselves a little more.
Author: Alfredo Toro Hardy, PhD – Retired Venezuelan career diplomat, scholar and author. Former Ambassador to the U.S., U.K., Spain, Brazil, Ireland, Chile and Singapore. Author or co-author of thirty-six books on international affairs. Former Fulbright Scholar and Visiting Professor at Princeton and Brasilia universities. He is an Honorary Fellow of the Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations and a member of the Review Panel of the Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Center.
Image source: AP