By Anton Evstratov and Ida Sarkissian
On January 3, the commander of the Al-Qods brigade of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, Major General Qassem Soleimani, was killed by an American drone at Baghdad Airport. Together with him, the commander and founder of the Iraqi Shiite militant Kataib Hezbollah group, Abu Mahdi Muhandis, also closely associated with the Iranian military structures, and several other officers of the said group were liquidated.
General Soleimani has long been under American sanctions, not allowing him to officially leave the country, and the entire structure of the IRGC was recognized by the United States as a terrorist organization. Nevertheless, the general was one of the most influential and active military and political leaders of the Middle East. He was the main conductor of Iranian foreign policy in the region, building the Shiite arc supervised by Tehran from Herat to Lebanon.
The day after the assassination of Soleimani, the Iranian Security Council was convened, during which they appointed a new Al-Kods commander, General Kaani, who had already promised to leave thousands of American corpses in the region. According to the experience of warfare and organizational activities, Major General Esmail Kaani is not inferior to his predecessor – since 1997 he worked as deputy commander of the Al-Kods brigade.
The political orientation of the new commander is not yet known, but given that he worked for almost 20 years under the direct supervision of Soleimani, it can be assumed that the vision of the Middle East policy of the two generals is not much different.
On the other hand, if Soleimani has repeatedly demonstrated the diplomat’s flexibility and remarkable skills, it will not be easy to establish a constructive dialogue with his successor, who came in the wake of such an odious move by the United States. It should be noted that Kaani, associated with Soleimani not only in the Al-Qods leadership, but also in the years of the Iran-Iraq war, where their friendship was born, is also recognized by the United States as a terrorist, and the new appointment is unlikely to limit will reduce brigade activity.
It is also noteworthy that Kaani in Al-Kods successfully supplemented Soleimani – if the latter focused on actions on the western borders of Iran (in Iraq and Syria), the former was responsible for Afghanistan and Central Asia. Moreover, while Soleimani was the charismatic leader of the division, meanwhile Kaani was busy with everyday practical work.
Therefore, the new commander could be a more effective military leader than his predecessor. It is hardly worth expecting from him as vivid charisma as from Soleimani, on the one hand making him an icon for the Shiites of the whole world, but on the other, in many ways contributing to his death. However, in decisiveness, professionalism, combat and operational experience, he is not inferior to his deceased friend, colleague and boss.
Considering that Iran has been waging a proxy war with the United States in various regions of the Middle East for many years, one could assume an aggravation of the situation in Yemen, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and, of course, in Iraq, where its first signs already took place.
On January 4, a rocket landed near the US Embassy in Baghdad. On the same day, two more Katyusha rockets fell on the territory of the Balad US Air Force base. Moreover, the leadership of the Iran-controlled Kataib Hezbollah group appealed to the Iraqi army not to be near the US military in order to avoid possible consequences.
And on January 7, Iran fired rockets at two American bases on Iraqi territory. The base in Erbil was hit, as well as the Ein al-Assad object, the video of the destruction of which was published the next day by leading world media. Despite the fact that the United States, including through the mouth of an official statement made by President Donald Trump the day after the shelling, said that the American troops had not suffered losses, it’s hard to believe.
Despite the warning that the Americans allegedly received from Iraqi special services (which, in turn, were notified of the Iranian strike), no data were received on mass evacuation of American manpower, equipment, and infrastructure. Nevertheless, Washington decided not to play for an increase, limiting itself to the economic sanctions announced by Trump.
The leaderships of both countries are aware of the severity of the consequences of a direct military conflict and are likely to try to get by with minimal risks. As an indirect continuation of “revenge”, one can assume the actions of Iranian proxies, “hunting” for individual American officials or diplomats, however, the unleashing of full-scale hostilities is beyond the interests of both Washington, which has already won a “small victory”, and Tehran, which was noted as a “small victory” for its part ”and not having enough resources for the war.
At the same time, from the point of view of the image, Iran currently looks very preferable – not many countries of the world could decide to launch an open missile strike at American military facilities, while avoiding the consequences.
Iran could try to increase world oil prices – earlier they made such an attempt through the Yemeni Ansar Allah, which destroyed a significant part of the Saudi oil refining infrastructure with the help of drones. However, this is also unlikely at this stage. The possibility of drawing an Iranian oil card is well understood in the United States – that is why Trump in his statement separately focused on achieving US energy self-sufficiency. However, even if Iran’s oil is not important to Washington, for its allies in Europe this is a much more important issue.
In general, Iran does not tend to take drastic steps, and, in parallel with the voicing of generally quite militant statements, Tehran will seek a reasonable solution behind closed doors. It is possible that this will be an attempt to establish dialogue with the help of a mediator – as it was, for example, after the Iran-Iraq war. Such an intermediary can be both traditional Oman and Jordan, and, for example, Japan or European countries.
However, such a scenario may not suit the numerous supporters of Soleimani inside Iran, who belong to an extremely conservative camp. The fact is that on the eve of the elections, especially after the November events, protests, etc., the reformist government of Iran was under a hail of criticism and attacks from conservatives.
Therefore, if the government and President Rowhani decide to smooth the situation and not take revenge, then their situation in the country will be even more shaken. In addition, they will have to make really huge efforts to persuade the Supreme Leader of the country Ali Khamenei, whose close was the deceased Qassem Soleimani.
On the other hand, Soleimani and Al-Kods forces were repeatedly involved inside Iran to suppress opposition, in particular in the events of 1999. In this regard, the opposition part of Iranian society may be delighted to eliminate its adversary and scarecrow, but it is unlikely to dare to demonstrate this in the wake of universal grief – unlike some Iranians abroad who are openly happy about what happened. There are, however, those who react in the opposite way – including among opponents of the Iranian Islamic regime.
We should not forget about the long-standing contradictions between Soleimani and Rouhani against the background of the President’s reduction of the military budget of Iran and deductions to the IRGC, as well as the establishment of a dialogue between Tehran and the West. The confrontation between the head of government and the commander of Al-Kods manifested itself even during public meetings, when they repeatedly threw taunts at each other.
And yet, for an external audience, the entire Iranian political elite is now acting as a single camp. Iran is already looking for the right political solution in the international arena. In particular, there are attempts to create an anti-imperialist camp with neighboring Turkey. Relations between Washington and Ankara have been in deep crisis over the past few years, despite Turkey’s membership in NATO.
Given Turkish ambitions in the region, Erdogan is already making attempts to agree to such a change in the regional structure, condolencing Iran and urging Tehran to confront the United States. And, taking into account the fact that the Iran-Turkey-Russia alliance is alternative to the West, enshrined in the Astana format of negotiations on Syria, as well as in bilateral agreements.
Russian-American confrontation, is already operating in the region, it can be assumed that Moscow will not stand aside from changing realities . Perhaps this will be expressed in new Russian military or nuclear contracts with Iran, the supply of Iran’s latest Russian weapons, and, on favorable terms, for example, on credit or by installments (given Tehran’s acute shortage of funds), but, most importantly, it is demonstrative and open.
Currently, Iranian intelligence agencies are also investigating the existence of an “Israeli trace” in the assassination of Soleimani. And if it is found, without going into direct conflict with the United States, Iran is quite capable of “recouping” on its most important regional ally.
They also understand this in Tel Aviv – this can explain the panic that reigned in the state structures and law enforcement agencies of the Jewish state in the first hours after the American action, as well as the close patrolling of the Lebanese border by Israeli aircraft. Obviously, the most dangerous for the Israelis is the Iranian indirect response from Lebanon – by the Hezbollah forces.
(The views expressed in this article belong only to the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of World Geostrategic Insights)