By Alberto Frigerio

    On October 6th, the citizens of Kazakhstan voted, in a national referendum, on the construction of the country’s first nuclear power plant. 

    Alberto Frigerio

    Despite concerns about the limited public space for activists opposing nuclear energy and a few alleged cases of procedural infractions, international observers reported no significant violations during the voting process. Around 7.8 million citizens participated (a 63% turnout rate), with 71% voting in favour of the nuclear power plant.

    For the Kazakh government, this result is a significant success, as President Tokayev has been a strong advocate for nuclear energy development. Kazakhstan is the world’s largest producer of uranium, holding 12% of global uranium resources and boasting the largest reserves. These resources present major economic opportunities for the country. Energy security is another critical factor. Kazakh energy officials have forecast an electricity shortage in the Almaty region in the coming years. While building a nuclear plant will take time, once operational, it is expected to help mitigate this looming energy crisis. Additionally, nuclear energy is seen as a key pillar in Kazakhstan’s effort to diversify its energy mix and transition to sustainability. The country aims to drastically reduce its reliance on coal and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060, and nuclear energy could play a crucial role in meeting growing energy demands while lowering greenhouse gas emissions. On the geopolitical front, adopting nuclear energy would further solidify Kazakhstan’s leadership in technological innovation in Central Asia, while opening new opportunities for international cooperation.

    Despite the positive referendum result and the potential benefits of developing nuclear power, the Kazakh government still has to face several public concerns. First, there is the issue of transparency and accountability. The government must prevent corruption, adhere to international quality standards, and secure foreign funding to complete the project. Support from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could be vital in this phase. Security is another pressing issue. Kazakhstan’s population remains mindful of the long-term damage caused by Soviet nuclear tests at Semipalatinsk. Although the current project is for peaceful energy purposes, security concerns persist, especially since parts of southern Kazakhstan are located in a seismic zone. Environmental concerns also loom, particularly regarding the potential impact on Lake Balkash’s water levels (the most likely location for the plant) and the management of nuclear waste, though Kazakhstan does have considerable experience in this area. Finally, there are political implications, particularly regarding who Kazakhstan will choose as its main partner for the project.

    The Partner Dilemma

    With the public now behind the construction of a nuclear power plant, the Kazakh government faces a key decision: which international partner will help build it and facilitate the technology transfer? Four potential partners are currently in the running: Électricité de France, China National Nuclear Corporation, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power, and Russia’s Rosatom. Other countries expressed an interest to participate in an open tender. President Tokayev has also floated the idea of an international consortium involving multiple leading global companies.

    Some observers suspect that Kazakhstan may have already reached a deal with Russia prior to the referendum. Others argue that Russia remains the most likely partner, given Rosatom’s significant stake in Kazakhstan’s uranium deposits and the country’s reliance on Russia for uranium enrichment services. The main concern here is that partnering with Russia could deepen Kazakhstan’s energy dependence on its northern neighbour.

    Multi-Vector Narrative or Multi-Vector Policy?

    Since gaining independence in 1991, Kazakhstan has officially pursued a multi-vector foreign policy, a strategy of engaging with multiple global powers to maximise its national interests. In January, Tokayev reaffirmed that a balanced and constructive foreign policy is the best way to safeguard these interests. His visits to countries as diverse as Italy, Qatar, Russia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Singapore reflect this intent.

    However, Kazakhstan’s deep political, economic, energy, and security ties with Russia often cast doubt on the effectiveness of this multi-vector approach. Pragmatically, Kazakhstan is unlikely to sever ties with Russia anytime soon. But the critical question is whether Russia is Kazakhstan’s main partner or simply one among several in a broader multi-vector framework.

    The choice of a nuclear partner could be pivotal in clarifying Kazakhstan’s future foreign policy trajectory. Opting for France, South Korea, China, or a consortium of these countries would signal Kazakhstan’s commitment to expanding its global partnerships beyond Russia, engaging both EU and East Asian nations in its energy sector and beyond. Conversely, giving Rosatom a central role could suggest a strengthening of Kazakhstan’s ties with Russia, calling into question the country’s dedication to a truly multi-vector policy.

    The decision Kazakhstan makes in choosing its nuclear partner will not only shape its energy future but also signal the direction of its foreign policy. As the country stands at this critical juncture, its next move will reveal whether its multi-vector policy is more than just rhetoric and whether Kazakhstan is ready to redefine its place in a rapidly evolving global order.

    Author: Alberto Frigerio Professor of International Relations at Almaty Management University. 

    (The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of World Geostrategic Insights).

    Image Source: Renat Tashkinbayev, YouTube Channel (Ulken, the village in Kazakhstan where the foresee  nuclear power plant should be built). 

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