By Denis Korkodinov
Relations between Ankara and Tehran may receive additional impetus if the parties can forget about the mutual grievances caused to each other in the past.
Since the 6th century, Turkish-Iranian relations have been an almost equal partnership. At the same time, the regular migration of Turkic tribes to the territory of the Persian’s original residence promoted mutual dialogue between the Turkic and Persian peoples, which, in turn, left an imprint on the culture of Persia. In addition, the concentration of the Turks on the Persian territory led to the formation of a fairly stable Turkic diaspora in Iran.
As a result of a series of bloody wars between the countries, the Turks and Persians came to the conclusion that it was expedient to coexist peacefully with each other. This led to the appearance of the Zukhab Treaty of 1639, according to which clear boundaries between Turkey and Iran were defined.
In this regard, it would be erroneous to assert that bilateral relations had an extremely positive dynamic. The Turks and Persians fought each other, then reconciled, and then fought again. However, after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the Ayatollah regime began to consider the Turkish factor as the leading potential threat. However, Turkey did not exclude the possibility of open confrontation with Iran.
Significant changes in relations occurred after 2002, when the “Justice and Development Party” that came to power began to actively develop a policy of “zero problems with neighbors”. This policy primarily concerned Tehran, the conflict with which was a major problem for the increasingly popular Recep Erdogan.
Thus, Ankara and Tehran were in a state of forced cooperation. This was due primarily to the need to neutralize the political ambitions of the Kurds in Iraq and Syria, where Iran and Turkey had their own interests. Thus, according to Iranian officials, the separatist tendencies of Iraqi Kurds could jeopardize the influence of Shiites in the region, which the ayatollah regards as allies. In turn, Ankara is also concerned about the excessive political activity of the Kurds, who, from the point of view of Turkish politicians, are a source of regional instability.
This state of affairs was the main reason for the rapprochement between Turkey and Iran. One of the first manifestations of this convergence was the visit of the representative of the General Staff of Iran, Mohammad Bagheri, to Ankara in August 2017. During this visit, the parties agreed on joint actions, including military ones, against the Kurdish armed formations.
Meanwhile, the Turkish-Iranian alliance inspires fear for the majority of Arab states, for whom the Shiite regime Ayatollah and Ankara, which maintains relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, are sources of increased danger. However, the activity of the Arab coalition caused concern in both Turkey and Iran. This was especially evident after the start of the American-Iranian confrontation, when Riyadh and other members of the Arab alliance began to put pressure on the Ayatollah regime, while Ankara sharply criticized such pressure.
Despite this, Turkey has a number of fundamental differences with Tehran. So, for example, Syria is the main stumbling block. Recep Erdogan still insists on a change of political leader in Syria, which is contrary to the interests of Iran, which seeks to ensure the status quo. The failure to agree on Syrian issues led to the fact that in 2015 Iranian President Hassan Rouhani publicly collapsed with insults to the Turkish leader. In response, Recep Erdogan accused the Ayatollah regime of destructiveness.
Among other things, Iraq is a stumbling block. The increased political influence of the Shiite government Nuri al-Maliki contributed to the marginalization of the Sunnis in Iraq, in connection with which Ankara felt its vulnerability. In turn, Tehran did not intend to change the existing state of affairs, giving the local Sunnis, who are supported by Turkey, privileges in the political and economic life of the country. Under the influence of Tehran, official Baghdad made Turkey demand to close its military base in Bashik, located in northern Iraq. This led to an international scandal, in which Recep Erdogan sharply criticized the Iraqi government.
Thus, relations between Turkey and Iran can not be called cloudless. There are ups and downs. At the same time, on a number of specific issues, related primarily to the prevention of external threats, and the economy, the parties may find a compromise.
(The views expressed in this article belong only to the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of World Geostrategic Insights)