By Nikola Mikovic
Western sanctions and pressure on Belarus have effectively pushed the Eastern European country deeper into Russia’s geopolitical orbit. The more European nations and the United States insist on democracy in the former Soviet republic, the less room for political maneuvers President Alexander Lukashenko will have.
During his 27-year-rule Belarusian leader learned how to successfully balance between Russia – his only ally – and the West. Ever since Moscow and Minsk signed an agreement on the creation of the Union State of Russia and Belarus in 1999, the Kremlin has been providing relatively cheap oil and gas to its neighbor, and subsidizing the Belarusian Soviet style-economy. Lukashenko, for his part, remained loyal to Moscow, even though he managed to preserve a significant degree of autonomy. For instance, he never recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, nor the Kremlin’s incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation in 2014. Moreover, Belarus reportedly supplied weapons to Ukraine to fight Russia-backed forces in the Donbass. At the same time, Minsk hosted the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany in an attempt to stop hostilities in the coal-rich region of Eastern Ukraine. Indeed, Belarus benefited from Lukashenko’s pragmatic “multi-vector” foreign policy.
Meanwhile, the winds of change have begun to blow. Russia and Belarus started to have some serious energy disputes. Whenever Lukashenko wanted to get better gas and oil deals from the Kremlin, he threatened to turn Belarus westward. He often had a strong anti-Russian rhetoric, but always carefully avoided crossing Russia’s “red lines”. The Kremlin, on the other hand, sent clear signals to Lukashenko demanding from Minsk deeper integrations into the Russia-Belarus Union State, in exchange for cheap energy. Aware that such a policy would mean the end of Belarusian sovereignty, Belarusian leader gradually started playing “the Western card”. He even briefly diversified the energy import in 2020, apparently in order to show the Kremlin that Belarus has an alternative to the Russian oil and gas.
Such a policy lasted until August 2020 when the Western-backed opposition staged mass protests against Lukashenko, following the controversial presidential election. His downfall seemed to be only a matter of time. Rumors were flying that not only the West, but also some Russian oligarchs funded the opposition to overthrow Lukashenko. But then the Kremlin openly supported its nominal ally. With Russia’s help, Belarusian President managed to consolidate his power, and defeat the opposition. Since there ain’t no such thing as a free lunch, the country’s dependency on Russia increased, and the Kremlin started playing more active role in Belarus.
Meanwhile, the exiled opposition figure Svetlana Tikhanovskaya called for an international tribunal to be set up to investigate what she called the “crimes” of President Alexander Lukashenko’s “dictatorship”. The European People’s Party Group – the largest and oldest group in the European Parliament – supported her proposal. Such actions will undoubtedly result in even stronger ties between Belarus and Russia, since the West seems to continue burning its bridges with Lukashenko. Belarusian leader, on the other hand, can no longer insist that Minsk’s integrations into the Russia – Belarus Union State must be “based on equality”. Such a policy was absurd in the first place, given that Russia is 82 times larger than Belarus, and has far greater economic and military strength than its ally. “The new reality” has already forced Lukashenko to agree on Russia’s terms and conditions regarding the energy price for Belarus. Also, after the Baltic countries imposed sanctions on Belarus, following the crackdown on protests in the summer and autumn of 2020, Minsk had started transiting its oil products through Russian seaports, after having withdrawn from the more profitable ports in the Baltic states, notably in Lithuania. According to reports, Belarus is also discussing with Russia the possibility of loading its export cargo not only through the ports of the Leningrad region in the north, but also through the Azov and Black seas in the south of Russia. In other words, Lukashenko is now strongly gravitating eastward.
“Our main partner is in the East, the brotherly country of Russia. Belarus’ trade with the People’s Republic of China grows very seriously. We are now working on very serious directions of cooperation with India. There is an interest in many things, post-Soviet space…”, said Belarusian President on May 26.
In the past, Lukashenko was balancing between Moscow and the West. Now his room for political maneuvers is rather narrow. Still, even though the embattled Belarusian leader is expected to keep playing “the Russian card”, that does not mean that he will not preserve some form of autonomy at home. For instance, the pro-Russian party Soyuz was recently denied registration in Belarus, despite the Kremlin’s efforts to create a parliamentary political system in the former Soviet republic, where political parties still have a fairly symbolic role. Thus, the influence of Russia on domestic politics in Belarus still remains very limited, although it is expected to grow.
In the foreseeable future Lukashenko will likely have to make additional concessions to the Kremlin, primarily in the field of economy. Russia already secured ownership of Belarus’ gas pipelines, and has provided the $10 billion loan for the construction of the Astravets nuclear power plant in Belarus. According to the law that the Russian President Vladimir Putin recently signed, the start date of the repayment of the principal debt on the loan is 1 April 2023. If debt is not repaid on time, after 180 days, the entire amount, including any interest on the loan and its servicing, will be consolidated and must be repaid immediately. But what if Belarus cannot afford to repay the loan?
Russia does not need to formally annex the Eastern European country. Through its “debt-trap policy”, the Kremlin could eventually owe all key energy facilities in Belarus, making the former Soviet republic de facto part of the Russian Federation.
Author: Nikola Mikovic (Journalist, researcher and analyst based in Serbia. He covers mostly the foreign policies of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine)
(The views expressed in this article belong only to the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of World Geostrategic Insights).
Image Credit: Kremlin.ru