Slaviša Milačić
Why the Armenian army proved weaker and what mistakes were made in preparing for military operations are issues under discussion after the Nagorno-Karabakh war.
Namely, this war was only partially “Blitzkrieg”, as it was called, because the attacks that tested the Armenian defense began in 2016 and were repeated periodically. There was also the preparation for this operation, for which the elite paratrooper brigade of the Azerbaijani army, which together with other units formed a corps of 25,000 soldiers, was transferred to the front line.
Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh had to think about what was happening in the summer, when sporadic exchanges of fire began along almost the entire front line. However, the Armenian structures responsible for national security have not adequately assessed it. Azerbaijan gradually formed two attack corps in which it gathered the most ready units of its army, including parts of the deep reserve. Warehouses were also built closer to the nip and a fuel supply system was established. All of this could be seen simply through binoculars, without even having to resort to complex reconnaissance operations.
Furthermore, the Armenian secret services did not provide the country’s political leadership with an accurate assessment of what weapons and in what quantities Azerbaijan was buying. Based on the analysis of these acquisitions, Armenia and Karabakh could have built a model of military tactics to counter what Baku was preparing. First of all, this applies to imported drones and self-propelled artillery that supports offensive battle groups. This alone would have been enough for the Armenian army to understand what they are planning on the other side of the front. Psychologically, both Karabakh and Armenia have relied on memories of the 1994 victory over Azerbaijan. Despite the obvious numerical and qualitative superiority of the Azerbaijani army, a legend lives on in Stepanakert and Yerevan. This attitude towards Azerbaijan has led to a loss of vigilance.
Another circumstance is very important. Over the past year, the Armenian army has minimized military contacts with Russia, and all contacts in the intelligence sphere of the two countries have also been decreased, and this was done at the initiative of the political leadership of Armenia . Nikol Pashinyan “decapitated” the military and intelligence leadership and placed Russophobes in key positions, who did not see the construction of military depots and the transfer of entire Azerbaijani corps to the line of contact this summer. Over the past six months, Armenia’s General Staff has been subjected to mass layoffs of officers who in their time graduated from the Moscow Military Academy and subsequently went there for further training.
In addition to the above, new weapons have been poorly purchased, especially for air defense, which plays a crucial role in modern wars. The Karabakh air defense system consists mainly of 9K33 Osa (tactical short range low altitude surface-to-air missile system), Strela-10 (visually targeted short-range surface-to-air missile system), 2K12 Kub (low to mid-level air defense system designed to protect ground forces from air strikes).
However, all of these systems are manufactured in the Soviet Union and are now obsolete. These air defense systems would be useful in protecting the country from the “old format” of Azerbaijani aviation. Very soon it was discovered that this war was something very specific, due to its massive use of drones, kamikaze drones, kamikaze aerial missiles. In this regard, special emphasis must be placed on the Bayraktar TB2 (Turkish unmanned aerial vehicle of medium altitude of long duration capable of remote controlled or autonomous flight operations) and the Israeli Harop IAI Harop (drone kamikaze) .
Thanks to the irresponsible policy of the Armenian government led by Nikol Pashinyan, almost nothing has been done to tactically oppose Azerbaijan. Furthermore, there have been incredible examples of corruption, bordering on treason.
Some high-ranking individuals (officials and officials) have come forward accusing Prime Minister Pashinyan and some of his colleagues of fraud and bribery (for personal financial gain) regarding arms trafficking. Such allegations include the Armenian prime minister’s alleged attempts to make money from his defense ministry.
Without going into too much detail, a Pashynian colleague would buy military hardware in Russia or elsewhere at a discount and then resell it at a higher price to anyone willing to buy it. This would include the Armenian military which as a result may have ended up paying too much for some of its more recent acquisitions.
Regardless of whether those allegations are real or not, it is clear that one couldn’t help but raise an eyebrow at the Armenian military procurement and recent hardware purchase. The greatest example of all dates back to January 2020, when Pashynian announced that Yerevan had purchased 35 units of the 9k33 OSA short-range tactical SAM for the special price of $ 27 million.
Those SAM batteries were apparently the second hand ones Jordan bought from the Soviet Union in … 1983! We are talking about OSA-AK or OSA-AKM produced in the late 70’s and early 80’s! Those batteries had actually been withdrawn from Amman as they were deemed obsolete!
Those batteries should have been modernized by the Armenian defense industry before being put into service. One has to wonder how many components had to be modified / modernized on such old systems: OSA was designed in the 1960s! The AKM variant is also nearly 40 years old! The radar and fire systems must have been pretty useless. And the missiles, stored in their transport / launch containers, must have reached the end of their useful life by some time! When you take this into account, you realize that $ 27 million for those 35 units is pure corruption.
So … all those outdated platforms were completely updated before the war started (they had 9 months to do it)? Well, the Armenian lists 15 OSA batteries destroyed. The Azeris list 40 neutralized. We know that the Armenian Ministry of Defense downplayed its losses while the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense grossly overestimated its “killings”. So the truth is between these two figures. The former Armenian chief of staff called the OAS “useless” and admitted that the 9k33 batteries failed to shoot down a single drone. There are images of Armenian OSA batteries deployed during the war still sporting their Jordanian camouflage …
Despite everything, Azerbaijan had 2,783 soldiers killed, with another 100 missing. Which means that Azerbaijan’s casualties amounted to nearly 2,900 soldiers. At the same time, Armenian casualties are estimated at around 2,317 soldiers..These data show us that the main reason for the defeat of the Armenians has been the inability of their political leadership to prepare the army for war.
How long the new situation will last, how things will turn out, depends on many factors, including Armenia’s ability to help keep Nagorno-Karabakh in the new condition and, of course, the new diplomatic approach that will promote a political solution for Nagorno-Karabakh. Because, despite everything, after this war, regarding a long-term and sustainable solution for this territory, nothing has been resolved. Azerbaijan is in a better position now than before, but the solution has yet to be negotiated.
Author: Slaviša Milačić – Historian and independent analyst. Montenegro
(The views expressed in this article belong only to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy or views of World Geostrategic Insights).
Image Credit: AFP