By Alfredo Toro Hardy
Among the global geostrategic trends, three stand out.
The first one is the strengthening of a revisionist axis that, at odds with the post-WWII rules-based liberal international order, aims at consolidating spheres of influence and geostrategic expansion. The second, is the strengthening of a series of converging international alliances whose objective is the preservation of the rules-based international order and the contention of the revisionist axis. The third, is the strengthening of a Western based far-right populist movement that aims at deconstructing the liberal international order. While the first two trends challenge each other, the third challenges the second of them from the inside.
The Revisionist Axis
According to Hal Brands “…revisionist actors -principally China, Russia and Iran- try to throw back American power and create their own spheres of influence (…) connections between revisionists actors are stronger than at any time in decades” (Brands, 2023). North Korea, a country that it’s leaving behind its international pariah status, has become one of the top four members of that axis. As Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Richard Fontaine add: “The four powers increasingly identify common interests, match up their rhetoric, and coordinate their military and diplomatic activities. Their convergence is creating a new axis of upheaval – a development that is fundamentally altering the geopolitical landscape (…) The growing cooperation among China, Iran, North Korea and Russia is fueled by their shared opposition to the Western-dominated global order, an antagonism rooted in their belief that that system does not accord them the status or the freedom of action they deserve (…) Their collective aim is to create an alternative to the current order, which they consider to be dominated by the United States”. (Kendall-Taylor and Fontaine, 2024). Not surprisingly, it has been argued that striking similarities exist between the emergence, interlinked relations and solidarity of the totalitarian regimes of the 1930s and today’s revisionist block (Brand, 2024).
China is the utmost economic and military rising power of the day. An industrial juggernaut, whose productive strength has translated into having the world’s largest war navy and a highly sophisticated conventional military arsenal. It has been argued that while U.S. manufacturing capacity has substantially diminished since the 1990s, that of China is as great today as that of the entire West combined. As an example, it is said that in 1995 the United States could produce about 30 times as many artillery shells as it can nowadays. (Smith, 2023). In 2021, China successfully experimented a low flying hypersonic missile able to fly at five times the sound speed within an indeterminate trajectory hard to detect. On top, China is in the process of passing from today´s 410 strategic nuclear warheads, to more than 1.000 in 2030 and 1.500 in 2035. The latter would be almost the same amount of strategic nuclear warheads that the U.S. possesses today. (Svastopulo and Hille, 2021; Faulconbridge 2023; Liberman, 2022).
Although in its war with Ukraine, Russia has proved out to be a disappointment in conventional military warfare and in relation to the quality of its conventional arsenal, its nuclear strength can never be underestimated. With around 5.889 nuclear warheads, of which 1,674 are deployed strategic ones, Russia tops the United States (who possesses 5,244 warheads and has around 1,674 deployed strategic ones). Moreover, Moscow’s advances on the development of a spaced-based nuclear weapon, designed to threaten America’s satellite network, has drawn high concerns in Washington. (Faulconbridge 2023; Barnes, Demirjian, Schmitt and Sanger, 2024).
North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, although at a totally different level, have also to be taken seriously. With 50 to 60 nuclear warheads deliverable on missiles, Pyongyang ranks amid the top three military players within the revisionist axis. Particularly, if its Hwansong-18 intercontinental ballistic missile, tested in December 2023, shows capable of reaching any part of the continental United States, as stated. In addition to such intercontinental ballistic missiles, North Korea’s strength includes the launching of a military satellite, the testing of an underwater nuclear drone, and a submarine launched cruise missile test. (Carlin and Hecker, 2024; Sue, 2024).
Iran, still a conventional military regional power, keeps advancing towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Although its allies have been battered by Israel, Iran keeps being a regional heavyweight with a network of non-state actors’ alliances and a military force of more than 1 million, susceptible to deterring any invasion of its territory. Its medium-range ballistic missile system includes the Sahab-3, the Emad-1 and the Seiiil, which can reach 2,000 kilometers. Meanwhile, its short-range system is formed by the Quiam-1, the Zolfaghar, the Shahab-2, and the Fateh that can reach from 300 to 750 kilometers. (Lamrani, 2020).
