Interview with Nabil Ali Al-Atum
The UN General Assembly vividly demonstrated that the US and Iran are still determined to confront each other in the process of regional dominance, especially after attacks on oil facilities in Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, Tehran is open for dialogue with its ideological opponents. In particular, the Iranian Coalition of Hope, initiative for a new security regional alliance, seeks to alleviate tensions in the Middle East, which would put the Gulf countries in an extremely vulnerable position, since if Washington would adopt the Iranian proposal, they would lose the opportunity to put pressure on the Ayatollah regime. Meanwhile, it seems that the Arab countries and the United States are trying to drive Tehran into a loop.
Especially for World Geostrategic Insights, Jordanian political expert on Iran, Nabil Ali Al-Atum, answered our questions.
1. On the eve of the summit of the UN General Assembly, the Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif came up with the initiative to conclude a new nuclear deal, which would complement the agreement boycotted by the White House administration in 2018. According to the terms of the new deal, Tehran is ready to give the international community the right to carry out more detailed monitoring of Iranian developments in the field of nuclear energy. In addition, the Ayatollah regime is ready to join the project banning the production and use of nuclear weapons. In turn, Washington pledges at the legislative level to lift economic sanctions against Iran. Does this mean that through mutual concessions Washington and Tehran intend to neutralize the tension between them and soften each other’s militaristic rhetoric? It is worth noting that in the case of the implementation of the new agreement, Iran actually abandons its plans for uranium enrichment, which raises the question of what to do with the volumes of uranium that has been enriched in Tehran recently. Does Iran intend to create a repository for unauthorized radioactive material, or will the material be transferred to the IAEA members for subsequent disposal under the terms of the transaction? When Saddam Hussein concluded a similar agreement with Washington, this did not prevent the White House administration from violating the agreements reached and overthrowing the Iraqi leader. Is it possible to repeat this scenario with respect to the Ayatollah regime? Will Washington comply with the terms of the new agreement regarding the abolition of economic pressure on Tehran, or will this agreement be another ploy to mislead the Iranian leadership and the international community in order to overthrow the Ayatollah regime?
– In accordance with the nuclear deal, Iran reduced its uranium reserves by 98 percent to 300 kilograms over 15 years and committed to bring the enrichment level to 3.67 percent. However, this deal seems to allow Iran to resume enrichment. For this, Tehran created two plants, Natanz and Fordo, where there are centrifuges equipped with gas, uranium hexafluoride, necessary for a chemical reaction. A number of Iranian officials, including President Rouhani, said Iran would not sell enriched uranium, despite a nuclear deal stipulating that Iran would limit its reserves. Moreover, most of the surplus radioactive material of Iranian origin is and will be located in other countries: the United States and, possibly, Russia and China.
Washington may resort to the scenario of overthrowing the Iranian regime. The Iranians are well aware that in such a war they lose, no matter what army they put up against their opponents. And that is exactly what happened to Saddam Hussein. However, the United States currently does not have the necessary regional bases for invading Iran, destroying its armed forces, eradicating the revolutionary regime in Tehran and controlling the country in favor of a more pliable new government.
Any US invasion of Iran will require the deployment of the US military in Iraq, but this will require another war for regime change against the current government in Baghdad. Alternatively, Washington could improve some conditions of deployment at military bases by penetrating Iran by sea.mBut that would make US troops extremely vulnerable to Iranian ballistic missiles. Moreover, this will not solve the problem of post-conflict occupation of the country.
Tehran’s opponents are most likely developing a scenario for a military campaign to change the ayatollah regime, which is likely to be aimed at undermining Iran’s economic stability in the hope of provoking popular discontent and counter-revolution. Instead of a full-scale invasion, this scenario will mean that the United States will try to catalyze the regime’s collapse through a policy of military and economic strangulation combined with air strikes and the active use of special operations forces.
The campaign to stifle the economy will largely depend on US financial and trade instruments to limit Iran’s trade with the rest of the world.
Thus, the White House administration does not plan to fulfill the terms of either the new nuclear deal that the Iranian leadership proposed on the eve of the UN General Assembly or the old nuclear agreement of 2015. Washington never pursued such a goal. Its task is to “squeeze” everything that is possible from Iran so that the Ayatollah’s regime collapses as a result of the depletion of its own resources.
2. Is the initiative proposed by Javad Zarif to conclude a new nuclear deal exclusively an Iranian project, or was this initiative under pressure from the United States? Who was afraid of whom: Washington or Tehran? More recently, Iran rejected any negotiations with the White House administration, while the United States was ready to conduct a dialogue “without preconditions.” Why is the situation now changed?
– The origin of the crisis between the USA and Iran is connected not only with nuclear business, but also with Iranian politics, which is due to a whole range of reasons.
The first reason is the behavior of Washington and Tel Aviv towards Iran, when any argument is used to put pressure on Iran.
In addition to the nuclear issue, the US is concerned about Shiite activity under the auspices of the Ayatollah regime. Iran believes that it is fulfilling a global mission and does not agree to restrictions. In this regard, he is irreconcilable with respect to any pressure carried out against him. This is the basis of the problem of Iran with the US allies in the Persian Gulf (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain), caused by the fragility of a number of Arab states after the entry of coalition forces under the leadership of the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as after the reconfiguration of the Middle East.
Proponents of the Conditional Dialogue Initiative in Tehran, partly because of a split in Iran’s ruling class and the institutions that make decisions between the tough, conservative and revolutionary movements, are determined to integrate into the international community, take advantage of the nuclear agreement and avoid a new wave of sanctions. While Iran’s demand for Washington’s return to a nuclear deal, which he unilaterally refused, is unlikely to be accepted by the US president, Tehran is not expected to enter into dialogue on a new deal that set the task of rehabilitating the previous agreement and putting it at the head angle of their diplomatic priorities. Not assuring Tehran that it will receive a better deal, it seems that intermediaries will have to look for another way to pacify Iran.
3. US. President Donald Trump and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson on September 23, 2019 in response to a proposal from Javad Zarif announced the need to conclude a new nuclear agreement in the near future on the terms proposed by Iran. At the same time, it was not by chance that Washington and London launched a message in the international information space that Iran was the main culprit for attacks on oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, and therefore pressure on Tehran is unlikely to be mitigated, since the countries of the anti-Iranian coalition still set to overthrow the Ayatollah regime at all costs. In addition, Riyadh recently stated that Tehran’s attack on Aramco’s facilities is an “act of war.” And if, after such accusations, Iran will again come under pressure from the United States and its allies, the new nuclear deal loses all meaning, since it is obvious that Washington will most likely not comply with it. In this regard, is it advisable under such conditions to conclude a new US-Iran agreement? Would it not be logical on the part of Javad Zarif to propose to Donald Trump not only a new nuclear deal, but also demand Iran’s justification in investigating the circumstances of the attack on Saudi oil facilities?
– Despite the fact that Tehran demanded a fair and comprehensive nuclear agreement with Washington, he rejected allegations of responsibility for the attack on Saudi Arabia. In turn, Riyadh did not provide evidence of Iran’s involvement in the attack on two areas of oil production and refining in its eastern regions.
Whatever the nuclear agreement, it was practically impossible, which indicates that the format of such agreements does not meet the expectations and capabilities of the parties. Therefore, the agreement itself loses all meaning. Meanwhile, in a situation where the Ayatollah regime is under pressure for any reason, the new nuclear agreement is unlikely to change anything. And since Tehran and Washington might not have concluded an agreement at all, focusing on solving the most acute problems of ensuring navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, tensions between the countries will only increase.
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