By Anton Evstratov and Ida Sarkissian
The main axiom of American politics in the Middle East is the thesis that without the help of Washington, regional players are not able to build adequate interaction, and will certainly plunge the entire region into chaos. Or another frightening scenario could be the re-establishment by Iran of the Persian Empire of the Achaemenids in the territories of at least Shiites (here the contradictions of the “imperial” perspective with the “scarecrow” of regional chaos are evident).
However, against the background of a gradual decrease in Washington’s direct influence on the political processes of the Middle East (the rejection of the war with Iran after attacks on the oil infrastructure of Saudi Arabia, statements about the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and Syria, etc.), there was no chaos or Iranian expansion.
Moreover, in the true sense of the word, regional diplomacy began to emerge – equal and proceeding from the interests of the countries of the region — Iran, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, etc. It is noteworthy that it was the Americans who unexpectedly killed the main coordinator of Iran’s foreign policy activity in the Middle East, Qassem Soleimani.
In fact, the assassination of a general is nothing more than the last and perhaps not very successful attempt to save the “Bush Jr. Doctrine,” which presupposes the establishment and defense of American hegemony in the Middle East, for its salvation, due the incapacity of Washington’s main allies.
However, the role of the United States in the region was not a key factor, as it was thought by American strategists. Iran now simply cannot even dream of some form of regional domination in the face of powerful sanctions, and the military budget of Saudi Arabia alone is 5 times that of Iran. At the same time, Iran does not have nuclear weapons, but there are more checks on its territory than anywhere else in the world, and this is against the background of the presence of military nuclear weapons from Israel, to which no checks are applied.
Against this background, Riyadh, despite American concerns, did not create nuclear weapons after attacks on its oil infrastructure, and used the capabilities of diplomacy – that is, there were attempts to establish a dialogue between KSA and Iran without any intervention or any noticeable role for the United States. Saudi Arabia began direct negotiations with Iran-controlled Yemeni Ansar Allah, which led to a 80% reduction in air strikes by Riyadh-led international coalition. Significantly reduced the number of deaths.
To smooth out the corners, Saudi Arabia went with neighboring Qatar – once an ally, and now almost the main enemy of the kingdom on the Arabian Peninsula. Against this background, there is a decrease in the degree of anti-Qatar discourse in the Saudi segment of social networks. The countries even went to the joint holding of some sporting events, thus setting the vector for a new rapprochement and overcoming existing contradictions.
There were direct Iranian-Saudi contacts at the level of middle-level officials, which led to the development of a thaw plan between Saudi Arabia and Iran, based on a non-aggression non-aggression treaty.
No less fundamental changes took place in relations between Iran and the United Arab Emirates. The UAE began the withdrawal of its troops from Yemen and initiated direct negotiations with the Islamic Republic on the safety of shipping. Abu Dhabi even provided Iran with a loan of $ 700 million, which is in sharp contrast to the US and Donald Trump’s personal pressure on Tehran.
Without a doubt, all these reciprocal steps could be tactical measures rather than part of some major strategic plan to change the structure of Middle East politics. The Arabian monarchies could reduce the degree of tension with Iran and Ansar Allah in order to wait a while and better prepare for a new round of confrontation with them, but the very precedent of mutual contacts of recently irreconcilable opponents cannot but be regarded as a positive reserve for the future.
However, the assassination of Soleimani crosses out these efforts – especially since it was the general who largely controlled the process of rapprochement of Tehran with the monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula. So, as Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi stated, Commander Al-Quds arrived in Iraq to try to defuse tensions with Riyadh in that country.
As a result, Iran has every reason to simply break off contacts with its Arabian partners on the assumption that Soleimani was killed, including through the efforts of KSA and the UAE. Indirectly, there is already confirmation of this kind of point of view among the Iranian political elite – it’s not for nothing that President Rouhani, speaking of a possible US response to the assassination of the general, mentioned Dubai’s missiles among possible targets.
Thus, the removal of the Al-Quds commander can only be seen as an attempt to block the peace initiatives of regional players and dumping the Middle East into the next phase of destabilization.
It is noteworthy that against this background, there were states ready to stop this trend and offer their mediation between the United States and Iran to smooth out their conflict. That was, for example, Qatar, whose foreign minister said that he had talked with representatives of Iran and the United States on this issue. The Foreign Minister of Oman tried to do the same. However, Iran refused the services of both countries.
After Iran’s missile strike on two US bases in Iraq, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called this operation a “slap in the face”, adding that military operations are not enough and the corrupt American presence in the region should end. It is worth recalling that most United States military bases in the Middle East are located in Arab countries. American troops, of course, are also present in Afghanistan and Turkey, but in the case of Turkey, it is impossible to imagine that Tehran even intended to conduct military operations or launch missiles on its territory.
The US military now stands in Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Oman. Among them, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain are hostile to Iran, and these countries can become a potential target for Iran’s response in case of continued escalation or unforeseen factors. As for Qatar, there is information that the drone from which the rocket was launched to Qassem Soleimani car was at the American base in Qatar. Interestingly, on Twitter appeared that the American base would be withdrawn from the emirate, but later its leadership denied this information.
Today, when Donald Trump said he was not going to respond to Iran’s actions, the scenario of bombing American bases in the Gulf countries is unlikely, but even then it is difficult to assume that this will prompt the White House to withdraw its contingent. Moreover, the opposite effect is possible, and a decision will be made to strengthen American bases in the Gulf countries. However, it is obvious that Iran will continue to demand the withdrawal of US forces from the region.
The most promising area for subversive, anti-American work in the region is, undoubtedly, Qatar – the “weak link” among the Arab states of the region, which had previously demonstrated a friendly disposition towards Tehran on the one hand and hostility towards Saudi Arabia on the other. Under the new paradigm, not only political statements of the country’s leadership and representatives of its media are brought in, but also ideology.
If the earlier theologian and actual ideologist of the Al-Wasatiyah concept, Yusuf al-Kardawi, openly branded and takfir Shiites from the screen of Al-Jazeera TV channel, now the official discourse of Qatari theologians has become related to Shiites in general and Iran in particular became much softer. Moreover, despite the fact that Al-Wasatyah is a Sunni religious and political concept, Qatari Sunnism is not the Sunni of Saudi Arabia, where the ideology of Salafism dominates.
Thus, Qatar has all the prerequisites for further partnership with Iran – this, obviously, is desired by the country’s political elite, and society more and more wants it. IRI is interesting for the rich, but small and relatively weak militarily Qatar in terms of the presence of powerful armed forces. Doha, in turn, can offer Tehran its enormous influence in the Arab media field, financial opportunities, especially relevant against the backdrop of US anti-Iranian sanctions, and mechanisms to circumvent them.
At the same time, one should not overestimate the possible Iranian-Qatari rapprochement – Doha remains an ally of the United States, has American troops on its territory, and it will be very difficult for the emirate to get rid of their presence. Fundamentally, a situation can change only if all sides of this complex interaction fundamentally play up.
However, Iran is able to influence other countries of the Persian Gulf – including those hostile to itself. The fact is that each of them has significant Shiite minorities, generally loyal to Tehran. Bahrain is especially promising for the Islamic Republic in this regard, where Shiites are more than 70%, and they are very politically active and passionate. In fact, since 2011, the Shiite majority of this country has been in permanent confrontation with the Al-Khalifa regime – Sunni and dictatorial.
Despite the legitimized and obvious segregation of Shiites and their minimal admission to authorities, neither the USA nor the EU countries that are so worried about democracy in Syria, Iran or Russia are in a hurry to impose sanctions on Bahrain, break allied treaties with it and threaten it with military actions . Iran has been playing this for a long time and may play big in the future. The loyalty to Bahrain of the West is explained quite simply – the largest base of the US Navy is located on its territory, and if local Shiites gain at least a local victory, this can seriously undermine American positions in the entire region.
A powerful Shiite community exists in Saudi Arabia. Subjected to repression and segregation much more than in Bahrain, Saudi Shiites are dangerous for the kingdom because they compactly live in oil-bearing areas. The Shiite community of Saudi Arabia has held protests more than once, followed by repression, including, for example, the execution of the local Shiite religious leader Sheikh al-Nimra. Thus, Iran, seeking to influence Saudi Arabia, has not only a carrot in the form of negotiations through the Iraqi government, but also a dangerous Shiite whip.
In combination with the already demonstrated Yemeni Hussites loyal to Tehran and the ability to influence the Saudi oil infrastructure, all this gives Iran a good position to put pressure on the already pretty tired from participating in Syrian affairs, and from the war in Yemen, and from the political confrontation with Iran kingdom. Undoubtedly, American troops, promises and military contracts can make a difference, but judging by recent events, the Saudi political elite has begun to trust Washington and eccentric Trump much less.
However, the most aggressive Gulf state against Iran, contrary to popular belief, is not Saudi Arabia, but the UAE, which has an unresolved territorial conflict with Tehran over the islands of Abu Musa, Big and Small Tumb. After the resumption of US sanctions due to the failure of the “nuclear deal”, the Emirates froze the accounts of Iranian businessmen on its territory, and also curtailed trade operations with Iran, “declaring” it, after the United States, as its enemy.
It is no accident that Iranian officials, speaking of a possible war with the United States, named Dubai as a possible target. Despite Iran’s prospects for influencing local Shiites, they should not be overestimated, and the UAE is likely to maintain its pro-American position in any case.
Kuwait and Oman in this context are somewhere between the UAE and Qatar, and there will not be a key role in a possible Big Game between Tehran and Washington. At the same time, one should not forget about Kuwait’s traditional fears of Iraq’s strengthening and indirectly – its alliance with Iran. Here, the emirate can act in two ways – either demand an increase in the American presence on its territory as a kind of military guarantee of security, or develop relations with Iran parallel to Baghdad.
Much in this context will depend on loyalty and interest in the second scenario of Iranian diplomacy. Oman, in turn, having an important geographical position, and relatively easy accessibility for military actions, both Iran and the USA, will continue attempts to self-position as an intermediary with absolute neutrality.
(The views expressed in this article belong only to the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of World Geostrategic Insights)