“It may be dangerous to be America’s enemy, but to be America’s friend is fatal,” former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger once remarked. Recent developments in Syria have clearly shown that being a proxy of Russia and Iran can be equally fatal.
Bashar al-Assad, Syria’s ousted leader, has enjoyed the support of Moscow and Tehran for many years. Had there not been Russian military forces, the Wagner Group, as well as various Iranian-backed militias, he would almost certainly have been overthrown back in 2015. With their help, his Syrian Arab Army managed to recapture significant parts of the war-torn country that had been occupied by Western-backed rebels and the Islamic State.
But in 2020, after the last major battles of the Syrian Civil War took place, it became apparent that Moscow was trying to find a way to get rid of its client. The Kremlin, through its media, analysts, and former diplomats, started to openly criticize the Assad government over various issues. They portrayed him as a corrupt politician, trying to force him to accept a new constitution that would significantly limit his power.
Previously, in October 2016, former Russian general Leonid Ivashov explained on Russian state-owned Channel One that the Kremlin’s engagement in the Syrian conflict was “critical to prevent the construction of the Quatar-Turkey pipeline, which would be catastrophic for Gazprom”. Indeed, Gazprom aimed to preserve its monopoly in Europe at any cost. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as well as the Nord Stream pipelines sabotage in September 2022, seem to have spoiled the energy giant’s plans.
Since Europe managed to diversify its gas imports and significantly reduce its dependence on Russian energy, the Kremlin’s strategy of “preventing the construction of the Quatar-Turkey pipeline” became unfeasible and even pointless. Assad, therefore, fell “victim” to the Kremlin’s failed plans. He could not rely on Iran either, as Tehran had previously clearly demonstrated that it was in the process of abandoning its proxies in the region.
After Israel launched a war against Hamas in Gaza, the Iran-backed Hezbollah got involved by targeting empty Israeli military barracks in the north of the country. The Shia group apparently did not get the green light from Tehran to use long-range missiles against targets deep in Israel. Instead, it took actions that did not cause any serious harm to the Israeli Defense Forces.
Such a strategy allowed the Jewish State to resolve the conflict in Gaza in its favor. As a result, Israel could begin destroying Hezbollah’s arsenal of long-range missiles, and killing its political and military leadership. It became clear that Iran, by tying Hezbollah’s hands, effectively “betrayed” its proxy. Israel won the war against the Shia group.
Quite aware of that, Assad did not have much choice but to flee the Syrian Arab Republic – a country that was rotten to the core. Not even his fellow Alawites in Latakia and Tartus were willing to fight for his regime. The rebellion has won.
What comes next?
To build the Quatar-Turkey pipeline, passing through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria, the West will need some sort of stability in the war-torn country. But achieving that goal will be easier said than done, given Israeli ambitions to occupy parts of Syria and unresolved Kurdish issue. Syria will, therefore, almost certainly go through a very turbulent period in the foreseeable future.
The new regime is unlikely to allow Russia to maintain its military facilities in the country. Moreover, it is rather questionable if Moscow, following the collapse of its energy policy, is still interested in a military presence in Syria. Hypothetically, the Russian military could stay in Syria, but the Kremlin would have to give something to the West in exchange.
One thing is for sure: Russia will now be under serious pressure to make another “goodwill gesture” to the United States and freeze the conflict in Ukraine. Such a move would allow Washington to focus either on China, or, more likely, on Iran.
The US, undoubtedly, expects Moscow to once again “betray” Tehran and halt its military cooperation with the Islamic Republic. In return, Washington may allow the Kremlin to maintain control over around 20 percent of Ukraine until the time comes for Kyiv to recapture those territories, much like Turkey-backed rebels seized Assad-control parts of Syria. The coming weeks and months will show whether the Kremlin will agree to play such a game.
At this point, it is the Islamic Republic, rather than Russia, that seems to be the biggest loser in Assad’s fall. The so-called Axis of Resistance no longer exists (there is still the Russian-Iranian Axis of the Impotent, though). Iran can no longer use Hezbollah and Syria as a tool against Israel. As a result, in the not-so-distant future, the Jewish State and the West, possibly with Azerbaijan’s help, are expected to back Iranians who may attempt to overthrow the Ayatollah regime in Tehran.
Given that the Islamic Republic remains deeply divided along religious versus non- religious, traditional versus modern and liberal versus despotic dichotomies, it will be very difficult for the authorities in Tehran to preserve the status quo in Iran. Meanwhile, they, as well as Russian officials, will continue blaming Assad for his downfall. But who will they blame when trouble is at their own door?
Author: Nikola Mikovic – Journalist, researcher and analyst based in Serbia.
(The views expressed in this article belong only to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy or views of World Geostrategic Insights).
Image Credit: AFP