By Alfredo Toro Hardy
Until not long ago, the United States was vertically split by its multiple divides. Something that was consistent with the anti-majoritarian nature of its system, as had been constructed by its Founding Fathers.
Nowadays, however, partisan identities have merged with those multiple divides, generating two overwhelming majorities. These antagonistic majorities have turned into differentiated identities, which coexist side by side demonizing each other. A sort of civil war of identities seems to be crisscrossing America. As a consequence, a dangerous horizontal fracture appears to be detaching not only the political system, but society as a whole. Under these circumstances, the decision-making process gets blocked and a radical change of course becomes unavoidable each time that a new political correlation of power happens in Washington.
Under these circumstances, preserving a rational and consistent foreign policy becomes almost impossible. For friends and foes, the United States has become an unpredictable and unreliable place. One, in which the only certitude is uncertainty itself. How to avoid comparing the current situation with the one that prevailed during the 20 years that succeeded the end of World War II? A highly rational period where consistency prevailed.
They were mistakes and excesses during that time, of course, with Vietnam being the most notorious of them. Not gratuitously, Vietnam put a sudden end to that period. In context, however, between 1945 and 1965 America´s foreign policy showed a level of efficiency, cohesion and predictability that had few precedents in its history. A group of rules of the game and conceptual bases were associated with it.
The rules of the game were essentially three: The President’s clear leadership in foreign policy; a limited number of political actors involved in foreign affairs, which enjoyed of wide authority; and the active participation of a cohesive elite for which foreign policy was as a sort of group crusade.
The rules of the game
The leadership of the U.S. President in foreign affairs was not contested. This resulted not from a Constitutional mandate, but from the tacit acquiescence of Congress. In fact, the Constitution’s lack of clarity in this area places it within the so-called implicit or inherent constitutional power. Meaning, that gray area where tradition or the acquiesce of the other branch of government may define an area of responsibility.
Actually, the nature of presidential powers has given rise to important institutional confrontations and scholarly debates. The successive administrations of Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft provided an excellent example of the interpretative gap regarding the extension of presidential powers. According to Roosevelt, the President was entitled to do whatever the needs of the Nation required, unless expressively forbidden by Constitution or Law. Contrariwise, Taft believed that the President could not exercise any power that had not been specifically granted by the Constitution of by a Law approved by Congress. In the mid of these two extremes, we find the implicit or inherent powers. During the period 1945-1965, Congress did not contest the President’s stewardship in this area. World War II and the subsequent challenge posed by the Soviet Union had overwhelmingly inclined the balance in that direction (Fisher, 1985, pp. 18-19, 23).
On top, initiatives in foreign policy areas were implemented by way of negotiations and agreements between a reduced number of political actors, which enjoyed of a high degree of authority. The simple support given to a presidential initiative in this field by the Senate Majority Leader and by the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, could carry the day. This implied, by extension, the ample latitude of power enjoyed by such figures, who could control important majorities within Congress. This was an expression, as well, of the special character attributed to foreign policy.
Finally, every President, independently of his party affiliation, could count with the efficient and loyal support of a highly homogeneous elite devoted to the foreign affairs of the country. This group was known as the “establishment”, and was formed by a network of figures that interconnected Washington, Ivy League universities, Wall Street, and powerful private foundations. Names such as Dean Acheson, George Kennan, Averell Harriman, Robert Lovett, John J. McCloy, Charles Bohlen, James Forrestal or Paul Nitze, represented the best and the brightest of this group.
The “establishment” embraced common values, particularly in their reverence to bipartisanship, moderation and rationality. Hence, the name they were given by Walter Isaacson and Thomas Evans: Wise men. Theirs were the ideas that guided America’s foreign affairs after World War II, including the containment policy to the Soviet Union. They were the architects of the “creation”, name given to the forging of the Cold War’s guidelines during Truman’s time. Their members gathered around New York’s based Council on Foreign Relations, where the notion of internationalism had emerged (Isaacson and Thomas, 1986; Hodgson, 1978).
The conceptual bases
Jointly with the rules of the game, there was a group of conceptual bases that prevailed during that period. They were mainly three as well: Internationalism, which promoted the active engagement of the United States in world affairs; bipartisanship, which advocated the idea that foreign policy was far too important to be submitted to the blusters of partisan confrontation; and centrism, which responded to the notion that only sailing at the middle of the political and ideological spectrum, it was possible to forge consensus.
Internationalism advocated the active engagement of the country on international affairs. It contrasted with the isolationism that had prevailed between both world wars, and which had been so prevalent through American history. Under its premises, the preservation of U.S.’ security had to be found mainly outside its borders. Indeed, only by promoting an international environment favorable to America’s values, interests, merchandises and investments, could its way of life and safety be preserved. As a result, it was necessary to directly confront whatever international challenges might emerge. This went against the notion of shielding against international threats by invoking the protection of the surrounding oceans, a premise that had clearly failed a few years earlier. For internationalists, isolationists tendencies within the country had to be confronted from its outset.
