World Geostrategic Insights interview with William Muntean on the future of Antarctic governance amid geopolitical tensions, the likely U.S. policy toward Antarctica by the new Trump administration, and what China wants to achieve in Antarctica in the short and long term.
William Muntean is a former Foreign Service officer. For the past five years, he has developed and implemented U.S. government policy toward Antarctica, representing the United States at the last two Antarctic Treaty meetings and leading the U.S. team that conducted surprise compliance inspections of foreign sites in the Ross Sea in 2020. William is currently a senior associate (non-resident) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington DC-Baltimore area.
Q1 – The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) has governed the Antarctic for the past 60 years, ensuring that it is a place of peace and scientific cooperation. However, today it faces challenges from the impacts of global climate change, demands for increasing economic use, and geopolitical tensions, as competition among major powers approaches Antarctica as well. How do you see the Future of the Antarctic Treaty System and governance of the continent?
A2 – Whatever challenges the ATS faces today, and there are plenty, are all challenges that it has faced before. The Antarctic Treaty was negotiated in 1959 shortly after Sputnik and was entered into force in 1961 shortly before the Cuban Missile Crisis. Obviously, this was a period of significant stress between two of the 12 signers of the Treaty, yet the Treaty was negotiated and entered into force. The Treaty and the system that was built on it has weathered major global political events ranging from the rise of the then-Third World and the fall of the Soviet Union even as people doubted the ATS would survive.
The ATS did so by adjusting to global political trends while successfully maintaining its focus on peace, science, and environmental protection in the region. It demonstrated its regional strength by keeping Antarctica from being a theatre in the war between Argentina and the UK in 1982 or from fracturing when the heads of government of Australia and France dramatically reversed their positions in 1989 regarding mining in the region. Negotiations based on ATS provision and on mutual respect were key to achieving these results. So looking to the future, the key question is whether key countries will continue to see the ATS as the best way to advance their interests in the region. To date, no country has expressed any reservations about the relevancy or the permanence of the ATS and past practice has amply demonstrated the success of the ATS provisions. If countries continue to engage in the ATS as they have for the past 60 years, then the ATS will continue to be considered a remarkable and positive achievement into the future.
Q2 – Antarctica, given its location at the bottom of the planet and as a junction between the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian oceans, has considerable strategic importance. However, in recent years the United States has reduced its commitment to the area. Why? Do you expect any changes in U.S. policy toward Antarctica from the new Trump administration?
A2 – Antarctica is far from U.S. domestic interests. The United States does not have a specific territorial claim nor does it have significant economic interests in the region. Regarding sovereignty, the Antarctic Treaty recognizes that the United States has the basis of a claim and the United States has reserved all rights for itself for decades but has never made a claim.
Additionally, unlike some other countries, the United States has never prioritized economic activity in the region due to the significant challenges to operating there. And of course, no American citizens live in the region. For these reasons, past and present administrations rarely focus on Antarctica and incoming President Trump is unlikely to take time from other issues closer to home to break this trend. The incoming Trump administration will likely continue efforts it started in its first term, namely rebuilding the U.S. icebreaker fleet for operations in both polar regions and using unannounced inspections authorized by the Antarctic Treaty to ensure that strategic competitors such as China and Russia do not threaten U.S. interests in Antarctica or from Antarctica. It is unlikely to spend significant time on advancing scientific research or strengthening environmental protection in the region given its stated intent to remove itself from the Paris Agreement.
Q3 – China has set up the Qinling Base, its third permanent Antarctic station, in February 2024; what do you think China wants to achieve in Antarctica in the short and long term?
A3 – China provided the most expansive explanation of its Antarctic interests in 2017 when it hosted the annual meeting of the Antarctic Treaty. At that meeting, China explained its goals for the region to be (1) enhanced protection for peaceful utilization; (2) rational utilization, which would include scientific research and development of natural resources; and (3) a balanced approach to international governance of the region by adhering to the ATS, strengthening research and cooperation, and responding to new challenges such as tourism. More recently, China refers to Antarctica twice in its 14th Five-Year Plan issued in 2021. In the global ocean governance section, it reaffirms that it will “improve our ability to participate in the protection and utilization of Antarctica” but did not include the region in its Polar Silk Road initiative, and includes developing “polar three-dimensional monitoring platforms and heavy icebreakers” in the strengthening science and technology section.
However, since those statements, China appears to have only advanced its polar operational capacity. It built Qinling station, its third year-round station in Antarctica. With this station active, China now has around 240 beds on the continent, which makes it 6th largest presence in the region, well behind the United States, which has around 1,400 beds, as well as Argentina, Australia, Chile, and Russia. China domestically built and launched Xue Long 2 in 2019 and both the Ji Di and Tan Suo San Hao in 2024.
China has not advanced any significant initiatives in the ATS but instead has consistently prevented increased environmental protections in the region by blocking consensus either by itself or with Russia to designate the Emperor Penguin as a specially protected species, to coordinate the local response to the impact of climate change on the region, and to establish three new marine protected areas. This combination of blocking coordination at the diplomatic level while increasing its footprint in the region gives fodder to those who question China’s long term commitment to the ATS.
William Muntean – Former U.S. foreign Service Officer, Senior Associate (non-resident) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
Image Credit: CGTN (China’s first overseas atmospheric background station starting operation in Antarctica on December 1st, 2024).