As already clearly pointed out by Linda Restrepo, head of the prestigious Inner Sanctum Vector N360 magazine, before Trump was officially sworn in as the new president of the United States of America, he had already disrupted international geopolitics, proposing one after another the merger of the United States of America with Canada, the takeover of Greenland, the takeover of the Panama Canal, the renaming of the Gulf of Mexico as the “American Gulf,” and so on.
However, behind all these seemingly insane ideas lies the grand vision of turning the United States of America into the world leader. Indeed, the United States of America is the only country in the world that has a “corporate name” not localized to a part of a Continent (e.g., United States of Mexico, Italy, People’s Republic of China, Botswana, Australia, etc.), but to an entire Continent: “of America.”
Although many commentators have ridiculed these “crazy proposals”, when we insert the projects into international relations theory, it is not difficult to find that they are indeed reasonable to a certain extent. It is just that the regulations of recent decades have limited the international imagination of ordinary policymakers. Moreover, none of Trump’s suggestions are original, but are more or less based on history.
So, starting from the same idea, apart from these plans that have been unveiled, the United States of America has a different conception of international relations – as an example, throwing into the dustbin of history the silly claims of boorish Italian wrong way of thinking that deems one president to be left-wing (Biden) and one to be right-wing (Trump). Whoever Trump was, he would think that the following geographical expressions we will discuss could be considered candidates to join the United States of America.
The three island countries of the North Pacific: the Marshall Islands (181.5 sq. km; 41,996 inhabitants), the Federated States of Micronesia (707.1 sq. km; 106,194 inhabitants), and the Republic of Palau (489 sq. km; 17,989 inhabitants). These three island countries in the North Pacific are now members of the United Nations, but were once in the trusteeship of the United States of America until the White House signed the Compact of Free Association (CoFA; U.S. law since Nov. 13, 1986) with them, allowing them to become independent in disguise, as Washington takes care of their foreign affairs and defense. They are in practice independent in mockery, but rather in the manner of subspecies protectorates.
Simply put, the international community has long been unsure whether the United States of America still has sovereignty over the three countries, because the United States of America continues to manage the three geographical expressions through the Office of Insular Affairs, just as it did before signing the CoFA and just as it governs American Samoa.
Under CoFA, citizens of the three countries can work freely in the United States of America. This is a very special agreement. In short, no one would doubt that these three countries are simply semi-colonies of the United States of America. Such a vague state of independence is beneficial to both sides: the United States of America can have more votes in the international community and can let others do some things that it is not politically correct to do (dirty work like accepting unwanted detainees), which can reduce some governance costs while building good relations with the indigenous peoples of the Pacific.
However, in recent years, the People’s Republic of China has been actively infiltrating the Pacific Ocean as a springboard for potential interference in the backyards of the United States of America and Australia. Because these countries have scattered populations, abundant natural resources and large territorial waters, they have traditionally been the targets of China’s expanding sphere of influence.
At present, the Marshall Islands and the Republic of Palau have diplomatic relations with Taiwan, but Beijing’s influence is already everywhere on the islands. If the People’s Republic of China succeeds in getting the three North Pacific island countries to break away from the sphere of influence of the United States of America, or even sign a partnership agreement with the three countries, this would provide leverage to pull the United States of America away from the second island chain. But to think that these three countries have the strength to act against the interests of the motherland is practically impossible: just think of the end that the revolutionary government of Grenada met in 1983.
So Trump does not need to propose the merger of the three countries. He just needs to change the terms of CoFA and make the expulsion of forces that bother the White House an obligation of the three countries. This is enough to solve many problems. However, the most effective way to resolve the issue once and for all is to allow the three countries to become part of the territory of the United States of America.
Geographically and culturally, the three aforementioned countries, the U.S. Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (472 square kilometers; 49,551 inhabitants) and Guam (541 square kilometers; 153,836 inhabitants) all share the same language and ethnicity. If they were to unite into a single unit, it is possible that they could even become an “independent” state in the future.
For the citizens of the three countries, becoming a U.S. citizen is also a guarantee of their identity. In addition, their young and middle-aged citizens have already gone to the United States of America to work. As a result, Trump’s ideas about absorbing some so-called independent states and various colonies of his own and of third countries are nothing but an antemural against the plan that the People’s Republic of China has been planning for many years.
The United States of America in the first island chain has always used the Ryūkyū (from Chin. Liuqiu) Islands as one of its hubs. After World War II, the United States of America directly ruled the Ryūkyū Islands for a long time and even issued independent stamps on the island, which reinforced the ancient identity of the Ryūkyū Kingdom. It was only in 1972 that Okinawa Island was returned to the Japanese government, and this was the beginning of the dispute over the sovereignty of the Sensaku (cin. Diaoyu) Islands.
Nowadays, most people take it for granted that Okinawa is an inseparable part of Japan, and few know that when Washington handed those islands over to Japan, there was great impatience from the inhabitants, who expected independence.
Trump, as an elder, is very familiar with the history of the United States of America and must have deep memories of the years when his country ruled the Ryūkyū Islands. Do not underestimate this psychological state of the current U.S. president’s student memory: in the maps on which Trump studied as a boy, the Panama Canal Zone, the Ryūkyū Islands, the three North Pacific island countries, etc. etc. etc. were all territories of the United States of America.
It is not difficult to understand that he is aware that he wants to restore his homeland, which, as we said, does not have a regionally localized corporate name (i.e., state name).
Precisely because the main cause of the Sensaku (Diaoyu) Islands issue is the return to memory of the Ryūkyū (Liuqiu) Islands, in recent years the People’s Republic of China has made it clear that it supports the Ryūkyū independence movement and has begun to raise awareness among international law scholars to prove that Okinawa has not been Japanese territory since ancient times.
For Beijing, if the Ryūkyū became independent, it is natural that they would be affected by Chinese influence, and the Sensaku (Diaoyu) island issue would be easily resolved. This would mean that it would be the United States of America that would be sidelined: and this to Biden, Trump, and whoever comes next is not okay. U.S. military bases in Okinawa have never been very popular with the locals, who aspire to true independence.
Although they provide a great deal of foreign currency and economic incentives, conflicts with the civilian population still occur from time to time. Japan is a country governed by a parliamentary system. If the public continues to oppose U.S. military bases, the government must at least respond. But on the other hand, Trump needs the Japanese executive to take more responsibility for the common alliance, which means increasing military spending and protection fees while reducing the prices of bases used by the U.S. military.
This back-and-forth can easily lead to a gap in expectations and even allow the People’s Republic of China to take advantage of the situation. This set of problems is enough to substantially undermine the stability of the Asia-Pacific/Indian Ocean-Pacific region; structurally, in the long run, it could prove even more critical than the situation in the Taiwan Strait. Even if the People’s Republic of China unified Taiwan, it would not stop its influence, and Okinawa/Ryūkyū would have an ascendancy.
If Trump solves the problem from the highest source, the situation may suddenly become clear. This does not mean that the United States of America should support the Ryūkyū Independents to lead the independence movement or directly annex the island of Okinawa.
But the fact that the United States of America once directly and long-term governed the Ryūkyū Islands, as well as the long-term governance of the United States of America in the Panama Canal Zone, is providing the White House with a historical justification to protect their interests in order to declare a “return.” Therefore, the most logical solution-beyond various independents-is to permanently establish the U.S. military base in Okinawa without changing local sovereignty. Say the same for Taiwan, vis-à-vis the neighboring northeastern state for the island of Yonaguni, Japan’s westernmost island.
This is actually modeled after the U.S. military base at Guantánamo in Cuba: the United States of America controlled Cuba after the Spanish-American War of 1898. At that time, Cuba was a vassal state (formerly a Spanish colony), so Washington permanently leased Guantánamo.
However, after Fidel Castro’s victorious revolution (Jan. 1, 1959, this treaty was respected, allowing the Guantanámo base to be used by the U.S. military. If Trump, in his negotiations with Japan, uses the “blockade” of the Okinawa Island base as a protective tariff for the United States of America and skyrockets the price, regardless of how much he pays to the Japanese side, it will be a sure profit.
Another place Trump should consider for direct annexation by the United States of America is the British Indian Ocean Territory, which should not have been on the list. It was only because of the misguided actions of the British Labor government that it became an issue that could simply be addressed. These are the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT-British Indian Ocean Territory, 60 sq. km; over 5,000 inhabitants with the islands: Chagos, Diego Garcia, Pero Banhos, Salomon Islands, Three Brothers, Six Islands, Egmont Island).