Dealing with a coalition of these four autocratic regimes is a daunting proposition. Especially so, for the following four reasons. First, each of them simultaneously disrupts and threatens America’s international led order in different regions of the world. Second, according to Thomas Schelling the confrontation between two nuclear superpowers, in parity conditions, is tantamount to that of two far west’s gunfighters: Whoever shoots first has the upper hand. This, because it can destroy a major proportion of its counterpart’s nuclear arsenal. This represents the current correlation of nuclear forces between the U.S. and Russia. (Fontaine, 2024). However, with China aiming at 1,500 strategic nuclear warheads, North Korea rapidly advancing in terms of its nuclear strength, and Iran moving towards the nuclear club, the existing equation will be substantially mismatched to America’s detriment. Third, this axis represents a new center of gravity where countries dissatisfied with the prevailing international order can turn to. In other words, it promotes an international system characterized by two increasingly organized and competitive orders. Fourth, the members of this axis can alternatively coordinate their actions or benefit from the actions of any of the others. In this last regard, U.S.’ Deputy National Security Advisor Matthew Pottinger says: “The effects of prolonging that war [in Ukraine] would be [for China] to drain the US Treasury and our munition stockpile, to create enormous strain on Europe and to see whether it can foment disunity (…) and to create a major distraction at a time that Xi’s getting his military and society geared up for war over Taiwan”. (Sciutto, 2024, p. 80).
Liberal International Order’s Web
In order to confront the increasing disruption of the rules-based liberal international order by the above axis, Washington and its allies have forcefully built a containment shield. The same has been particularly notorious in relation to Moscow and Beijing. The U.S.’ European alliances significantly strengthened after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Washington’s firm reaction to it had important consequences. It not only showed to NATO allies that its leadership was still indispensable, but made it clear that it had the determination to exercise said leadership. Washington has, indeed, led in response to the invasion, in the revitalization of NATO and in its articulation, in the sanctions against Russia, and in the organization of the help provided to Ukraine. It has also been Kiev’s main source of support in military equipment and intelligence, deciding at each step of the road what kind of armament should be supplied to the Ukrainian forces. In short, before European allies that had doubted Washington’s commitments to their continent, and of the viability of NATO itself, America proved up to be the indispensable superpower.
Alliances in the Indo-Pacific have also been strengthened and expanded. The number of initiatives to keep China at bay have been numerous. The U.S., Japan, Australia and India created a strategic quadrilateral forum known as the Quad, which is nonother than a factual alliance aimed at the contention of China. More formally, Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, gave birth to a military strategic alliance, the AUKUS, with the same purpose. On its side, Japan and Australia signed a security cooperation agreement. Leaving aside its restrained postwar defense policy, Japan decided to duplicate its defense budget, taking it to 2 percent of its GDP. This will transform Japan into number three worldwide in terms of military spending, just behind the U.S. and China. Within the same context, Japan and the U.S. established a joint command to its military forces, while agreeing to create a shared littoral regiment equipped with the most modern anti-ships missiles.
Passing over its mutual long standing mistrust, Japan and South Korea, jointly with the U.S., established a trilateral framework aimed at promoting a rules-based Indo-Pacific region. On the same token, Japan, the Philippines and the U.S. held a first-ever trilateral summit aiming at defense cooperation and economic partnership. After several fruitless years attempting to mollify China’s position in relation to their maritime dispute in the South China Sea, the Philippines decided to renew its Mutual Defense Treaty with the U.S., which had elapsed in 2016. Although pledging to remain neutral, even Vietnam, a traditional de facto ally of China, decided to upgrade its diplomatic relations with Washington to the highest level.
America’s several decades’ policy of “strategic ambiguity” in relation to Taiwan evaporates, as a result of China’s increasing threats and harassment against the island. On top of an unambiguous support to Taipei by the President and Congress, the Pentagon has formulated a military doctrine for going in its defense in case of invasion. The idea of defending Taiwan, if invaded, it’s beginning to take shape in Japan as well.