Bipartisanship was linked to the perception that the preservation of national security, was the natural purview of foreign policy. By extension, this implied that this area had to be shielded from the vicissitudes and zig sags that characterized partisan politics. It required, thus, of a deferential treatment, whereby both parties should search consensus when dealing with foreign affairs matters.
Centrism was related to the notion that consensus could only be found by avoiding the extremes. After the end of World War II, a majority of moderate politicians prevailed in both parties, thus allowing to find agreements between them. Democrats and Republicans at the center could hence run the Senate. By circumventing the antipodes, it was possible to find a middle ground where convergence was possible.
The example represented by the approval and implementation of the Marshall Plan in 1948, allows to understand well how the combination of the above-mentioned rules of the game and conceptual bases interacted.
Putting in motion the Marshall Plan
In June of 1948, at a lecture at Harvard University, Truman’s second Secretary of State, General George Marshall, presented the guidelines of the European Recovery Program. The program, which would be known as the Marshall Plan, contemplated an economic recovery aid to Western Europe of US$13 billion (equivalent to US$142 billion in 2020). Its purpose was to rebuild war-torn areas, modernize industry, improve prosperity, and remove trade barriers. Its final aim, though, was essentially political in nature: Preventing the spread of communism in Western Europe. The beneficiaries of this aid not only included former allies, but also countries that just three years before had been at war with the United States. The plan, it has to be added, contemplated the largest transfer in history of public resources from a country to others.
Even for a politically strong President, whose party held the majority of the Senate, this undertaking would have been a difficult sale. Nonetheless, this was far from being the case. Two elements characterized America’s political scene at the time. On the one hand, eight months before, Truman’s Democrats had lost for the first time in 14 years the control of both the Senate and the House. On the other hand, in 18 months a presidential election was to take place, one in which President Truman’s lack of popularity made his chances for reelection scant.
In other words, the most far-reaching economic aid plan in history was been proposed by an administration that did not control the Congress, and which would be most probably ousted in just a year and a half. However, ten months after its presentation at Harvard, the Marshall Plan had not only been approved by Congress, but a Federal Agency in charge of its implementation had been created and its funds allocated. What had made this possible? Its reasons were the following:
First, the respect granted to the President of the United States, in an area under its implicit constitutional power, outweighed the political weakness of the temporary tenant of the White House.
Second, the fact that national security was involved, allowed for this plan to be managed with due respect and consideration, thus propitiating a bipartisan convergence.
Third, the support given to the plan by the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Republican Senator Arthur Vanderberg, allowed to commit the vote of a majority of Senators. Indeed, favorable voting senators not only recognized the leadership enjoyed by the Chairman of the Committee with jurisdiction on the matter, but respected the agreement reached within such Committee.
Fourth, existing dissent to the Marshall Plan within the extremes of the political spectrum, was manifestly overcome by the centrist majorities within both parties.
Fifth, internationalists’ supporters, comprising press editors, bankers, scholars, union leaders, and the like, put in motion an intensive public opinion campaign under the so-called Committee for the Marshall Plan.
Sixth, the members of the “establishment” played a pivotal role within said Committee, acting as its organizers and eager promoters.
America’s foreign policy crisis
In 1965, however, this whole post WWII foreign policy structure was shaken to its foundations. A war event and a President were responsible for it: Vietnam and Lyndon B. Johnson.
As a variation to the central theme of containment to the Soviets, President Dwight D. Eisenhower had introduced, a few years earlier, the concept of the “falling domino” principle in relation to Indochina. Within the analogy of a row of dominoes, indeed, it was fundamental to avoid that the first one them could be knocked down as, otherwise, the whole row would follow suit. In that specific case, the row included the whole of South East Asia. Events in Vietnam, during his administration, would be seen under this light.
Eisenhower’s successor, President John F. Kennedy, would accept the premises of this theory, making of Vietnam a test case of America’s determination to contain the expansion of communism in the region. By bringing U.S.’ presence in Vietnam to several thousand military advisors, Kennedy opened the door for the subsequent massive American military involvement there. However, he kept it under control. It was up to Lyndon B. Johnson, after Kennedy’s assassination, to put in motion that massive involvement (Leeson and Dean, 2009).
Lyndon Johnson’s domestic “Great Society” program, had won him a place of privilege in the history of the United States. His management of Congress in relation to this overtly ambitious package of domestic reforms in civil rights, fight against poverty and education had been truly masterly. Why then, would be precisely him the one that brought havoc upon America’s foreign policy system? Although upon arrival to the White House he was one of the most experienced politicians to have reached office, he had very little experience on foreign policy matters. His lack of security in this regard led him to overreact in relation to Vietnam. Fearing that if he didn’t show enough resolve in confronting the communists in Vietnam, his “Great Society” would be seriously affected, he created a nightmare for himself and for his country (Destler, Gelb and Lake, 1984, pp. 61-62).
As the United States got increasingly bogged down in an uncertain war with no end in sight, the gap between his optimistic messages and the costs involved, led to a loss of presidential credibility. Throughout 1964 and 1965, Johnson created expectations that could not survive to a long war, while making of this “his” war. Meantime, 1965 became the year in which 175,000 American soldiers were sent to Vietnam and the bombing of North Vietnam began. Instead of searching for common grounds with Congress, amid this highly complex situation, Johnson seemed to want to extract a blank check from it (Neustadt, 1986, p. 168).