Although the British Labor government has issued a joint announcement with the government of the Republic of Mauritius (islands: 2,007 sq. km; 1,223,427 inh.) to cede BIOT sovereignty to that republic, the two sides have not yet reached a final agreement because the new Mauritian government has upped the ante. For the United States of America, the strategic location of the U.S. military base BIOT is very important. It can be considered an important hub of the entire Indo-Pacific strategy. There is no other ideal base to monitor the entire Indian Ocean, and there is no possibility of giving up the BIOT base.
To get to the root of the problem, one must first examine the law. In 1966, the United Kingdom and the United States of America signed an agreement for U.S. use of Diego Garcia’s main island, BIOT, as a military base. There was no mention of any fee (i.e., it was free), but the UK received a one-time discount for the purchase of U.S. missiles in the same year. The agreement, valid for 50 years, was automatically renewed for 20 years, that is, until 2036, unless one of the parties proposed to end the cooperation. In other words, as tenants, the United States of America should have a say in the sudden transfer of sovereignty over the BIOT from Britain to Mauritius.
Just as in the business world, although sometimes the landlord sells his property along with the lease and the tenant must continue to pay rent to the new landlord, if the new landlord’s behavior seriously violates the original lease agreement between the old landlord and the tenant himself, the tenant may also have recourse against the new landlord. For example, if the agreement between the tenant and the old landlord is to rent the space to operate an upscale private art gallery, but the new landlord operates an equivocal space on the ground floor, and shady characters show up around every day, it would be unusual for the tenant not to complain.
When the United States of America leased BIOT from the United Kingdom, the agreement clearly stated that it would be used as a military base.
If Mauritius becomes the new owner this year and the U.S. lease as a tenant does not expire until 2036, even if it does not yet pay rent (which is already a big question), it could be affected by the “commercial” direction of the new owner. If Mauritius introduces forces hostile to the United States of America into the BIOT, as in the above case, where an equivocal room on the ground floor disturbs the tenant on the second floor, how can the United States of America continue to rely on this place as a military base?
Therefore, Trump actually has the motivation, qualifications and ability to consider this “agreement” as a “hostile takeover.” Although the U.S. is only a tenant, this characterization can be used to hold that the U.K. has breached the contract because it has not done its best to meet the conditions of the document, which runs from now until 2036, in accordance with the “national security” of U.S. military bases. If a party violates the contract, it can seek compensation or simply propose a new “agreement” to solve a number of problems. The new “agreement,” of course, provides that the UK, as the sovereign state of the BIOT, will directly sell the BIOTs to the United States of America.
In the future, if the peoples of Mauritius or Diego Garcia want to file a lawsuit or claim sovereignty, they can go directly to Trump, and the exhausted United Kingdom can get rid of this burden. The United States of America can also, in return, allow the United Kingdom to share the base for free. From the perspective of the UK’s interests, there is no room for refusal.
Trump has also proposed taking back the Panama Canal. In addition to asking the Panamanian government to reduce the price for the U.S. to use the canal, he was also concerned that the “hostile forces” of Li Ka-shing’s Cheung Kong Holdings of Xianggang (Hong Kong)-which controls ports on both ends of the Panama Canal-would become an entry point for the People’s Republic of China to infiltrate the U.S. backyard.
However, if this is the concern of the United States of America for “national security” in case of war, simply recapturing the Panama Canal does not seem to be enough. In the Caribbean – the aforementioned backyard of the United States of America – Trump has two other places to consider for “mergers” and “acquisitions”: the first is the independent Bahamas (13,939 sq. km.; 339,314 inhabitants).
The Bahamas is an independent sovereign country. Although their geopolitical importance is not as great as that of Panama, it is also an important gatekeeper (overseer at the entrance) of the United States of America. The Bahamas are only 80 kilometers from the Florida islands on the east coast of the United States of America, a distance that can certainly be swum back and forth. If hostile forces monitored the United States of America through the Bahamas, this would be a serious national security crisis.
It happens that Li Ka-shing’s Cheung Kong Holdings is also the founder of the Bahamas. It began investing heavily as early as the late 1990s, notably becoming the largest single shareholder in the strategic Freeport Container Terminal (the largest container port site, on the island of Grand Bahama) and currently controls about 2 percent of the national territory.
Since many essential goods are transported to the United States of America through the Bahamas, the United States of America has numerous security facilities in that archipelago and also fears that various contraband items may be smuggled in illegally from container terminals controlled by the “Hong Kong Chinese.” Demanding that the Bahamas expel Hong Kong forces or asking the Bahamas to join the United States of America as the 51st state is also in line with Trump’s thinking.
Another is the British colony with internal autonomy of the Turks and Caicos Islands (498 sq. km; 49,309 inhab.), one of the famous tax havens. Long ago Canada had plans to annex these small islands. In fact, the only economic industries there are dummy corporations for smuggling money, making the islands the ideal setting for many spy novels and movies.
The local legal system is British and the U.S. dollar is commonly used, which is quite similar to the Chinese principle of “one country, two systems” in Hong Kong. If the United States of America had wanted to merge with Canada, how could they have missed this Canadian “quasi-colony” in the Caribbean? Do not underestimate these seemingly insignificant islands. If the United States of America were to take them, they could completely recycle it at their total external financial disposal.
Trump seems to be very familiar with the history of the modern expansion of the United States of America. You should know that the present-day Virgin Islands of the United States (Virgin Islands of the United States: 348 sq. km; 87,146 pop.) were purchased in 1917 from Denmark, by the government of President Thomas Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924; pr.1913-21), under the pretext of concerns about wartime infiltration by hostile forces and the impact on the security of the nearby Panama Canal. Of course, the following question arises: based on the same logic, why can’t similar purchases take place today?
And we come to the Greenlandic issue. Trump understood perfectly well that the strategic location of Greenland (2,166,086 sq. km.; 56,699 inhabitants; since 1953 an integral part of the Danish Kingdom), has a fundamental importance in the geopolitics of melting Arctic glaciers. If we open the map, we will understand that if the United States of America gets Greenland, it has no reason to give up another Arctic place with a very similar identity to Greenland: the Svalbard Islands (60,299 sq. km; 3,042 inhab.; Norwegian, but unincorporated area of the country, not part of the Schengen area). Simply put, the sovereignty of Svalbard belongs to Norway, just as the sovereignty of Greenland currently belongs to Denmark, but Svalbard has an international treaty that establishes its special status.
Countries from all over the world can conduct business on the island, anyone can enter the area without a visa, and they have the right to reside and work there indefinitely. The only thing is that you cannot die there because the body cannot decompose. Norway’s sovereignty over the island is relatively limited. This arrangement is because the resources in the Arctic should belong to all mankind. It is only for administrative convenience that the countries agree to allow neighboring Norway to exercise limited governance.
In other words, the Svalbard Islands could be more easily subject to infiltration by some major powers than Greenland. And this is not a hypothesis, but an objective reality that has occurred. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union established some scientific bases in the Svalbard Islands, where Soviet citizens worked and conducted “educational research activities.” If a real war broke out, whoever got there first could use military installations to invade the Arctic territories of neighboring countries, and the United States of America, at any time.
During the 20th century, many Americans proposed to acquire Greenland and even considered the Svalbard Islands. Trump is also aware that if the Arctic Circle is to be the geopolitical hotspot of tomorrow, the Antarctic Circle will be no exception.
Since the discovery of Antarctica, the largest and even medium and small countries have hoisted their flags at the South Pole, each claiming partial sovereignty over Antarctica under the principles of occupation of terra nullius in international law. After a series of verbal battles, the countries finally signed the Antarctic Treaty in Washington on Dec. 1, 1959 among Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the South African Union (then dominion of the United Kingdom) and the Soviet Union. They reached a consensus to “freeze” the sovereignty claims of various countries and jointly conduct “scientific research exploration” in Antarctica.
However, the so-called “freeze” does not mean that countries “give up” their respective sovereignty claims in Antarctica. It all depends on who fires the first shot, and the Antarctic Treaty could die at any moment. Who in the world today is more likely than Trump to tear up the Antarctic Treaty and formally annex part of that territory?
Before claiming in the newspapers that Trump’s are “crazy proposals,” “ridiculous demands,” and so on, it is good to study history.
Author: Giancarlo Elia Valori – Honorable de l’Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France, Honorary Professor at the Peking University.
(The views expressed in this article belong only to the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of World Geostrategic Insights).