The European Union adhered to the U.S., the United Kingdom and Canada, in sanctioning the Chinese authorities involved in human right abuses in Xinjiang. Equally, and for the same reasons, the European Parliament refused to ratify the longtime negotiated investment agreement between China and the European Union. Significantly, European contacts with Taiwan have increased as its democratic nature and China’s harassment over it, are providing a new light on the subject. Within that context, Taiwan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs was officially received by the European Parliament. Both France and Germany sent warships to navigate in the South China Sea in defiance of Beijing’s claimed ownership of 90 percent of it. Moreover, NATO’s updated “Strategic Concept” document, which outlines primary threats to the alliance, identified China for the first time as a direct threat to its security: “The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values (…) It strives to subvert the rules-based international order, including in the space, cyber and maritime domains (…)The deepening strategic partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to our values and interests”. (NATO, 2022). Not surprisingly, NATO’s last summit included the presence of the heads of state and government of Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea.
Far-right illiberal populism
While the two above trends show their respective strength, a third one also materializes. In different parts of the world, with particular reference to the United States and Europe where the impact is larger, a powerful far-right populist movement shakes the liberal order. Both America and Europe, indeed, are besieged by an illiberal extreme right. One, which is both nationalist and “civilizationism”. The former because it’s at odds with internationalism, globalization, and any form of cosmopolitan worldview. As such, it is isolationist and anti-European (against European integration). In the case of the U.S. it is clearly isolationist: “The GOP is becoming the isolationist party (…) By more than two to one, Republicans endorse the view that ‘We should pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate on problems here at home’. Only 30 percent of Republicans believe ‘It is best for the future of our country to be active in world affairs’. Whenever a policy becomes difficult or costly, isolationisms emerge” (Schneider, 2022).
The latter (“civilizationist”), because it views itself as the expression of a white Christian civilization threatened by nonwhite immigrants (Kundnani, 2024). This takes form through theories like that of the “Anxiety of White Extinction” in the United States (Perry, 2018) or the “Great Replacement” in France (Sowerwine, 2018, p. 460).
On the other hand, it promotes a group of ultra conservative ideas at odds, among others, with tolerance towards sexual diversity, moral relativism, and same-sex partnerships and marriages. Within this context, Vladimir Putin’s emphasis on traditional family values has transformed him into the idol of far-right populists. These values were highlighted in his February 29, 2024 state of the nation address: “Some countries deliberately destroy norms of morality, institutions and family, push whole peoples towards extinction and degeneration”. (Luchenko, 2024). In Franklin Foer words: “But right-wing leaders around the world -from Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines to Nigel Farage in Britain, to Donald Trump in the U.S.- now speak of Putin in heroic terms”. (Foer, 2017).
However, the reason why Putin is seen with admiration by extreme right populists, goes beyond his “traditional family values”. In Ronal Brownstein words: “But conservative-populist nationalists in both the United States and Europe view Putin as a potential ally (…) European populist parties share a common set of priorities focused on restricting immigration, unwinding global economic and political integration (by renouncing the European Union, and, for some of these parties, NATO as well), taking tougher steps to fight Islamic radicalism, and, in most cases, opposing cultural liberalism and secularization at home. On all those fronts, they view Putin not as a threat, but as an ally”. (Brownstein, 2017).
The growing strength of this populist far-right is exemplified by the following. Firstly, Donald Trump’s razor thin competition for November’s presidential election, where he could perfectly well emerge as the winner. Secondly, the high possibility of France’s Marine Lepen winning the presidency in 2027. Thirdly, the fact that both in Hungary and Italy the far-right controls government, while in Netherlands, Finland and Croatia, it is part of governing coalitions. Fourthly, both in France and in Sweden far-right parties, although not within government coalitions, are instrumental in keeping the current governments in place. Fifthly, the far-right arrived in first place in Austria’s parliamentary elections of last month. Sixthly, in recent elections held in Portugal and Slovakia, far-right parties significantly increased their voting percentage. Seventhly, the far right recently won Germany’s regional elections in Saxony, Brandenburg and Thuringia. Eighthly, in the European Union’s parliamentary elections, far-right parties substantially increased their percentual share within the European Parliament. In several cases, they obtained the majority of the votes within their respective countries (i.e., France, Germany, Netherlands or Austria).