When things began to unravel
From this point onwards, the foreign policy system began to unravel. Congress began to assert its prerogatives on foreign affairs. Legal constrains to the presidential power in the conduction of the country’s foreign policy began taking shape. A long list of legislative initiatives in that direction materialized in the following years, including the Case Act of 1972, the War Powers Act of 1973, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act in 1974, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act in 1974, the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, or the Boland Amendment between 1982 and 1984. (Toro Hardy, 1988, pp. 66-81).
Meanwhile, a cacophony of angry voices within the Senate destroyed the previously existing deference towards the President in this area. The establishment, on its side, got immerse in internal divisions, while a legion of foreign affairs’ experts and think tanks, with conflicting and quarrelsome points of view, emerged from the blue. The so-called wise men were simply swallowed by the turmoil. Bipartisanship became an uphill task. And so on. (Toro Hardy, 1988, pp. 66-81; Herring, 2008, Chapter 18).
Not everything shipwrecked amid the emerging torment, though. Internationalism remained in place as the guiding principle in America’s foreign affairs. The center of the political spectrum kept being the natural place to build up consensus which, by extension, maintained alive the need for bipartisanship. Containment to Soviet’s expansionist impulses, remained in place as America’s main foreign policy strategy.
In sum, the U.S.’ foreign policy system, even if badly wobbled, showed great resilience. Henceforward, the country’s foreign policy vessel would have to navigate amid wilder seas. Nonetheless, it was able to successfully keep its course. A good example of this was provided by the Carter administration, during the years 1977-1979. Even if the White House had to wage costly battles with Congress for each of its foreign affairs’ initiatives, it still retained a strong position. During those three years, President Carter engaged in five clashes with the Senate in relation to the following initiatives: The Panama Canal Treaty, the arms sales to moderate Arab countries, military assistance to Turkey, the veto to the Defense Bill and the normalization of diplomatic relations with the Popular Republic of China. In those five confrontations, the White House ended up by carrying the day. There were moments in which the wrestle between Congress and the White House could become rough, though. A good example of this was provided by the so-called Iran-Contra Affairs, during President Reagan’s second term in office (Toro Hardy, 1984, p.p. 147-148).
America’s lack of strategic compass and China’s window of opportunity
Nowadays, though, things have completely change. To begin with, there is no strategic course to follow, no strategic compass. While Democrats remain still committed internationalists, Republicans have become isolationists. Strategic consistency becomes impossible when both parties inhabit in two different foreign policy planets. Centrism and bipartisanship have totally disappeared, as Republicans veered off to the extreme. For a President to define a foreign policy course of action, and being able to maintain the rudder under control, it becomes necessary to held a majority in both the Senate and the House (where the funding comes from). If he loses the Senate, he becomes a foreign affairs’ lame duck. And, even if successful in preserving a sense of direction, everything attained can be simply swept away if a different correlation of power materializes in Washington. Hence, options oscillate between a non-discernible foreign policy and dramatic zig zagging.
While this happens, China, America’s main rival, follows a sustained course of action in pursuit of clear-cut strategic objectives. By 2049, the centenary of the People’s Republic founding, China aims to have achieved a prominence commensurate to its glorious past. Projects such as the Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation, Made in China 2025 or the Belt and Road Initiative, converge in defining concrete goals that must have been amply reached by that date. This includes, of course, having recovered Taiwan and having consolidated its dominant position in the South China Sea, priorities within the so-called Chinese Dream. Moreover, Xi Jinping visualizes the next ten to fifteen years as a window of opportunity to shift China’s correlation of power with the United States. Hence, Beijing seeks the convergence of strategies, energies and political determination towards this window of opportunity. China’s strategic compass could not be clearer.
How, then, not bringing back to memory the twenty years that succeeded World War II, when America knew what it wanted and how to get it? Or even, for the matter, the tumult that followed after Vietnam, where a clear sense of general direction still prevailed.
References
Destler, I.M., Gelb, L., and Lake, A. (1984). Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Fisher, L. (1985). Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Herring, G.C. (2008). From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1776. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Leeson, P.T. and Dean, A.M. (2009). “The American domino theory: An empirical investigation”. American Journal of Political Science, July.
Neustadt, R.E. (1986). Presidential Power. New York: Macmillan Publishing.
Toro Hardy, A. (1988). El Desafío Venezolano: Como Influir las Decisiones Políticas Estadounidenses. Caracas: Universidad Simón Bolívar.
Author: Alfredo Toro Hardy, PhD – Retired Venezuelan career diplomat, scholar and author. Former Ambassador to the U.S., U.K., Spain, Brazil, Ireland, Chile and Singapore. Author or co-author of thirty-six books on international affairs. Former Fulbright Scholar and Visiting Professor at Princeton and Brasilia universities. He is an Honorary Fellow of the Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations and a member of the Review Panel of the Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Center.