By Alfredo Toro Hardy
Referring to the contrasting interpretations of universality in China and the West, Martin Jacques refers that both perceive themselves to be universal, albeit in totally different ways.
Whereas in the West universality is linked to the notion of proselytizing its values and beliefs, China doesn’t feel the need of externalizing itself. For the West, indeed, a sort of evangelizing mission prevails. One, in which the values and virtues of its civilization have to be taken to others. In this regard, both nineteenth century colonialism and twentieth century American Wilsonianianism had as common denominator the impulse of spreading their self-perceived superior models, to less fortunate parts of the world. Force was the common way to do so in the first case, while it was not excluded in the second.
Universalism in China, on the other hand, identifies itself with the notion of Middle Kingdom: The land under Heaven. A middle-staged location between the Heavens and the Earth’s barbarian lands. As such, it is a stay-at-home universalism, where all that could exist it’s there. Why, then, bother with convincing others with what it’s unreachable to them? (Jacques, 2019). Kishore Mahbubani agrees with this vision, when saying: “The Chinese mind has always focused on developing Chinese civilization, not developing global civilization” (Mahbubani, 2008, p. 239).
Chinese universalism, though, could have followed similar patterns to those of the West, if it hadn’t been for Admiral Zheng He’s aborted enterprise in the fifteenth century A.D. Indeed, between 1405 and 1424, at a high point of the Ming Dynasty, he undertook six epic voyages. These led Zheng’s gigantic fleet to Southeast Asia, India, the Persian Gulf, and East Africa. Gavin Menzies, however, goes even further than it is conventionally accepted by historians. In his book 1491: The Year China Discovered America, he asserts that in his 1421-1423 trip, the Admiral’s fleet circumnavigated the globe and reached America. (Menzies, 2003).
As it stands, though, his achievements were breathtakingly enough. Over 60 of the 317 ships of his fleet were more that 400 feet long and 160 feet wide. Being several stories high, they had 9 masts and 12 sails. The likes of these ships would not be seen again for centuries, and it would take until World War I to assemble another armada of such proportions. Around 28,000 people participated in the first expedition, which beside sailors and soldiers, also included scholars and astronomers. What a striking difference with Columbus’ three tiny caravels that ventured into the wider Atlantic Ocean at the end of that same century. (Columbia University).
At that time, however, the powerful Ming Court was divided between the pro-expansionist voices, led by Admiral Zheng, and the traditionalist Confucian advisers to the court. The latter argued in favor of introspection and frugality, thus aiming at putting an end to these costly and potentially dangerous maritime adventures. Emperor Zhu Di, better known in history as the Yongle Emperor, obviously sided with the first group. His aim, though, was not to conquer barbarian lands but simply to overwhelm them with China’s advanced technology and riches. In other words, the objective was to project the Tributary system to far-away lands. (Toro Hardy, 2020, p. 134). This implied receiving from China the benefits of its trade and civilization, in exchange for acknowledging its hegemonic role within a Sinocentric world order. Countries within this system had to send tributary envoys to China, on schedule, to prostrate before the Chinese Emperor, acknowledging his superiority and precedence over their own rulers. This was the so-called “kotow”. (Chu and Liu, 1994, p. 177). Extending this system to far-away regions, implied a highly ambitious externalization of Chinese universalism.
Upon the Yongle Emperor’s death, however, everything changed. This exceptional chapter in Chinese history ended as suddenly as it had begun. According to Niall Ferguson: “But then, in 1424, this was shattered. Yongle died – and China’s overseas ambitions were buried with him (…) The hajin decree definitively banned oceanic voyages. From 1500, anyone in China found building a ship with more than two masts was liable of the death penalty; in 1551 it became a crime even to go to sea in such a ship. What lay behind this momentous decision? We may never be sure. But the consequences of China’s turn inwards seem clear”. (Ferguson, 2011, loc. 971/8539).
The tributary system, of course, did not disappear. But it remained confined, as it had previously been, to China’s neighbors. The idea of projecting Chinese civilization to faraway lands was wiped out. To the contrary, this great nation kept itself within its Great Wall and subjected to its conservative Confucian ideas. As a result, it continued to emphasize its nature as an inward-looking status quo power.
It must be added that the same Ming dynasty, under which Admiral Zheng’s expeditions flourished, was also responsible for the construction of China’s Great Wall. Although its original more primitive version was built during the Qin dynasty, in the second century B.C. The Ming dynasty, like most other dynasties or regimes in Chinese history, was obsessed with the need to hold the country together and shield it from the disruptive influence of foreigners. As Mark Leonard explains: “The Chinese have labelled this obsession with boundaries the ‘Great Wall mentality’” (Leonard, 208, p. 132).
This long standing historical tradition, of which the Yongle period was an outlier, has been utterly discarded by Xi Jinping who aims at redefining the world order under Chinese terms. An integral part of Beijing’s current geopolitical push consists in persuading countries, both in Asia and around the world, that Chinese world dominance is inevitable, which should induce them to begin deferring to its demands. (Doshi, 2021).
Mao Zedong also wanted to externalize the People Republic’s ideology, but Marxism should be remembered as a Western construct. Xi goes much further. As he explained at a speech delivered at the 19th Communist Party Congress, on October 2017: “Rooted in a land of more than 9.6 million square kilometers, nourished by a nation’s culture of more than 5,000 years, and backed by the invincible force of more that 1.3 billion people, we have an infinitely vast stage of our era, a historical heritage of unmatched depth and incomparable resolve that enable us to forge ahead…” (Xinhua, 2017). What Xi aims at is nothing short of a Sinocentric world order. This implies searching to defeat Western universalism in its own game: Spreading its self-perceived superior legacy and model.
References:
Chu, Samuel C. and Liu, K.C. (1994). Li Hung-Chang and China’s Early Modernization. Milton Park: Routledge.
Columbia University. “The Ming Voyages, Asia for Educators”.
Ferguson, Niall (2011). Civilization: The West and the Rest. London: Penguin Books.
Doshi, Rush (2021). “The long game: China’s grand strategy to displace American order”. Brookings. August 2.
Jacques, Martin (2019). “What China will be as a great power”. Keynote address at the 32nd Annual Camden Conference, February 22.
Leonard, Mark (2008). What Does China Think? New York: HarperCollins.
Mahbubani, Kishore (2008). The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East. New York: Public Affairs.
Menzies, Gavin (2003). In his book 1491: The Year China Discovered America. London: Bantan Books.
Toro Hardy, Alfredo (2020). China Versus the US: Who Will Prevail? New Jersey: World Scientific.
Xinhua (2017). “Full text of Xi Jinping’s report at the 19th National Congress”, November 3.
Author: Alfredo Toro Hardy, PhD – Retired Venezuelan career diplomat, scholar and author. Former Ambassador to the U.S., U.K., Spain, Brazil, Ireland, Chile and Singapore. Author or co-author of thirty-six books on international affairs. Former Fulbright Scholar and Visiting Professor at Princeton and Brasilia universities. He is an Honorary Fellow of the Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations and a member of the Review Panel of the Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Center.
(The views expressed in this article belong only to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy or views of World Geostrategic Insights).
Image: Yongle Emperor – President Xi Jinping