It has to be added that Russia’s invasion has impacted its American and European friends in different ways. Trump and a majority of the Republican Party have refused to support Ukraine. Moreover, the former President called the invasion “savvy” and the action of a “genius”. Moscow’s European allies, on their part, divided themselves in two groups. Hungary’s Fidesz, Germany’s AfD, Slovakia’s Republika, Romania’s Alliance for the Union, Bulgaria’s Revival, Austria’s Freedom Party, Belgium’s Flemish Interest, Italy’s Northern League, Poland’s Party of Freedom or France’s Rassemblement National, remained sympathetic to Russia and refused to vote within the European Parliament on policies punishing or criticizing Russia. With the exception of Hungary’s Fidesz (which has no grouping affiliation), all the above-mentioned parties are members of the European Parliament’s Identity and Democracy (ID) group. However, the far-right European Conservatives and Reformist group (ECR), home to Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s party, has supported sanctions against Russia and aid to Ukraine. Within this latter group, and besides Meloni’s Brothers of Italy, are also Poland’s Law and Justice, Spain’s Vox, Sweden’s Sweden Democrats or Romania’s Alliance for the Union of Romanians.
However, and notwithstanding this division between the ID and the ECR groups in relation to Ukraine’s invasion, they both aim at the deconstruction of the European post-war liberal establishment. In this regard, even the ECR’s members retain a significant convergence of interests with Putin’s Russia. (Lindstaedt, 2024; Van Rij, 2024). Not surprisingly, as Natasha Lindstaedt argued: “Vladimir Putin looks to be the big winner from the far-right surge in the recent European Parliament election”. (Lindstaedt, 2024).
Fighting on two fronts at the same time
The three above mentioned trends are involved in a highly dynamic interaction. As Fareed Zakaria writes: “There are increasing indications that this ‘axis’ of revisionists powers is coordinating and helping one another (…) The United States and its allies must try to thwart these efforts of coordination. But this will require that they themselves be unified” (Zakaria, 2024). Needless to say, if right-wing populism prevails in the Western World, not only coordination against the revisionist powers would be utterly derailed, but the liberal international order might be blown to pieces as well.
The balance of future events lies, to a significant extent, in the result of the U.S.’ November election. If Trump is the winner, the Western liberal international order will likely begin to crumble. His anti-NATO standing, his isolationism, his perception of the European Union as an economic foe, his transactional approach to Indo-Pacific allies where money matters more than geopolitics, his soft-spot for illiberal strong rulers, all will connive in that direction. On top, the U.S. would find natural allies within the cohort of like-minded far-right European populists. This could not only boost the political strengthening of the latter, but induce a new configuration of Western strategic illiberal alliances.
Conversely, if Kamala Harris prevails next November, the Western liberal international order will stand its ground. Not only the U.S.’ web of international alliances will be able to remain in place, but America’s credibility as the indispensable superpower would be temporarily reinforced. Moreover, a new period of strategic convergence between Washington and London could naturally take shape, which as in past occasions might have a multiplier effect upon other actors, helping define a prevailing narrative (this of course could be hampered by the U.K.’s current weakened position). The European far-right’s surge, even if not deterred, would at least not be encouraged. On the same token, domestic far-right populism, although weakened by a Harris triumph, would not be defeated.
Things, though, don’t look bright for the liberal international order. In the worst-case scenario, it might be blown to pieces from the inside. In the best-case scenario, it would have to stand its ground not only against anti-Western rivals, but also against Western illiberal forces. The daunting task of containing the revisionist axis, is thus compounded by the need to deal with revisionist forces from within.
As such, the international liberal order might be defeated by the growing strength of its foreign foes, by the success of its internal detractors, or as a result of its own implosion, brought over by the combined impact of increasing external and internal pressures. At this point in time, its failure, although far from being preordained, looks more plausible than its long-term success. This would seem the natural outcome of having to fight simultaneously at its front and at its rear.
Author: Alfredo Toro Hardy, PhD – Retired Venezuelan career diplomat, scholar and author. Former Ambassador to the U.S., U.K., Spain, Brazil, Ireland, Chile and Singapore. Author or co-author of thirty-six books on international affairs. Former Fulbright Scholar and Visiting Professor at Princeton and Brasilia universities. He is an Honorary Fellow of the Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations and a member of the Review Panel of the Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Center.
(The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of World geostrategic Insights).
Image Source: AFP (A Chinese Coast Guard vessel (L) blocks a chartered supply boat on a mission to deliver provisions to a grounded Philippine Navy vessel at Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea.